

WILEY FINANCE

FOURTH EDITION

# Financial Statement Analysis Workbook

*A Practitioner's Guide*

MARTIN FRIDSON  
FERNANDO ALVAREZ





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*Financial Statement Analysis, Fourth Edition*

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# Financial Statement Analysis Workbook

*Step-by-Step Exercises and  
Tests to Help You Master  
Financial Statement Analysis*

Fourth Edition

MARTIN FRIDSON  
FERNANDO ALVAREZ



WILEY

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*In memory of my father, Harry Yale Fridson, who  
introduced me to accounting, economics, and logic,  
as well as the fourth discipline essential to the  
creation of this book—hard work!*

M. F.

*For Shari, Virginia, and Armando.*

F. A.



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# Preface to Fourth Edition Workbook

This fourth edition of *Financial Statement Analysis*, like its predecessors, seeks to equip its readers for practical challenges of contemporary business. Once again, the intention is to acquaint readers who have already acquired basic accounting skills with the complications that arise in applying textbook-derived knowledge to the real world of extending credit and investing in securities. Just as a swiftly changing environment necessitated extensive revisions and additions in the second edition, new concerns and challenges for users of financial statements have accompanied the dawn of the twenty-first century.

For one thing, corporations have shifted their executive compensation plans increasingly toward rewarding senior managers for “enhancing shareholder value.” This lofty-sounding concept has a dark side. Chief executive officers who are under growing pressure to boost their corporations’ share prices can no longer increase their bonuses by goosing reported earnings through financial reporting tricks that are transparent to the stock market. They must instead devise more insidious methods that gull investors into believing that the reported earnings gains are real. In response to this trend, we have expanded our survey of revenue recognition gimmicks designed to deceive the unwary.

Another innovation that demands increased vigilance by financial analysts is the conversion of stock market proceeds into revenues. In terms of accounting theory, this kind of transformation is the equivalent of alchemy. Companies generate revenue by selling goods or services, not by selling their own shares to the public.

During the Internet stock boom of the late 1990s, however, clever operators found a way around that constraint. Companies took the money they raised in initial public offerings, bought advertising on one another’s web sites, and recorded the shuttling of dollars as sales. Customers were superfluous to the revenue recognition process. In another variation on the theme, franchisers sold stock, lent the proceeds to franchisees, then immediately had the cash returned under the rubric of fees. By going out for a short stroll and coming back, the proceeds of a financing mutated into revenues.

The artificial nature of these revenues becomes apparent when readers combine an understanding of accounting principles with a corporate

finance perspective. We facilitate such integration of disciplines throughout *Financial Statement Analysis*, making excursions into economics and business management as well. In addition, we encourage analysts to consider the institutional context in which financial reporting occurs. Organizational pressures result in divergences from elegant theories, both in the conduct of financial statement analysis and in auditors' interpretations of accounting principles. The issuers of financial statements also exert a strong influence over the creation of the financial principles, with powerful politicians sometimes carrying their water.

A final area in which the new edition offers a sharpened focus involves success stories in the critical examination of financial statements. Wherever we can find the necessary documentation, we show not only how a corporate debacle *could have been* foreseen through application of basic analytical techniques, but also how practicing analysts actually did detect the problem before it became widely recognized. Readers will be encouraged by these examples, we hope, to undertake genuine, goal-oriented analysis, instead of simply going through the motions of calculating standard financial ratios. Moreover, the case studies should persuade them to stick to their guns when they spot trouble, despite management's predictable litany. ("Our financial statements are consistent with generally accepted accounting principles. They have been certified by one of the world's premier auditing firms. We will not allow a band of greedy short-sellers to destroy the value created by our outstanding employees.") Typically, as the vehemence of management's protests increases, conditions deteriorate and accusations of aggressive accounting give way to revelations of fraudulent financial reporting.

The principles and theories put forth in the University Edition of *Financial Statement Analysis*, fourth edition, are reinforced through the questions and exercises in this workbook. Part One, Questions, provides chapter-by-chapter fill-in-the-blank questions, financial statement exercises, and computational exercises. They are designed to be thought-provoking exercises requiring analysis and synthesis of the concepts covered in the book. In short, these questions do not call for "regurgitation of information."

The answers to all questions can be found in Part Two. Answers are provided in *boldfaced, italic type* in order to facilitate the checking of answers and comprehension of the material.

Financial markets continue to evolve, but certain phenomena appear again and again in new guises. In this vein, companies never lose their resourcefulness in finding new ways to skew perceptions of their performance. By studying their methods closely, analysts can potentially anticipate the variations on old themes that will materialize in years to come.

MARTIN FRIDSON  
FERNANDO ALVAREZ

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PART

# One

## Questions



# Questions on Each Chapter

## **CHAPTER 1: THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING**

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1. Three ways that corporations can use financial reporting to enhance their value are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
2. The true purpose of financial reporting is \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Corporations routinely \_\_\_\_\_ because the appearance of \_\_\_\_\_ receives a higher \_\_\_\_\_ multiple.
4. According to the \_\_\_\_\_, reversals of the excess write-offs offer an artificial means of \_\_\_\_\_ in subsequent periods.
5. The following are some of the powerful limitations to continued growth faced by companies:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
6. Some of the commonly heard rationalizations for declining growth are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
7. \_\_\_\_\_ reached its zenith of popularity during the \_\_\_\_\_ movement of the 1960s. However, by the 1980s, the stock market had converted the \_\_\_\_\_ into a \_\_\_\_\_.
8. \_\_\_\_\_ is one of the ways that the notion of diversification as a means of maintaining \_\_\_\_\_ is revived from time to time.

9. The surprise element in Manville Corporation's 1982 bankruptcy was, in part, a function of \_\_\_\_\_.
10. The analyst's heightened awareness of legal risks are a result of bankruptcies associated with:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
11. Some of the stories used to sell stocks to individual investors are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. A "play" in some current economic trend such as
    - i. \_\_\_\_\_
    - ii. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
12. When the story used to sell stocks to individual investors originates among stockbrokers or even \_\_\_\_\_, the zeal with which the story is disseminated may depend more on \_\_\_\_\_ than the \_\_\_\_\_.
13. The ostensible purpose of financial reporting is \_\_\_\_\_ of a corporation's earnings.
14. Over a two-year period BGT paid L&H \$35 million to develop translation software. L&H then bought BGT and the translation product along with it. The net effect was that instead \_\_\_\_\_, L&H recognized \_\_\_\_\_.

## **CHAPTER 2: THE BALANCE SHEET**

1. A study conducted on behalf of Big Five accounting firm Arthur Andersen showed that between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, book value fell from \_\_\_\_\_ percent to \_\_\_\_\_ percent of the stock market value of public companies in the United States.
2. As noted by Baruch Lev of New York University, two examples of how traditional accounting systems are at a loss to capture most of what is going on today are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_

3. In the examples in Question 2 there is no accounting event because \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Some of the distinct approaches that have evolved for assessing real property are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
5. Some financial assets are unaffected by the difficulties of evaluating physical assets because \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ markets.
6. Under the compromise embodied in SFAS 115, financial instruments are valued according to \_\_\_\_\_ by the company \_\_\_\_\_.
7. If a company wrote off a billion dollars worth of goodwill, its ratio of assets to liabilities would \_\_\_\_\_. Its ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ would not change, however.
8. Through stock-for-stock acquisitions, the sharp rise in equity prices during the late 1990s was transformed into \_\_\_\_\_, despite the usual assumption that \_\_\_\_\_.
9. Unlike \_\_\_\_\_, goodwill is not an asset that can be readily \_\_\_\_\_ to raise cash. Neither can a company enter into a \_\_\_\_\_ of its goodwill, as it can with its plant and equipment. In short, goodwill is not \_\_\_\_\_ that management can either \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ to extricate itself from a financial tight spot.
10. A reasonable estimate of a low-profit company's true equity value would be \_\_\_\_\_.
11. Determining the cost of capital is a notoriously controversial subject in the financial field, complicated by \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
12. Among the advantages of market capitalization as a measure of equity are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
13. A limitation of the peer-group approach to valuation is that \_\_\_\_\_ and therefore \_\_\_\_\_ one major benefit of using \_\_\_\_\_ as a gauge of actual equity value.

14. Instead of striving for theoretical purity on the matter, analysts should adopt a \_\_\_\_\_, using the measure of equity value \_\_\_\_\_.
15. Historical-cost-based balance sheet figures are the ones that matter in \_\_\_\_\_ that a company will violate \_\_\_\_\_ requiring \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Users of financial statements can process only \_\_\_\_\_, and they do not always have \_\_\_\_\_.
17. Deterioration in a company's financial position may catch investors by surprise because it \_\_\_\_\_ and is \_\_\_\_\_.

### **CHAPTER 3: THE INCOME STATEMENT**

---

1. Students of financial statements must keep up with \_\_\_\_\_ of the past few years in transforming \_\_\_\_\_ into \_\_\_\_\_.
2. In the \_\_\_\_\_, each income statement item is expressed as \_\_\_\_\_ (sales or revenues), which is represented as \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Besides facilitating comparisons between a company's present and past results, the \_\_\_\_\_ can highlight important facts \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Even within an industry, the breakdown of expenses can vary from company to company as a function of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Percentage breakdowns are also helpful for comparing a single company's performance with \_\_\_\_\_ and for comparing \_\_\_\_\_ on the basis of \_\_\_\_\_.
6. In essence, Peet's is more of \_\_\_\_\_ and Starbucks is more involved in \_\_\_\_\_.
7. Costs as percentages of sales also vary among companies within an industry for \_\_\_\_\_ than differences \_\_\_\_\_.
8. The more widely diversified pharmaceutical manufacturers can be expected to have \_\_\_\_\_ percentage \_\_\_\_\_, as well as \_\_\_\_\_ percentage expenses, than industry peers that focus exclusively on \_\_\_\_\_.

9. Analysts must take care not to mistake difference that is actually \_\_\_\_\_ as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_. A subtler explanation may be available at the modest cost of \_\_\_\_\_.
10. Executives whose bonuses rise \_\_\_\_\_ have a strong incentive not only \_\_\_\_\_, but also to use \_\_\_\_\_.
11. On a retrospective basis, a surge \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ may indicate that \_\_\_\_\_.
12. Along with \_\_\_\_\_, another major expense category that can be controlled through \_\_\_\_\_ is \_\_\_\_\_.
13. An unusually low ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ with the ratios of its industry peers may indicate that management is being unrealistic in acknowledging the pace of wear and tear on fixed assets. Understatement of \_\_\_\_\_ and overstatement of \_\_\_\_\_ would result.
14. A company knows that creating \_\_\_\_\_ expectations about \_\_\_\_\_ can raise \_\_\_\_\_ and lower \_\_\_\_\_.
15. One way persuading investors that a major development that hurt earnings last year will \_\_\_\_\_ affect earnings \_\_\_\_\_ is to suggest that any \_\_\_\_\_ suffered by the company was somehow \_\_\_\_\_, and, by implication, \_\_\_\_\_.
16. An extraordinary item is reported on an \_\_\_\_\_ basis, below the \_\_\_\_\_ from continuing operations.
17. The accounting rules prohibit corporate officials from displaying certain hits to earnings “above the line,” that is, \_\_\_\_\_, and from using the label \_\_\_\_\_. Accordingly they employ designations such as \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_. These terms have \_\_\_\_\_, but \_\_\_\_\_ the highlighted items are \_\_\_\_\_.
18. In recent years, \_\_\_\_\_ has become a catchall for charges that companies wish analysts to consider \_\_\_\_\_, but which do not qualify for \_\_\_\_\_.
19. Corporate managers commonly perceive that \_\_\_\_\_ will be \_\_\_\_\_ if they take (for sake of argument) a \$1.5 billion write-off than if \_\_\_\_\_. The benefit of exaggerating the damage is that in subsequent years, \_\_\_\_\_.

20. The most dangerous trap that users of financial statements must avoid walking into, however, is inferring that the term “restructuring” connotes \_\_\_\_\_.
21. The purpose of providing pro forma results was to help analysts \_\_\_\_\_ accurately when some event \_\_\_\_\_ caused \_\_\_\_\_ to convey a misleading impression.
22. Computer software producers got into the act by \_\_\_\_\_ from the expenses considered in calculating \_\_\_\_\_.
23. Unlike operating income, a concept addressed by FASB standards, \_\_\_\_\_ is a number that subjectively \_\_\_\_\_ many \_\_\_\_\_ that lack any standing under GAAP.
24. In fact, analysts who hope to forecast future financial results accurately *must* apply \_\_\_\_\_ and set aside genuinely \_\_\_\_\_.
25. Analysts must exercise judgment when considering pro forma earnings; however, they must make sure to examine \_\_\_\_\_, instead of \_\_\_\_\_ by relying solely on \_\_\_\_\_.
26. An older, but not obsolete, device for beefing up reported income is \_\_\_\_\_.
27. A comparatively \_\_\_\_\_ ratio of PP&E to \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ is another sign of potential trouble.
28. Management can \_\_\_\_\_ through techniques that more properly fall into the category of \_\_\_\_\_.
29. One way to increase profitability through \_\_\_\_\_ involves \_\_\_\_\_.
30. A corporation can easily accelerate its sales growth by \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Creating genuine value for shareholders through \_\_\_\_\_ is more difficult, although unwary investors sometimes fail to recognize the distinction.
31. Analysts need to distinguish between internal growth and external growth. \_\_\_\_\_ consists of sales increases generated from a company’s existing operations, while \_\_\_\_\_ represents incremental sales brought in through \_\_\_\_\_.
32. If Company A generates external growth by acquiring Company B and neither Company nor its new subsidiary increases its profitability, then \_\_\_\_\_ the merged companies is \_\_\_\_\_ than the sum of the two companies’ values.



33. In general, the \_\_\_\_\_ the combining businesses are, the \_\_\_\_\_ it is that the hoped-for economies of scope \_\_\_\_\_.
34. As synergies go, projections of economies of scale in combinations of companies \_\_\_\_\_ tend to be more plausible than economies of scope purportedly available to companies in \_\_\_\_\_ businesses.
35. A company with relatively large \_\_\_\_\_ has a \_\_\_\_\_ breakeven level. Even a modest economic downturn will reduce \_\_\_\_\_ below the rate required to keep the company profitable.
36. Deals that work on paper have often foundered on
- \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
37. Financial statements cannot capture certain \_\_\_\_\_ that may be essential to \_\_\_\_\_. These include
- \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_

**CHAPTER 4: THE STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS**

- The present version of the statement that traces the flow of funds in and out of the firm, the statement of cash flows, became mandatory, under \_\_\_\_\_, for issuers with fiscal years ending after \_\_\_\_\_.
- For financial-reporting (as opposed to \_\_\_\_\_) purposes, a publicly owned company generally seeks to maximize \_\_\_\_\_, which investors use as a basis for valuing its shares.
- A privately held company, unlike a \_\_\_\_\_, which shows one set of statements to the public and another to the Internal Revenue Service, a private company typically prepares \_\_\_\_\_ of statements, with \_\_\_\_\_ foremost in its thinking. Its incentive is

- not \_\_\_\_\_, but to \_\_\_\_\_, the income it reports, thereby \_\_\_\_\_ its tax bill as well.
4. In a classic LBO, a group of investors acquires a business by \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ the balance.
  5. The amount attributable to depreciation \_\_\_\_\_ in the current year. Rather, it is a bookkeeping entry intended to represent the \_\_\_\_\_, through use, \_\_\_\_\_.
  6. Viewed in terms of cash inflows and outflows, rather than earnings, \_\_\_\_\_ begins to look like \_\_\_\_\_.
  7. Analysts evaluating the investment merits of the LBO proposal would miss the point if they focused on \_\_\_\_\_ rather than \_\_\_\_\_.
  8. In an LBO, the equity investors do not reap spectacular gains without incurring significant \_\_\_\_\_. There is a danger that everything \_\_\_\_\_ and that they will lose \_\_\_\_\_. Specifically, there is a risk that \_\_\_\_\_ will fall short of expectations, perhaps as a result of \_\_\_\_\_ or because the investors' expectations \_\_\_\_\_.
  9. The \_\_\_\_\_, rather than the \_\_\_\_\_, provides the best information about a highly leveraged firm's financial health.
  10. Among the applications and uses of the Statement of Cash Flows are:
    - a. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. \_\_\_\_\_
    - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  11. When a company is \_\_\_\_\_, its balance sheet may \_\_\_\_\_ its asset value, as a result of \_\_\_\_\_ having lagged the \_\_\_\_\_ of the company's operations.
  12. Revenues build gradually during the \_\_\_\_\_ phase, during which time the company is just \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
  13. Growth and profits accelerate rapidly during the \_\_\_\_\_ phase, as the company's products begin to penetrate the market and the \_\_\_\_\_.
  14. During the \_\_\_\_\_ period, growth in sales and earnings decelerates as the \_\_\_\_\_. In the \_\_\_\_\_ phase, sales opportunities are limited to the replacement of products previously sold, plus \_\_\_\_\_.

15. Price competition often intensifies at this stage, as companies \_\_\_\_\_. The \_\_\_\_\_ stage does not automatically follow maturity, but over long periods some industries do get swept away by \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Sharply declining sales and earnings, ultimately resulting in \_\_\_\_\_, characterize industries in decline.
17. \_\_\_\_\_ are typically voracious cash users.
18. \_\_\_\_\_ are start-ups that survive long enough to reach the stage of entering the public market.
19. For a company at \_\_\_\_\_, it may take several years for sales to reach \_\_\_\_\_ sizable fixed costs that are \_\_\_\_\_.
20. Unlike a \_\_\_\_\_, Green Mountain is \_\_\_\_\_. It issues substantial \_\_\_\_\_ each year to fund its \_\_\_\_\_.
21. \_\_\_\_\_ are in a less precarious state in terms of cash flow than their emerging growth counterparts.
22. Reflecting the \_\_\_\_\_ of its business, Kimberly-Clark generates a \_\_\_\_\_ level of \_\_\_\_\_.
23. Far from depending \_\_\_\_\_, this mature company \_\_\_\_\_, giving them the opportunity to \_\_\_\_\_ it in higher-growth, \_\_\_\_\_.
24. Some \_\_\_\_\_ choose instead to \_\_\_\_\_ internally. They either launch or acquire businesses with \_\_\_\_\_. The older businesses become \_\_\_\_\_ for funding the newer activities.
25. \_\_\_\_\_ are past the cash strain faced by growth companies that must fund large \_\_\_\_\_ programs.
26. \_\_\_\_\_ struggle to generate sufficient cash as a consequence of meager earnings.
27. By studying the cash flow statement, an analyst can make informed judgments on such questions as:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
28. In difficult times, when a company must cut back on various expenditures \_\_\_\_\_, management faces many difficult choices. A key objective is to \_\_\_\_\_.

29. At times, \_\_\_\_\_ becomes \_\_\_\_\_, as a function \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_. During the \_\_\_\_\_ that occasionally befall the business world, \_\_\_\_\_ is unavailable at any price.
30. If a corporation's financial strain becomes acute, the board of directors may take the comparatively extreme step of \_\_\_\_\_.
31. Reducing \_\_\_\_\_ is a step that corporations try very hard to avoid, for fear of \_\_\_\_\_ and consequently suffering an increase in \_\_\_\_\_.
32. A final factor in assessing financial flexibility is the change in adjusted working capital. Unlike conventional working capital \_\_\_\_\_, this figure excludes \_\_\_\_\_, as well as \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
33. A company with a strong balance sheet can fund much of that cash need by increasing its \_\_\_\_\_ (credit extended by vendors). External financing may be needed, however, if accumulation of unsold goods causes \_\_\_\_\_ to rise disproportionately to \_\_\_\_\_. Similarly, if customers begin paying more slowly than formerly, can widen the gap between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
34. One typical consequence of violating \_\_\_\_\_ or striving to head off \_\_\_\_\_ is that management reduces discretionary expenditures to avoid \_\_\_\_\_.
35. Overinvestment has unquestionably led, in many industries, to prolonged periods of \_\_\_\_\_, producing in turn chronically \_\_\_\_\_. In retrospect, the firms involved would have served their shareholders better if they had \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_, instead of \_\_\_\_\_.
36. Keeping cash "trapped" in marketable securities can enable a firm \_\_\_\_\_ over "lean-and-mean" competitors when \_\_\_\_\_ make it difficult to \_\_\_\_\_.
37. Another less obvious risk of eschewing financial flexibility is the danger of permanently losing \_\_\_\_\_ through \_\_\_\_\_ occasioned by recessions.
38. The income statement is a dubious measure of the success of a \_\_\_\_\_ company that is being managed to \_\_\_\_\_ rather than \_\_\_\_\_, reported profits.

39. The cash flow statement is the best tool for measuring \_\_\_\_\_, which, contrary to a widely held view, is not merely a security blanket for \_\_\_\_\_.
40. In the hands of an aggressive but prudent management, a cash flow cushion can enable a company to \_\_\_\_\_ when competitors are forced to cut back.

## **CHAPTER 5: WHAT IS PROFIT?**

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1. Profitability is a yardstick by which businesspeople can measure their \_\_\_\_\_ and justify \_\_\_\_\_.
2. When calculating \_\_\_\_\_ profits, the analyst must take care to consider only genuine revenues and deduct all relevant costs.
3. There can be no bona fide profit without \_\_\_\_\_. Bona fide profits are the only kind of profits \_\_\_\_\_ in financial analysis.
4. Merely \_\_\_\_\_, it is clear, does not increase wealth.
5. An essential element of genuinely useful financial statement analysis is: \_\_\_\_\_.
6. The issuer of the statements can \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ its reported earnings simply by using its latitude to assume shorter or longer \_\_\_\_\_.
7. The rate at which the tax code allows owners to write off property overstates \_\_\_\_\_.
8. In the \_\_\_\_\_, companies typically record depreciation and amortization expense that far exceeds physical wear-and-tear on assets.
9. In many industries, fixed assets consist mainly of \_\_\_\_\_. The major risk of analytical error does not arise from the possibility that \_\_\_\_\_, but the reverse.

## **CHAPTER 6: REVENUE RECOGNITION**

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1. Many corporations employ \_\_\_\_\_ practices that comply with GAAP yet \_\_\_\_\_.
2. Under intense pressure to maintain their stock prices, companies characterized by \_\_\_\_\_ seem particularly prone \_\_\_\_\_.

3. To seasoned investors, \_\_\_\_\_ by a senior manager represents \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Bonus-seeking managers may initially veer off the straight-and-narrow by \_\_\_\_\_ a small amount from \_\_\_\_\_, intending to \_\_\_\_\_ the following year, but they instead fall further and further behind. Eventually, the gap between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ grows too large to sustain.
5. Even when an independent accounting firm certifies that a company's financials \_\_\_\_\_ with generally accepted accounting principles; the analyst must stay alert for evidence \_\_\_\_\_.
6. Staying alert to evidence of flawed, \_\_\_\_\_, reporting is essential, even when the auditors \_\_\_\_\_.
7. As a rule, distorting one section of the financial statements \_\_\_\_\_. Assiduous tracking of a variety of \_\_\_\_\_ should raise serious questions about a company's reporting, at a minimum.
8. The explanation for the sudden drop in projected earnings was that in 2001 Bristol-Myers \_\_\_\_\_ to induce them to \_\_\_\_\_ at a much faster rate than necessary to \_\_\_\_\_.
9. "\_\_\_\_\_" is a security analysts' term for the financial reporting gimmick that Bristol-Myers employed \_\_\_\_\_.
10. Along with other pharmaceutical producers, Bristol-Myers was feeling profit pressures due to \_\_\_\_\_ to replace sales of products \_\_\_\_\_.
11. Haydon was known for speaking candidly about Bristol-Myers's declining sales prospects. Consequently, his reassignment was \_\_\_\_\_.
12. Also suspect was Bristol-Myers's repeated practice of \_\_\_\_\_ that exactly equaled \_\_\_\_\_.
13. The Bristol-Myers Squibb case study nevertheless illustrates the value of \_\_\_\_\_ against \_\_\_\_\_.
14. According to Take-Two management, the adjustment arose because the company \_\_\_\_\_ on some games it sold to "\_\_\_\_\_" but which were later \_\_\_\_\_ by Take-Two.

15. \_\_\_\_\_ to the lesson taught by many other cases of financial misreporting, it paid to accept the Take-Two \_\_\_\_\_ assurances that the company's business prospects \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Take-Two shipped hundreds of thousands of video games to distributors \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ booked the shipments \_\_\_\_\_, then \_\_\_\_\_ in later periods.
17. Encouragingly for users of financial statements, managers \_\_\_\_\_ are often betrayed by \_\_\_\_\_.
18. In layaway sales, customers reserve goods \_\_\_\_\_, and then make additional payments over a specified period, \_\_\_\_\_ when they have paid in full.
19. Prior to the change in accounting practice, which FAS 101 made mandatory, Wal-Mart booked layaway sales \_\_\_\_\_. Under the new and more conservative method, the company began to recognize the sales \_\_\_\_\_.
20. On the whole, Bally's reported profit margins benefited from the increase in \_\_\_\_\_ as a percentage of total revenues. The reported earnings, however, rested on assumptions regarding the percentage of customers who \_\_\_\_\_.
21. As in any sales situation, aggressive pursuit of new business could result in \_\_\_\_\_. On average, the newer members might prove to be \_\_\_\_\_ or less committed to physical fitness than \_\_\_\_\_.
22. There was no change in the accounting principle, namely \_\_\_\_\_. In the case of a health club, members' upfront fees represent \_\_\_\_\_. Club operators should therefore recognize the revenue over the period in which \_\_\_\_\_.
23. Under GAAP, the general requirement was to spread membership fees \_\_\_\_\_. If a company offered refunds, it could not \_\_\_\_\_ until the refund period expired, unless there was \_\_\_\_\_ to enable management to \_\_\_\_\_ estimate \_\_\_\_\_ with reasonable confidence.
24. Under certain circumstances, a company engaged in long-term contract work can \_\_\_\_\_. This result arises from GAAP's solution to a mismatch commonly observed \_\_\_\_\_.

25. GAAP addresses the problem through the \_\_\_\_\_, which permits the company to recognize revenue in \_\_\_\_\_, rather than in line with its billing.
26. As is generally the case with \_\_\_\_\_, taking liberties with the percentage-of-completion borrows \_\_\_\_\_, making a surprise \_\_\_\_\_ at some point.
27. The SEC claimed that management at Sequoia Systems inflated revenue and profits by:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
28. The SEC also claimed that management at Sequoia Systems profited from the scheme by \_\_\_\_\_.
29. Loading the distribution channels consists of \_\_\_\_\_ to accept larger shipments of goods than \_\_\_\_\_.
30. Loading does not boost \_\_\_\_\_, but merely shifts the timing of its \_\_\_\_\_.
31. Inevitably, the underlying trend of final sales to consumers slows down, at least temporarily. At that point, the manufacturer's growth in reported revenue will maintain its trend only \_\_\_\_\_, relative to their sales. If the distributors balk, \_\_\_\_\_, forcing a \_\_\_\_\_, of previously recorded profits.
32. Krispy Kreme revised its senior executive compensation plan.<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, officers would receive \_\_\_\_\_ unless the company \_\_\_\_\_ in each quarter \_\_\_\_\_.
33. In essence, according to the *Wall Street Journal's* story, Krispy Kreme \_\_\_\_\_ by taking money \_\_\_\_\_.
34. Had Krispy Kreme instead \_\_\_\_\_, it would have \_\_\_\_\_. The catch is that an asset is supposed to be \_\_\_\_\_. Terminated stores would not seem \_\_\_\_\_.
35. Most, if not all, of the \_\_\_\_\_ on Krispy Kreme's \_\_\_\_\_ appeared to have come from a \_\_\_\_\_ transaction, rather than from \_\_\_\_\_.

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<sup>1</sup>SEC v. Scott A. Livengood, John W. Tate, and Randy S. Casstevens. SEC Complaint against Scott A. Livengood, John W. Tate, and Randy S. Casstevens, May 4, 2009.



36. Krispy Kreme increased the size of the corrections to its fiscal 2004 results. The previously undisclosed problems involved \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_.
37. Krispy Kreme was \_\_\_\_\_ fictitious earnings. Rather, the SEC complaint depicted a \_\_\_\_\_, through a wide range of \_\_\_\_\_, to beat \_\_\_\_\_.
38. An exceptionally long record of \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ is a reason to \_\_\_\_\_.
39. A second lesson of the Krispy Kreme case is that \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ often go hand in hand.
40. It is impossible to assess the quality of an internal investigation without information on the \_\_\_\_\_, and the basis \_\_\_\_\_.
41. Users of financial statements should not be intimidated by corporate \_\_\_\_\_ that denounce allegedly irresponsible \_\_\_\_\_.
42. In 2001, Halliburton adopted an even more aggressive approach to \_\_\_\_\_. For some projects, Halliburton began reporting sales \_\_\_\_\_. Previously, the policy was to book revenues \_\_\_\_\_. In addition, the company began keeping some disputed bills on the books \_\_\_\_\_. The previous policy was to refrain from a write-off only \_\_\_\_\_.
43. Halliburton became more aggressive about \_\_\_\_\_, a classic technique for \_\_\_\_\_.
44. If earnings look suspiciously \_\_\_\_\_ during a \_\_\_\_\_ for the company's industry, users of financial statements should \_\_\_\_\_ explains the disparity.
45. A stock's value is a function of expected \_\_\_\_\_, which partly depend on the \_\_\_\_\_ vis-à-vis its competitors'.
46. Generally, the initial response of corporate executives caught in a lie is \_\_\_\_\_, but gratifyingly often, \_\_\_\_\_.
47. Analysts who strive to go beyond routine \_\_\_\_\_ can profit by seeking \_\_\_\_\_ of corporate disclosure, even when \_\_\_\_\_ have already placed \_\_\_\_\_.
48. Sometimes, management \_\_\_\_\_ revenue recognition in order to \_\_\_\_\_ short-run profits. The motive for this paradoxical

- behavior is a desire to report the sort of \_\_\_\_\_ that equity investors reward with \_\_\_\_\_.
49. Grace executives reckoned that with earnings already meeting Wall Street analysts' forecasts, a windfall \_\_\_\_\_ the company's stock price. Such an inference would have been consistent with investors' customary \_\_\_\_\_ that they perceive to be generated by \_\_\_\_\_.
  50. Grace's 1998 statement that its auditors had raised no objections to its accounting for the Medicare reimbursement windfall was true only \_\_\_\_\_ that Price Waterhouse issued clean financials, based on materiality considerations. As a spokeswoman for the auditing firm pointed out, such an opinion \_\_\_\_\_.
  51. According to Michael Jensen: "Tell a manager that he will get a bonus when targets are realized and two things will happen":
    - a. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  52. All too often, companies wouldn't be able to accomplish the frauds without \_\_\_\_\_.
  53. According to Jensen, almost every company uses a budget system that \_\_\_\_\_ employees for \_\_\_\_\_ and punishes them \_\_\_\_\_. He proposes reforming the system by severing the link between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
  54. Even in the case of the bluest of the blue chips, watching for rising levels of \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_, relative to \_\_\_\_\_, should be standard operating procedure.
  55. When the revenues derived from \_\_\_\_\_ fail to materialize, the managers may resort to \_\_\_\_\_. The positive mental attitude that overstates revenues in the early stage \_\_\_\_\_, however, than \_\_\_\_\_ at a later point.

## **CHAPTER 7: EXPENSE RECOGNITION**

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1. Corporate managers are just as creative \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ the recognition of as they are in maximizing and speeding up \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Investors attach little significance to \_\_\_\_\_ profits and losses in valuing stocks. Therefore, a public company has a strong incentive to \_\_\_\_\_ into a one-time event and to \_\_\_\_\_ nonrecurring into smaller pieces and \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Nortel Networks illustrated \_\_\_\_\_, one of the most \_\_\_\_\_ of financial reporting.
4. Between September 2000 and \_\_\_\_\_ Nortel's market capitalization sank *by 99%*, devastating \_\_\_\_\_ that were heavily invested in its shares.
5. The company had to wave a \_\_\_\_\_ with respect to \_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ financial reports.
6. In addition to dashing hopes \_\_\_\_\_, Nortel rattled the market by firing \_\_\_\_\_ Dunn, \_\_\_\_\_ Beatty, and \_\_\_\_\_ Gollogly.
7. Nortel's management's credibility \_\_\_\_\_ as the \_\_\_\_\_ for producing definitive \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Nortel's investigation, which previously had focused on \_\_\_\_\_ had turned to \_\_\_\_\_.
9. Incorrect recognition of that amount resulted from a combination of:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_
10. Nortel followed a strategy of \_\_\_\_\_ in its money-losing period of 2001–2002. \_\_\_\_\_ created \_\_\_\_\_ that could be taken \_\_\_\_\_.
11. Nortel's experience shows that if a company \_\_\_\_\_, it will have no compunction about \_\_\_\_\_ through \_\_\_\_\_.
12. An important takeaway from the Nortel case is that \_\_\_\_\_ can prove \_\_\_\_\_.
13. \_\_\_\_\_ are another frequently abused element of \_\_\_\_\_. General Motors's fiddling with this device \_\_\_\_\_ in the *integrity* of financial reporting.
14. At issue in GM's restatement was \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ from \_\_\_\_\_.

15. GM said that some cash flows from \_\_\_\_\_ that should have been classified among its \_\_\_\_\_ were instead booked as \_\_\_\_\_.
16. This revelation puzzled accounting experts because the applicable rules were unambiguous. \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ fell into \_\_\_\_\_; \_\_\_\_\_ were included in \_\_\_\_\_.
17. GM Management said it had \_\_\_\_\_ it was leasing to car-rental companies, assuming they would be \_\_\_\_\_ more after those companies \_\_\_\_\_.
18. Ordinarily, a company's stock price \_\_\_\_\_ when its reported earnings \_\_\_\_\_.
19. Freddie Mac steadfastly \_\_\_\_\_ that its handling of \_\_\_\_\_ was aimed at \_\_\_\_\_.
20. Even if it was true that \_\_\_\_\_ represented the \_\_\_\_\_ Freddie Mac's \_\_\_\_\_ had a huge impact that even \_\_\_\_\_ could not detect \_\_\_\_\_.
21. Freddie Mac's manipulation did not end there. Another ploy to \_\_\_\_\_ consisted of ceasing to use \_\_\_\_\_.
22. Companies can follow a variety of approaches in downplaying expenses such as:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_

## **CHAPTER 8: THE APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF EBITDA**

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1. The impetus for trying to redirect investors' focus to \_\_\_\_\_ or other variants has been \_\_\_\_\_ recorded by many "new economy" companies.
2. Users of financial statements had discovered certain limitations in net income as a \_\_\_\_\_. They observed that two companies in the same industry could report similar \_\_\_\_\_, yet have substantially different \_\_\_\_\_.

3. Net income is not, to the disappointment of analysts, a standard by which every company's \_\_\_\_\_ can be compared.
4. The accounting standards leave companies considerable discretion regarding the \_\_\_\_\_ they assign to their \_\_\_\_\_. The same applies to amortization schedules for \_\_\_\_\_.
5. For some companies, the sum of net income, income taxes, and interest expense is not equivalent to EBIT, reflecting the presence of such factors as \_\_\_\_\_ below \_\_\_\_\_.
6. Shifting investors' attention away from traditional fixed-charge coverage and toward \_\_\_\_\_ was particularly beneficial during the 1980s, when some buyouts were so \_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_\_ would not cover pro forma interest expense even in a good year.
7. Capital spending is likely to exceed depreciation over time as the company \_\_\_\_\_ to accommodate \_\_\_\_\_. Another reason that capital spending may run higher than depreciation is that newly acquired equipment may be \_\_\_\_\_ than the old equipment being written off, as a function of \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Delaying equipment purchases and repairs that are \_\_\_\_\_ but not \_\_\_\_\_, should inflict no lasting damage on the company's \_\_\_\_\_ provided the \_\_\_\_\_ lasts for only a few quarters.
9. Depreciation is not available as a long-run source of cash for \_\_\_\_\_. This was a lesson applicable not only to the extremely \_\_\_\_\_ deals of the 1980s, but also to the more \_\_\_\_\_ capitalized transactions of later years.
10. Beaver's definition of cash flow was more stringent than \_\_\_\_\_ since he did not add back either \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ to net income.
11. Beaver did not conclude that analysts should rely solely on the \_\_\_\_\_, but merely that it was the single best \_\_\_\_\_.
12. Some investment managers consider that the single ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ (as they define it) to \_\_\_\_\_ predicts bankruptcy better than all of \_\_\_\_\_ quantitative and qualitative considerations combined.

13. Aside from \_\_\_\_\_, the amount of working capital needed to run a business represents a fairly constant \_\_\_\_\_ of a company's sales. Therefore, if inventories or receivables \_\_\_\_\_ materially as a percentage of sales, analysts should strongly suspect that the earnings are \_\_\_\_\_, even though management will invariably offer a \_\_\_\_\_ explanation.
14. If a company resorts to stretching out its payables, two other ratios that will send out warning signals are:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
15. Merrill Lynch investment strategist Richard Bernstein points out that \_\_\_\_\_ earnings tend to be more stable than \_\_\_\_\_ earnings, EBIT tends to be more stable than \_\_\_\_\_ earnings, and \_\_\_\_\_ tends to be more stable than EBIT.
16. Strategist Bernstein found that by attempting to \_\_\_\_\_ inherent in companies' earnings, investors reduced the \_\_\_\_\_ of their stock selection.

## **CHAPTER 9: THE RELIABILITY OF DISCLOSURE AND AUDITS**

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1. Fear of the consequences of breaking the law keeps corporate managers in line. \_\_\_\_\_ the law is another matter, though, in the minds of many executives. If their bonuses depend on \_\_\_\_\_, they can usually see their way clear to adopting that course.
2. Technically, \_\_\_\_\_ appoints the auditing firm, but \_\_\_\_\_ is the point of contact in hashing out the details of presenting financial events for \_\_\_\_\_.
3. At some point, \_\_\_\_\_ becomes a moral imperative, but in the real world, accounting firms must be \_\_\_\_\_.
4. It is common for front-line auditors to balk at an \_\_\_\_\_ proposed by a company's management, only to be overruled by \_\_\_\_\_.
5. \_\_\_\_\_ is an unambiguous violation of accounting standards, but audits do not \_\_\_\_\_.

6. Extremely clever scamsters may even succeed in undermining the auditors' efforts to select \_\_\_\_\_ a procedure designed to foil concealment of fraud.
7. When challenged on inconsistencies in their numbers, companies sometimes \_\_\_\_\_, rather than any intention to \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Seasoned followers of the corporate scene realize that companies are not always as \_\_\_\_\_ as investors \_\_\_\_\_.
9. According to president and chief executive of Trump World's Fair Casino Hotel, the firm's focus in 1999 was threefold:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
10. Investors who relied solely on \_\_\_\_\_ by Trump World's Fair Casino Hotel were burned if they bought into the rally that followed the \_\_\_\_\_ press release.
11. Abundant evidence has emerged over the years of corporate managers \_\_\_\_\_ to paint as rosy a picture as possible.
12. To say that \_\_\_\_\_, however, is quite different from saying that
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_ are as good as \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_
13. Popular outrage over the \_\_\_\_\_ accounting scandals created \_\_\_\_\_ to eliminate \_\_\_\_\_.
14. Systematic problems in the audit process arise not only \_\_\_\_\_ but also from \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_.
15. In the 1990s, \_\_\_\_\_ emerged as a means of keeping a lid on costs. Instead of focusing on \_\_\_\_\_, they identified the areas that in \_\_\_\_\_ presented the greatest risk of error or fraud, such as \_\_\_\_\_. Incredibly, these judgments in some cases were based on \_\_\_\_\_.
16. In WorldCom's early days, Arthur Andersen audited the company in \_\_\_\_\_. As the company grew, however, Andersen migrated toward \_\_\_\_\_. If a question arose about controls or procedures, Andersen relied on the \_\_\_\_\_.

17. Congress's unwillingness to give the SEC \_\_\_\_\_ reflected more than \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.
18. One final line of defense for users of a company's financial statements is \_\_\_\_\_. This protection has \_\_\_\_\_ over the years.
19. In one of the few encouraging notes of recent years, the SEC has imposed a \_\_\_\_\_ requirement on audit committee members.
20. Many companies are either \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_. Rather than laying down the law (or GAAP), the auditors typically wind up \_\_\_\_\_ to arrive at a point where they can convince themselves that \_\_\_\_\_ have been satisfied.
21. Given the observed gap between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ in financial reporting, users of financial statements must provide themselves \_\_\_\_\_ through tough \_\_\_\_\_.

## **CHAPTER 10: MERGERS-AND-ACQUISITIONS ACCOUNTING**

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1. Choosing a method of accounting for a merger or acquisition does not affect the combined companies' subsequent \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_. The discretionary accounting choices can have a \_\_\_\_\_, however, on \_\_\_\_\_.
2. Meyer emphasized that he was \_\_\_\_\_ Tyco \_\_\_\_\_, but merely of \_\_\_\_\_. Nevertheless, the diversified manufacturer responded in the \_\_\_\_\_; Tyco angrily denounced Meyer's report, stating that \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Alert analysts had suspected something was going on behind the scenes. They questioned why in the most recent fiscal year, \_\_\_\_\_ to Tyco's \_\_\_\_\_ doubled to \$21.6 billion even though the company reported \$4.8 billion \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Swartz acknowledged that the amount spent on \_\_\_\_\_ was not determinable from Tyco's financial statements because it reported \_\_\_\_\_ and did not disclose the \_\_\_\_\_.
5. The investigators concluded that Tyco repeatedly used aggressive, \_\_\_\_\_, including \_\_\_\_\_ immediately before acquisition, in order to generate \_\_\_\_\_. Company officials referred



- to such practices as \_\_\_\_\_ and ordered employees to “create stories” to justify \_\_\_\_\_.
6. Tyco’s financial reporting aggressiveness involved \_\_\_\_\_ through a nonstandard definition of the term. Tyco excluded \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ for its ADT security-alarm business, labeling the latter \_\_\_\_\_.
  7. Although the pooling-of-interests method has been abolished, M&A accounting remains an area in which analysts must be on their toes. Companies have developed \_\_\_\_\_ for exploiting the discretion afforded by the rules. \_\_\_\_\_ in the post-acquisition period remains a key objective.
  8. For example, one M&A-related gambit entails the GAAP-sanctioned use, for financial reporting purposes, of \_\_\_\_\_. Typically, companies use this discretion to simplify the closing of their books at month- or quarter-end.
  9. Under Securities and Exchange Commission rules, companies do not have to \_\_\_\_\_ to reflect the revenues and earnings of acquired businesses \_\_\_\_\_.
  10. There can be no guarantee of loans secured by stock issued in the combination, which would effectively \_\_\_\_\_ implicit in a bona fide \_\_\_\_\_ of stock, and are likewise prohibited.
  11. Regulators may tighten up rules that can be abused, such as the \_\_\_\_\_, but corporate managers usually manage to stay one step ahead. Analysts who hope to keep pace would do well to study \_\_\_\_\_ in order to understand the thought process of the field’s most notorious innovators.
  12. Clues to hanky-panky may include:
    - a. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. \_\_\_\_\_, and, if an acquired company was a public reporter prior to its acquisition
    - c. \_\_\_\_\_

**CHAPTER 11: IS FRAUD DETECTABLE?**

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1. Beneish defines manipulation to include both \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ *within GAAP*.
2. Beneish finds, by statistical analysis, that the presence of any of the following five factors increases the probability of earnings manipulation:
  1. \_\_\_\_\_
  2. \_\_\_\_\_
  3. \_\_\_\_\_
  4. \_\_\_\_\_
  5. \_\_\_\_\_
3. The evidence of criminal misrepresentation \_\_\_\_\_, but \_\_\_\_\_ definitely identified some of the most famous frauds \_\_\_\_\_ and the companies \_\_\_\_\_.
4. In studying these notorious frauds, readers should pay close attention \_\_\_\_\_, but also \_\_\_\_\_ as the validity of their stated profits is challenged.
5. Unexpected \_\_\_\_\_ is a classic warning sign of financial misrepresentation.
6. When Enron at long last conceded that it was overly indebted, management tried to:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_
7. Enron also misled investors by aggressively exploiting wiggle room in the accounting rules. The company booked revenue from its energy-related derivatives contracts on the basis of \_\_\_\_\_, rather than \_\_\_\_\_, as is the norm for \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Excessive liberties with \_\_\_\_\_ accounting rules constituted yet one more element of Enron's misrepresentation.
9. On a conference call dealing with Enron's earnings, analyst Richard Grubman complained that the company was \_\_\_\_\_ in refusing to include a \_\_\_\_\_ in its earnings release.

10. Still, the \_\_\_\_\_ vehicles, combined with \_\_\_\_\_ disclosures, enabled Enron to make itself look less \_\_\_\_\_ than it really was.
11. While Enron grossly misled investors by \_\_\_\_\_, a large part of its deception consisted of \_\_\_\_\_ of basic accounting standards, with \_\_\_\_\_ of its auditor.
12. Equally crude was a scheme in which Enron reportedly borrowed \$500 million from a bank and \_\_\_\_\_. A few days later it sold \_\_\_\_\_ and repaid the bank, reporting the proceeds from the meaningless transaction as \_\_\_\_\_.
13. The \_\_\_\_\_ of Enron's \_\_\_\_\_ was a major concern. "Ultimately they're telling you \_\_\_\_\_, but they're not telling you \_\_\_\_\_ Business Valuation Services analyst Stephen Campbell complained. "That is essentially saying '\_\_\_\_\_.'"
14. Off Wall Street Consulting group recommended a short sale of Enron based on two factors identifiable from the financial statements, namely, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_.
15. Analysts should be especially wary when \_\_\_\_\_, as indicated by tools such as \_\_\_\_\_, coincides with \_\_\_\_\_ financial reporting.
16. According to the SEC's complaint, HealthSouth's falsification began \_\_\_\_\_.
17. Flat denial by Scrusby, regardless \_\_\_\_\_, was a consistent theme as the \_\_\_\_\_ unfolded.
18. The complaint stated that when HealthSouth officials and accountants urged Scrusby \_\_\_\_\_, he replied, in effect, "\_\_\_\_\_."
19. The "Sarbox" provision requiring CFOs and CEOs to attest to the accuracy of financial statements gave prosecutors a powerful weapon to wield against falsifiers, but \_\_\_\_\_ dispelled any notion that the tough new law \_\_\_\_\_.
20. HealthSouth exaggerated its earnings by understating the gap between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
21. If the auditors did question an accounting entry, HealthSouth executives reportedly \_\_\_\_\_ to validate the item.

22. HealthSouth also propped up profits by failing to \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_. In addition, the company \_\_\_\_\_ when it sold assets \_\_\_\_\_.
23. Compounding Scusby's legal problems, federal prosecutors disclosed in July 2003 that they had uncovered evidence of:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_
  - e. \_\_\_\_\_
24. The most dismaying aspect of the performance of HealthSouth's auditor, Ernst & Young LLP, was \_\_\_\_\_ to challenge a \_\_\_\_\_ in cash.
25. In the view of experts in the field, internal checks and balances also broke down at HealthSouth. The board's audit committee met \_\_\_\_\_ during 2001, \_\_\_\_\_ than the minimum recommended by the SEC.
26. Investors had little official warning of trouble until \_\_\_\_\_ Parmalat's collapse. As late as October 2003, Deutsche Bank's equity research group rated the company's stock \_\_\_\_\_, highlighting \_\_\_\_\_, and Citibank put out \_\_\_\_\_ report in November. Furthermore, the company's debt carried an \_\_\_\_\_ rating up until \_\_\_\_\_ the bankruptcy filing.
27. A major red flag was Parmalat's \_\_\_\_\_, despite claiming to have a \_\_\_\_\_.
28. Merrill Lynch analysts downgraded Parmalat to SELL, saying that the company's \_\_\_\_\_, while reporting \_\_\_\_\_, threw into question \_\_\_\_\_.
29. Another hazard signal emerged on February 26, 2003, when Parmalat suddenly canceled its plan \_\_\_\_\_. The company said it would instead \_\_\_\_\_, suggesting the market had less confidence in Parmalat's \_\_\_\_\_ than management had thought.
30. Oddly, the person who achieved the greatest renown for early recognition of the Parmalat's house of cards was \_\_\_\_\_, but a \_\_\_\_\_.

**CHAPTER 12: FORECASTING  
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS**

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1. It is \_\_\_\_\_ that determine the value of a company's stock and the \_\_\_\_\_ that determines credit quality.
2. The process of financial projections is an extension of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, based on assumptions about future \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Sales projections for the company's business can be developed with the help of such sources as \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and firms that sell \_\_\_\_\_ models.
4. Basic industries such as \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_ tend to lend themselves best to the \_\_\_\_\_ described here. In technology-driven industries and "hits-driven" businesses such as \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, the connection between \_\_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_ will tend to be looser.
5. The expected intensity of industry competition, which affects a company's \_\_\_\_\_ on to customers or to retain \_\_\_\_\_, influences the \_\_\_\_\_ forecast.
6. Since the segment information may show only operating income, and not \_\_\_\_\_, the analyst must add \_\_\_\_\_ to operating income, then make assumptions about the allocation of \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ expense by segment.
7. The R&D percentage may change if, for example, the company \_\_\_\_\_ in an industry that is either significantly more, or significantly less, \_\_\_\_\_ than its existing operations.
8. The key to the forecasting interest expense method employed here is to estimate the firm's embedded cost of debt, that is, the \_\_\_\_\_ on the company's \_\_\_\_\_.
9. Accurately projecting interest expense for \_\_\_\_\_ companies is important because \_\_\_\_\_ may depend on the size of \_\_\_\_\_ they must cover each quarter.
10. The completed income statement projection supplies \_\_\_\_\_ of the projected statement of cash flows.

11. Before assuming a constant-percentage relationship, the analyst must verify that \_\_\_\_\_.
12. A sizable \_\_\_\_\_ might be presumed to be directed toward share repurchase, reducing \_\_\_\_\_, if management has indicated a desire to \_\_\_\_\_ and is \_\_\_\_\_ by its board of directors.
13. Typically, the analyst must modify the underlying \_\_\_\_\_ assumptions, and therefore the projections, several times during the year as \_\_\_\_\_ diverges from \_\_\_\_\_.
14. A firm may have considerable room to cut \_\_\_\_\_ in the short run if it suffers a decline in funds provided by \_\_\_\_\_. A projection that ignored this could prove overly pessimistic.
15. An interest rate decline will have limited impact on a company for which interest costs represent a \_\_\_\_\_. The impact will be greater on a company with a large interest cost component and with much of its debt at \_\_\_\_\_. This assumes the return on the company's assets is \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Analysts are generally not arrogant enough to try to forecast the figures accurately to the first decimal place, that is, to the \_\_\_\_\_ for a company with revenues in the \_\_\_\_\_.
17. It is generally inappropriate to compare a \_\_\_\_\_ item (EBITDA) with a balance sheet figure, especially in the case of a \_\_\_\_\_ company.
18. It is unwise to base an investment decision on historical statements that antedate a major financial change such as:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_
19. A pro forma income statement for a single year provides no information about \_\_\_\_\_ in sales and earnings of \_\_\_\_\_ that is being spun off.
20. Pro forma adjustments for a divestment do not capture the potential benefits of increased \_\_\_\_\_ on the company's \_\_\_\_\_.
21. The earnings shown in a merger-related pro forma income statement may be higher than the company can sustain because:

- a. The acquired company's owners may be shrewdly selling out at top dollar, anticipating a \_\_\_\_\_ that is foreseeable by \_\_\_\_\_, but not to the acquiring corporation's management.
  - b. Mergers of companies in the same industry often work out poorly due to \_\_\_\_\_.
  - c. Inappropriately applying \_\_\_\_\_ to an industry with very different requirements.
22. A \_\_\_\_\_ investor buying a 30-year bond is certainly interested in the issuer's financial prospects beyond \_\_\_\_\_. Similarly, a substantial percentage of the present value of future dividends represented by a stock's price lies \_\_\_\_\_.
23. Radical financial restructurings such as \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_ necessitate \_\_\_\_\_ projections.
24. Of the various types of analysis of financial statements, projecting \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ requires the greatest skill and produces \_\_\_\_\_.
25. The lack of \_\_\_\_\_ is what makes financial forecasting so \_\_\_\_\_. When betting huge sums in the face of \_\_\_\_\_, it is essential that investors understand \_\_\_\_\_ as fully as they possibly can.

## **CHAPTER 13: CREDIT ANALYSIS**

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1. Financial statements tell much about a borrower's \_\_\_\_\_ to repay a loan, but disclose little about the equally important \_\_\_\_\_ to repay.
2. If a company is dependent on raw materials provided by a subsidiary, there may be a \_\_\_\_\_ presumption that it will stand behind the subsidiary's \_\_\_\_\_, even \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Illiquidity manifests itself as an excess of current \_\_\_\_\_, over \_\_\_\_\_. The \_\_\_\_\_ ratio gauges the risk of this occurring by comparing the claims against the company that will become

- payable during \_\_\_\_\_ with the assets that are already in the form of cash or that will be converted to cash during \_\_\_\_\_.
4. The greater the amount by which asset values could deteriorate, the greater the \_\_\_\_\_, and the greater the creditor's sense of \_\_\_\_\_. Equity is by definition \_\_\_\_\_ minus \_\_\_\_\_.
  5. Aggressive \_\_\_\_\_ frequently try to satisfy the letter of a \_\_\_\_\_ leverage limit imposed by lenders, without fulfilling the \_\_\_\_\_ behind it.
  6. A firm that "zeros out" its \_\_\_\_\_ at some point in each operating cycle can legitimately argue that its "true" leverage is represented by the \_\_\_\_\_ on its balance sheet.
  7. Current maturities of long-term debt should enter into the calculation of \_\_\_\_\_, based on a conservative assumption that the company will replace maturing debt with \_\_\_\_\_.
  8. Exposure to interest rate fluctuations can also arise from long-term \_\_\_\_\_. Companies can limit this risk by using \_\_\_\_\_.
  9. Public financial statements typically provide \_\_\_\_\_ information about the extent to which the issuer has \_\_\_\_\_ its exposure to interest rate fluctuations through \_\_\_\_\_.
  10. Analysts should remember that the ultimate objective is not to \_\_\_\_\_ but to \_\_\_\_\_.
  11. In general, the credit analyst must recognize the heightened level of risk implied by the presence of preferred stock in the \_\_\_\_\_. One formal way to take this risk into account is to calculate the ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.
  12. In addition to including capital leases in the total debt calculation, analysts should also take into account the \_\_\_\_\_ liabilities represented by contractual payments on \_\_\_\_\_, which are reported as \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_ to Financial Statements.
  13. A corporation can employ leverage yet avoid showing debt on its consolidated balance sheet by \_\_\_\_\_ or forming \_\_\_\_\_.
  14. Under SFAS \_\_\_\_\_, balance sheet recognition is now given to pension liabilities related to employees' service to date. Similarly, SFAS



- \_\_\_\_\_ requires recognition of postretirement health care benefits as an on-balance sheet liability.
15. The precise formula for \_\_\_\_\_ a ratio is less important than the assurance that it is \_\_\_\_\_ for all companies being evaluated.
  16. In general, credit analysts should assume that the achievement of \_\_\_\_\_ bond ratings is a \_\_\_\_\_ goal of corporate management.
  17. The contemporary view is that profits are ultimately what sustain \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. High profits keep plenty of cash flowing through the system and confirm the value of productive assets such as \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_.
  18. The cumulative effect of a change in accounting procedures will appear \_\_\_\_\_ or after \_\_\_\_\_ have already been deducted. The sum of net income and provision for income taxes will then differ from the \_\_\_\_\_ that appears in the income statement.
  19. Operating margin shows how well management has run the business \_\_\_\_\_ wisely, controlling \_\_\_\_\_ before taking into account financial policies, which largely determine \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_, which is outside management's control.
  20. Fixed-charge coverage is an \_\_\_\_\_ ratio of major interest to credit analysts. It measures the ability of a company's \_\_\_\_\_ to meet the \_\_\_\_\_ on its debt, the lender's most direct concern. In its simplest form, the fixed-charge coverage ratio indicates the \_\_\_\_\_ by which \_\_\_\_\_ suffice to pay \_\_\_\_\_.
  21. Regardless of whether it is \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_, however, all interest accrued must be covered by \_\_\_\_\_ and should therefore appear in the \_\_\_\_\_ of the fixed-charge coverage calculation.
  22. The two complications that arise in connection with incorporating operating lease payments into the fixed-charge coverage calculation are:
    - a. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  23. Companies sometimes argue that the denominator of the fixed-charge coverage ratio should include only \_\_\_\_\_ expense, that

- is, the difference between \_\_\_\_\_ and income derived from \_\_\_\_\_, generally consisting of marketable securities.
24. Ratios related to sources and uses of funds measure credit quality at the most elemental level—a company's ability to \_\_\_\_\_.
  25. Given corporations' general reluctance to sell new equity, a recurrent cash shortfall is likely to be made up with \_\_\_\_\_ financing, leading to a rise in \_\_\_\_\_ ratio.
  26. A company that suffers a prolonged downtrend in its ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ is likely to get more deeply into debt, and therefore become \_\_\_\_\_ with each succeeding year.
  27. Unlike earnings, \_\_\_\_\_ is essentially a programmed item, a cash flow assured by the accounting rules. The higher the percentage of cash flow derived from \_\_\_\_\_, the higher is the \_\_\_\_\_ of a company's cash flow, and the \_\_\_\_\_ its financial flexibility on the vagaries of the marketplace.
  28. Analysts cannot necessarily assume that all is well simply because capital expenditures consistently exceed depreciation. Among the issues to consider are:
    - a. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. \_\_\_\_\_
    - c. \_\_\_\_\_
    - d. \_\_\_\_\_
  29. A limitation of combination ratios that incorporate balance-sheet figures is that they have little meaning if \_\_\_\_\_.
  30. The underlying notion of a turnover ratio is that a company requires a certain level of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ to support a given volume of sales.
  31. A \_\_\_\_\_ is a possible explanation of declining inventory turnover. In this case, the inventory may not have suffered a severe reduction in value, but there are nevertheless unfavorable implications for \_\_\_\_\_. Until the inventory glut can be worked off by \_\_\_\_\_ to match the lower \_\_\_\_\_, the company may have to borrow to finance its unusually high working capital, thereby increasing its \_\_\_\_\_.
  32. Fixed-charge coverage, too, has a weakness, for it is based on \_\_\_\_\_, which are subject to considerable manipulation.

33. Built from two comparatively hard numbers, the ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ provides one of the best single measures of \_\_\_\_\_.
34. Expected \_\_\_\_\_ have an important bearing on the decision to \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ credit, as well as on the \_\_\_\_\_ of debt securities.
35. Line of business is another basis for defining \_\_\_\_\_.
36. Beyond a certain point, calculating and comparing companies on the basis of \_\_\_\_\_ financial ratios contributes little \_\_\_\_\_.
37. \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ financial ratios can have different implications for different companies.
38. Quantitative models such as Zeta, as well as others that have been devised using various mathematical techniques, have several distinct benefits such as:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
39. Like the quantitative models consisting of \_\_\_\_\_, the default risk models based on stock prices provide useful, but \_\_\_\_\_, signals.

**CHAPTER 14: EQUITY ANALYSIS**

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1. In this chapter, the discussion focuses primarily on the use of financial statements in \_\_\_\_\_.
2. Of the methods of fundamental common stock analysis, no other approach matches the intuitive appeal of regarding the stock price as the \_\_\_\_\_ of expected \_\_\_\_\_ dividends. This approach is analogous to the \_\_\_\_\_ calculation for a bond and therefore facilitates the comparison of different \_\_\_\_\_ of a single \_\_\_\_\_.
3. By thinking through the logic of the \_\_\_\_\_ method, the analyst will find that value always comes back to \_\_\_\_\_.

4. The company's earnings growth rate may diverge from its sales growth due to changes in its \_\_\_\_\_.
5. As a rule, a \_\_\_\_\_ company will not increase its dividend on a regular, annual basis.
6. Many analysts argue that \_\_\_\_\_, rather than \_\_\_\_\_, is the true determinant of dividend-paying capability.
7. Cash generated from \_\_\_\_\_, which is generally more difficult for companies to manipulate than \_\_\_\_\_, can legitimately be viewed as the preferred measure of future \_\_\_\_\_.
8. The ability to vary the \_\_\_\_\_, and therefore to assign a \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ multiple to a company's earnings, is the equity analyst's defense against earnings \_\_\_\_\_ by management.
9. It is appropriate to assign an \_\_\_\_\_ discount factor to the earnings of a company that competes against larger, better-capitalized firms. A small company \_\_\_\_\_ of depth in management and concentration of \_\_\_\_\_.
10. A building-materials manufacturer may claim to be cushioned against fluctuations in housing starts because of a strong emphasis in its product line on \_\_\_\_\_.
11. Analysts should be especially wary of companies that have tended to jump on the bandwagon of \_\_\_\_\_ associated with the \_\_\_\_\_ of the moment.
12. Earnings per share will not grow merely because \_\_\_\_\_.
13. Leverage reaches a limit, since lenders will not continue advancing funds beyond a certain point as \_\_\_\_\_.
14. One way to increase earnings per share is to \_\_\_\_\_.
15. To the extent that the company funds share buybacks with idle cash, the increase in \_\_\_\_\_ is offset by a reduction arising from \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Like most ratio analysis, the Du Pont Formula is valuable not only for \_\_\_\_\_ but also for \_\_\_\_\_.
17. Besides introducing greater volatility into the \_\_\_\_\_, adding debt to the balance sheet demonstrates \_\_\_\_\_.

18. Some companies have the potential to raise their share prices by \_\_\_\_\_, while others can increase their value by \_\_\_\_\_.
19. Management's main adversaries in battles over \_\_\_\_\_ were aggressive \_\_\_\_\_.
20. At least in the early stages, before some raiders became overly aggressive in their financial forecast assumptions, it was feasible to extract value without creating undue bankruptcy risk, simply by \_\_\_\_\_.
21. In future bear markets, when stocks again sell at depressed price-earnings multiples, investors will probably renew their focus on \_\_\_\_\_.
22. A leveraged buyout can bring about improved profitability for either of two reasons:
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
23. Today's \_\_\_\_\_ may be a precursor of tomorrow's bankruptcy by a company that has economized its way to \_\_\_\_\_.
24. A focus on \_\_\_\_\_ multiples, the best-known form of fundamental analysis, is not the investor's \_\_\_\_\_ to relying on technicians' stock charts.
25. For the investor who takes a longer view, \_\_\_\_\_ provides an invaluable reference point for valuation.



# Financial Statement Exercises

1. Indicate in which of the principal financial statements each item appears.

a.

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accounts Payable			
Accumulated Depreciation			
Adjusted Net Income			
Capital Expenditures			
Cash and Equivalents—Change			
Common Shares Outstanding			
Current Debt—Changes			
Direct Operating Activities			
Earnings per Share (Fully Diluted)			
Earnings per Share (Primary)			
Equity in Net Loss (Earnings)			
Extraordinary Items			
Financing Activities—Net Cash Flow			
Gross Plant, Property, and Equipment			
Income before Extraordinary Items			
Indirect Operating Activities			
Interest Paid—Net			
Investing Activities			
Investment Tax Credit			
Long-Term Debt Due In One Year			
Minority Interest			
Net Receivables			
Operating Activities—Net Cash Flow			
Other Assets and Liabilities—Net Change			
Other Investments			
Preferred Stock—Nonredeemable			
Pretax Income			
Retained Earnings			
Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipment			
Selling, General, and Administrative Expense			
Stock Equivalents			

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Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Total Current Assets			
Total Income Taxes			
Total Preferred Stock			

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b.

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Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accrued Expenses			
Adjusted Available for Common			
Available for Common			
Cash and Equivalents			
Common Equity			
Cost of Goods Sold			
Deferred Taxes			
Dividends per Share			
Earnings per Share (Primary)			
Equity			
Financing Activities			
Funds from Operations—Other			
Income Taxes Paid			
Interest Expense			
Inventory—Decrease (Increase)			
Investing Activities—Other			
Investments at Equity			
Long-Term Debt			
Long-Term Debt—Reduction			
Net Plant, Property, and Equipment			
Notes Payable			
Other Assets			
Other Current Liabilities			
Preferred Dividends			
Prepaid Expenses			
Receivables—Decrease (Increase)			
Sale of Investments			
Savings Due to Common			
Special Items			
Total Assets			
Total Equity			
Total Liabilities and Equity			

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c.

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accounts Payable and Accrued Liabilities—Increase (Decrease)			
Acquisitions			
Assets			
Capital Surplus			
Cash Dividends			
Common Stock			
Deferred Charges			
Discontinued Operations			
Earnings per Share (Fully Diluted)			
EPS from Operations			
Exchange Rate Effect			
Financing Activities—Other			
Gross Profit			
Income Taxes—Accrued—Increase (Decrease)			
Intangibles			
Inventories			
Investing Activities—Net Cash Flow			
Investments—Increase			
Liabilities			
Long-Term Debt—Issuance			
Minority Interest			
Non-Operating Income/Expense			
Operating Profit			
Other Current Assets			
Other Liabilities			
Preferred Stock—Redeemable			
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock			
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock			
Sales			
Short-Term Investments—Change			
Taxes Payable			
Total Current Liabilities			
Total Liabilities			
Treasury Stock			

- Construct a common balance sheet from the Balance Sheets of the following firms, determine their operating strategy, and discuss the implications.

## Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CBRL)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	87.8	14.2	12.0	11.6	47.7
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>87.8</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>47.7</b>
Accounts Receivable	11.4	11.8	13.5	12.7	13.5
Other Receivables	0	0	6.9	4.1	0
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>13.5</b>
Inventory	128.3	144.4	156.0	137.4	144.1
Prepaid Exp.	4.4	12.6	11.0	9.2	8.6
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	17.5	12.6	18.1	23.3	22.3
Other Current Assets	404.3	4.7	3.2	0	0
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>653.8</b>	<b>200.3</b>	<b>220.6</b>	<b>198.3</b>	<b>236.3</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	1,415.4	1,500.2	1,571.8	1,572.4	1,621.5
Accumulated Depreciation	(432.9)	(481.2)	(526.6)	(570.7)	(617.4)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>982.5</b>	<b>1,019.0</b>	<b>1,045.2</b>	<b>1,001.8</b>	<b>1,004.1</b>
Other Long-Term Assets	45.0	45.8	47.8	45.1	51.7
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>1,681.3</u></b>	<b><u>1,265.0</u></b>	<b><u>1,313.7</u></b>	<b><u>1,245.2</u></b>	<b><u>1,292.1</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	70.9	93.1	93.1	92.2	116.2
Accrued Exp.	139.6	134.2	110.8	110.8	118.4
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	8.1	8.2	8.7	7.4	6.7
Curr. Port. of Cap. Leases	0	0	0	0	0
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	21.4	18.1	0	0	7.6
Unearned Revenue, Current	18.8	21.2	22.6	22.5	27.5
Other Current Liabilities	71.6	0	29.5	32.1	33.0
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>330.5</b>	<b>274.7</b>	<b>264.7</b>	<b>265.0</b>	<b>309.5</b>

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
Long-Term Debt	911.5	756.3	818.7	699.3	640.0
Capital Leases	0	0	0.1	0.1	0
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0	0	0	0	25.9
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	81.9	62.4	54.3	55.7	57.1
Other Non-Current Liabilities	55.1	67.5	83.1	89.6	67.8
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>1,379.0</b>	<b>1,160.9</b>	<b>1,221.0</b>	<b>1,109.6</b>	<b>1,100.5</b>
Common Stock	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Additional Paid In Capital	4.3	0	0.7	13.0	6.2
Retained Earnings	302.2	112.9	119.5	167.2	234.0
Treasury Stock	0	0	0	0	0
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(4.5)	(9.0)	(27.7)	(44.8)	(48.8)
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>302.3</b>	<b>104.1</b>	<b>92.8</b>	<b>135.6</b>	<b>191.6</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>302.3</u></b>	<b><u>104.1</u></b>	<b><u>92.8</u></b>	<b><u>135.6</u></b>	<b><u>191.6</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>1,681.3</u></b>	<b><u>1,265.0</u></b>	<b><u>1,313.7</u></b>	<b><u>1,245.2</u></b>	<b><u>1,292.1</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	30.9	23.7	22.3	22.7	22.7
Total Debt	919.6	764.5	827.5	706.8	646.8
Net Debt	831.8	750.2	815.5	695.1	599.1
Debt Equivalent Oper. Leases	434.8	444.1	463.0	483.3	527.0
Finished Goods Inventory	114.3	109.9	142.0	125.2	131.3

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
Other Inventory					
Accounts	14.0	34.5	13.9	12.2	12.8
Land	277.6	287.9	299.6	286.2	287.6
Buildings	967.5	687.0	711.0	686.7	698.4
Machinery	0	336.9	359.1	379.5	410.4
Construction in Progress	17.9	19.7	15.1	16.1	11.5
Leasehold Improvements	149.1	165.5	183.7	200.7	210.3
Full-Time Employees	74,031.0	64,000.0	65,000.0	66,000.0	67,000.0
Assets under Cap. Lease, Gross	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3

**Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	0.1	153.6	151.2	88.0	219.6
Short-Term Investments	0	0	20.0	100.0	50.0
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>153.6</b>	<b>171.2</b>	<b>188.0</b>	<b>269.6</b>
Accounts Receivable	1.9	4.9	5.4	3.6	4.8
Other Receivables	2.2	8.8	9.5	0.3	0
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.8</b>
Inventory	2.6	3.5	4.3	4.8	5.6
Prepaid Exp.	8.6	7.1	9.0	11.8	14.4
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	2.3	0.9	2.4	2.6	3.1
Other Current Assets	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>178.8</b>	<b>201.8</b>	<b>211.1</b>	<b>297.5</b>

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	427.1	522.4	645.9	777.4	882.1
Accumulated Depreciation	(86.4)	(117.6)	(151.0)	(191.5)	(245.7)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>340.7</b>	<b>404.7</b>	<b>494.9</b>	<b>585.9</b>	<b>636.4</b>
Goodwill	17.7	17.7	21.9	21.9	21.9
Deferred Tax Assets, LT	13.6	0	0	0	0
Other Long-Term Assets	2.7	2.9	3.4	6.1	5.7
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>392.5</u></b>	<b><u>604.2</u></b>	<b><u>722.1</u></b>	<b><u>825.0</u></b>	<b><u>961.5</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	13.2	19.6	19.9	23.9	25.2
Accrued Exp.	23.2	33.1	44.3	44.8	63.3
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0	1.5	0	0	4.2
Unearned Revenue, Current	3.7	7.0	9.0	8.0	9.3
Other Current Liabilities	1.8	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>102.2</b>
Long-Term Debt	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.8
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	0	18.7	16.5	29.9	38.9
Other Non-Current Liabilities	37.7	46.3	66.3	91.9	113.2
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>130.3</b>	<b>160.0</b>	<b>202.4</b>	<b>258.0</b>
Common Stock	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Additional Paid In Capital	375.7	470.7	489.3	502.0	539.9
Retained Earnings	(38.5)	3.0	72.5	150.7	277.5
Treasury Stock	0	0	0	(30.2)	(114.3)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(28.2)	0	0	(0.2)	0
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>309.4</b>	<b>474.0</b>	<b>562.1</b>	<b>622.6</b>	<b>703.5</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>309.4</u></b>	<b><u>474.0</u></b>	<b><u>562.1</u></b>	<b><u>622.6</u></b>	<b><u>703.5</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>392.5</u></b>	<b><u>604.2</u></b>	<b><u>722.1</u></b>	<b><u>825.0</u></b>	<b><u>961.5</u></b>

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance					
Sheet Date	26.3	32.5	32.8	32.2	31.5
Total Debt	3.5	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.9
Net Debt	3.5	(149.5)	(167.1)	(184.1)	(265.7)
Debt Equivalent Oper. Leases	326.9	387.8	560.3	727.6	810.3
Land	6.6	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.9
Buildings	320.9	0	0	0	0
Machinery	99.6	120.2	148.0	179.9	207.0
Leasehold Improvements	320.9	394.0	489.8	589.3	666.2
Full-Time Employees	13,000.0	15,000.0	18,800.0	20,400.0	22,250.0

**Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. (NasdaqGS:BWLD)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-25- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-30- 2007	Reclassified Dec-28-2008	Dec-27- 2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	4.0	11.8	1.5	8.3	9.6
Short-Term Investments	48.4	52.8	66.5	36.2	43.6
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>68.0</b>	<b>44.5</b>	<b>53.2</b>
Accounts Receivable	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	2.1
Other Receivables	3.7	5.2	8.9	7.4	9.3
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>11.4</b>
Inventory	1.5	1.8	2.4	3.1	3.6
Prepaid Exp.	2.0	1.1	3.1	3.3	3.0
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	0.8	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.9
Other Current Assets	0	0	—	7.7	24.4
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>98.5</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	110.8	132.8	169.7	235.6	298.1
Accumulated Depreciation	(42.1)	(54.7)	(67.0)	(81.2)	(108.4)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>68.7</b>	<b>78.1</b>	<b>102.7</b>	<b>154.4</b>	<b>189.6</b>

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-25- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-30- 2007	Reclassified Dec-28-2008	Dec-27- 2009
Goodwill	0.4	0.4	0.4	11.0	11.2
Other Intangibles	0.3	0.4	0.4	7.3	6.7
Other Long-Term Assets	2.7	7.4	9.1	2.5	3.0
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>133.1</u></b>	<b><u>161.2</u></b>	<b><u>197.1</u></b>	<b><u>243.8</u></b>	<b><u>309.1</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	6.6	5.9	10.7	16.7	13.4
Accrued Exp.	10.7	16.5	18.8	18.6	26.1
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0.1	0.3	—	0	0
Unearned Revenue, Current	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.7
Other Current Liabilities	0.6	0.8	0.7	10.4	24.5
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>48.2</b>	<b>66.7</b>
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	4.8	3.2	2.2	8.9	14.9
Other Non-Current Liabilities	11.3	16.0	20.8	15.1	17.6
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>55.4</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>99.2</b>
Common Stock	74.5	75.0	80.8	86.3	93.9
Additional Paid In Capital	0	0	—	0	0
Retained Earnings	24.9	41.2	60.8	85.3	115.9
Treasury Stock	0	0	—	0	0
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(2.6)	0	—	0	0
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>96.8</b>	<b>116.2</b>	<b>141.7</b>	<b>171.6</b>	<b>209.8</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>96.8</u></b>	<b><u>116.2</u></b>	<b><u>141.7</u></b>	<b><u>171.6</u></b>	<b><u>209.8</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>133.1</u></b>	<b><u>161.2</u></b>	<b><u>197.1</u></b>	<b><u>243.8</u></b>	<b><u>309.1</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance					
Sheet Date	17.2	17.6	17.7	17.9	18.1
Net Debt	(52.4)	(64.6)	(68.0)	(44.5)	(53.2)
Debt Equivalent Oper. Leases	96.7	120.9	138.7	179.0	223.2
Buildings	64.5	NA	1.6	6.6	18.3
Machinery	45.3	54.0	70.0	95.5	121.2
Construction in Progress	1.0	1.0	1.9	10.7	6.4
Leasehold Improvements	64.5	77.8	96.3	122.8	152.1
Full-Time Employees	1,282.0	1,113.0	988.0	1,200.0	1,200.0
Part-Time Employees	4,843.0	6,210.0	8,576.0	10,800.0	12,800.0

## Denny's Corporation (NasdaqCM:DENN)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec-28- 2005	Restated Dec-27- 2006	Restated Dec-26- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-30- 2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	28.2	26.2	21.6	21.0	26.5
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>26.5</b>
Accounts Receivable	16.8	15.0	13.6	15.1	18.1
Notes Receivable	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>18.1</b>
Inventory	8.2	8.2	6.5	5.5	4.2
Prepaid Exp.	8.4	9.1	9.5	9.5	9.5
Other Current Assets	0	4.7	6.7	2.3	0
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>58.3</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	669.9	615.5	491.7	444.9	390.2
Accumulated Depreciation	(381.7)	(379.3)	(307.0)	(284.9)	(258.7)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>288.1</b>	<b>236.3</b>	<b>184.6</b>	<b>160.0</b>	<b>131.5</b>
Goodwill	50.2	50.1	42.4	34.6	32.4
Other Intangibles	71.7	73.6	69.0	64.4	59.5
Loans Receivable Long-Term	0	0	0	0	0
Deferred Charges, LT	15.8	6.3	5.1	3.9	2.7
Other Long-Term Assets	23.9	14.9	18.4	25.5	28.2
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>511.3</u></b>	<b><u>444.4</u></b>	<b><u>377.4</u></b>	<b><u>341.8</u></b>	<b><u>312.6</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	47.6	42.1	43.3	25.3	22.8
Accrued Exp.	70.6	52.5	58.8	52.4	43.9
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	1.9	5.5	2.1	1.4	0.9
Curr. Port. of Cap. Leases	6.2	7.0	4.1	3.5	3.7
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0	11.8	9.7	8.8	8.0
Other Current Liabilities	22.1	16.9	13.6	15.7	12.8
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>148.4</b>	<b>135.8</b>	<b>131.5</b>	<b>107.1</b>	<b>92.1</b>



Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec-28- 2005	Restated Dec-27- 2006	Restated Dec-26- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-30- 2009
Long-Term Debt	516.8	415.8	326.0	300.6	258.9
Capital Leases	28.9	24.9	20.8	22.1	19.7
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0	0	3.7	15.2	9.9
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	0	12.1	11.6	12.3	13.0
Other Non-Current Liabilities	83.7	79.3	66.1	63.9	46.5
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>777.8</b>	<b>667.9</b>	<b>559.6</b>	<b>521.2</b>	<b>440.1</b>
Common Stock	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0
Additional Paid In Capital	517.9	527.9	533.6	538.9	542.6
Retained Earnings	(765.8)	(735.0)	(703.6)	(694.4)	(652.8)
Treasury Stock	0	0	0	0	0
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(19.5)	(17.4)	(13.1)	(24.9)	(18.2)
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>(266.5)</b>	<b>(223.6)</b>	<b>(182.2)</b>	<b>(179.4)</b>	<b>(127.5)</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>(266.5)</u></b>	<b><u>(223.6)</u></b>	<b><u>(182.2)</u></b>	<b><u>(179.4)</u></b>	<b><u>(127.5)</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>511.3</u></b>	<b><u>444.4</u></b>	<b><u>377.4</u></b>	<b><u>341.8</u></b>	<b><u>312.6</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	91.8	93.2	94.6	95.7	96.6
Total Debt	553.8	453.3	353.0	327.6	283.2
Net Debt	525.5	427.0	331.4	306.6	256.7
Debt Equiv. of Unfunded Proj. Benefit Obligation	15.9	9.9	0.8	12.8	7.7
Debt Equivalent Oper. Leases	409.8	405.3	400.1	398.3	390.4
Finished Goods Inventory	0	0	6.5	5.5	4.2

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec-28- 2005	Restated Dec-27- 2006	Restated Dec-26- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-30- 2009
Land	56.9	37.5	28.8	23.7	18.0
Buildings	474.9	393.2	279.4	243.2	209.0
Machinery	138.1	0	0	0	0
Full-Time Employees	27,000.0	27,000.0	21,000.0	15,000.0	11,000.0
Assets under Cap.					
Lease, Gross	37.6	39.6	20.6	19.3	12.3
Assets under Cap.					
Lease, Accum. Depr.	(17.0)	(20.2)	(12.2)	(10.5)	(5.9)
Assets on Oper. Lease,					
Gross	0	0	48.1	56.5	61.0
Assets on Oper. Lease,					
Accum. Depr.	0	0	(35.1)	(37.0)	(40.0)

**California Pizza Kitchen Inc. (NasdaqGS:CPKI)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Jan-01- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-30- 2007	Dec-28- 2008	Jan-03- 2010
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	11.3	8.2	10.8	14.4	21.4
Short-Term Investments	11.4	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>14.4</b>	<b>21.4</b>
Accounts Receivable	4.1	7.9	2.0	2.8	3.2
Other Receivables	0	0	10.3	7.1	9.3
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>12.5</b>
Inventory	3.8	4.7	5.2	5.4	5.6
Prepaid Exp.	5.5	5.4	5.8	1.9	7.0
Deferred Tax Assets,					
Curr.	8.4	11.7	7.0	6.0	7.1
Other Current Assets	1.4	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>53.6</b>

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Jan-01- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-30- 2007	Dec-28- 2008	Jan-03- 2010
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	399.3	467.9	543.5	591.0	602.9
Accumulated Depreciation	(185.9)	(212.5)	(245.7)	(295.5)	(347.5)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>213.4</b>	<b>255.4</b>	<b>297.9</b>	<b>295.5</b>	<b>255.4</b>
Goodwill	0	0	0	4.6	4.6
Other Intangibles	6.0	7.8	8.8	4.9	4.7
Deferred Tax Assets, LT	4.5	5.9	13.8	20.7	25.0
Other Long-Term Assets	4.4	3.6	5.5	5.2	6.9
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>274.3</u></b>	<b><u>310.5</u></b>	<b><u>367.1</u></b>	<b><u>368.4</u></b>	<b><u>350.3</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	7.1	15.0	20.0	12.3	11.3
Accrued Exp.	35.6	42.8	49.7	49.5	53.4
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	0	0	21.0	0	0
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0	3.6	1.0	4.1	0
Unearned Revenue, Current	0	0	8.0	9.7	20.6
Other Current Liabilities	4.1	4.5	9.2	3.8	4.1
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>108.9</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>89.4</b>
Long-Term Debt	0	0	0	74.0	22.3
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0	0	0	1.2	1.6
Other Non-Current Liabilities	30.2	36.1	40.1	39.2	47.7
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>76.9</b>	<b>102.2</b>	<b>149.0</b>	<b>193.9</b>	<b>161.0</b>
Common Stock	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Additional Paid In Capital	231.2	221.1	216.0	163.8	174.0
Retained Earnings	(34.0)	(13.0)	1.8	10.5	15.0
Treasury Stock	0	0	0	0	0
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>197.3</b>	<b>208.3</b>	<b>218.1</b>	<b>174.5</b>	<b>189.3</b>

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Jan-01- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-30- 2007	Dec-28- 2008	Jan-03- 2010
Total Equity	<u>197.3</u>	<u>208.3</u>	<u>218.1</u>	<u>174.5</u>	<u>189.3</u>
Total Liabilities and Equity	<u>274.3</u>	<u>310.5</u>	<u>367.1</u>	<u>368.4</u>	<u>350.3</u>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	29.5	28.9	28.4	23.9	24.2
Total Debt	0	0	21.0	74.0	22.3
Net Debt	(22.7)	(8.2)	10.2	59.6	0.9
Debt Equivalent Oper.					
Leases	182.8	219.2	252.8	304.0	304.8
Land	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8
Buildings	237.5	10.1	10.1	10.6	11.3
Machinery	139.5	151.9	174.7	196.8	192.4
Construction in Progress	16.5	40.5	37.4	35.6	6.4
Leasehold					
Improvements	227.4	259.7	315.6	342.3	387.1
Full-Time Employees	12,900.0	13,900.0	14,800.0	15,100.0	14,600.0

3. Construct a common size income statement from the Income Statement of the following firms, determine their operating strategy, and discuss the implications.

**Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CBRL)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Jul-28- 2006	Reclassified Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
Total Revenue	2,219.5	2,351.6	2,384.5	2,367.3	2,404.5
Cost of Goods Sold	1,539.0	1,637.1	1,683.3	1,681.2	1,654.0
Gross Profit	680.4	714.5	701.2	686.1	750.5
Selling General & Admin Exp.	512.1	547.6	549.6	541.8	583.0

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Jul-28- 2006	Reclassified Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
R & D Exp.	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation & Amort.	0	0	0	0	0
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	<b>512.1</b>	<b>547.6</b>	<b>549.6</b>	<b>541.8</b>	<b>583.0</b>
<b>Operating Income</b>	<b>168.4</b>	<b>166.8</b>	<b>151.7</b>	<b>144.3</b>	<b>167.5</b>
Interest Expense	(22.2)	(59.4)	(57.4)	(52.2)	(49.0)
Interest and Invest. Income	0.8	7.8	0.2	0	0
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>(21.4)</b>	<b>(51.7)</b>	<b>(57.3)</b>	<b>(52.2)</b>	<b>(49.0)</b>
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>146.9</b>	<b>115.2</b>	<b>94.4</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>118.5</b>
Restructuring Charges	(6.6)	0	0	0	0
Impairment of Goodwill	0	0	0	0	0
Asset Writedown	0	0	(0.9)	(2.1)	(2.8)
Legal Settlements	0	1.3	0	0	0
Other Unusual Items	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>140.4</b>	<b>116.5</b>	<b>93.5</b>	<b>90.1</b>	<b>115.7</b>
Income Tax Expense	44.9	40.5	28.2	24.1	30.5
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>95.5</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>85.3</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	20.8	86.1	0.3	0	0
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>116.3</u></b>	<b><u>162.1</u></b>	<b><u>65.6</u></b>	<b><u>65.9</u></b>	<b><u>85.3</u></b>
Dividends per Share	\$0.52	\$0.56	\$0.72	\$0.8	\$0.8
Payout Ratio %	20.7%	9.6%	24.0%	26.7%	21.8%

(Continued)

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Jul-28- 2006	Reclassified Aug-03- 2007	Aug-01- 2008	Jul-31- 2009	Jul-30- 2010
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	225.6	223.7	209.3	203.6	228.5
EBITA	168.4	166.8	151.7	144.3	167.5
EBIT	168.4	166.8	151.7	144.3	167.5
EBITDAR	280.0	279.2	267.2	264.0	294.4
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp. General and Administrative Exp.	38.3	40.5	42.2	42.4	45.2
Net Rental Exp.	128.8	136.2	127.3	120.2	145.9
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	54.3	55.5	57.9	60.4	65.9
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	17.4	31.8	33.8	33.2	38.3
	37.0	23.7	24.1	27.3	27.6

**Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2007	Reclassified Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>627.7</b>	<b>822.9</b>	<b>1,085.8</b>	<b>1,332.0</b>	<b>1,518.4</b>
Cost of Goods Sold	428.6	547.9	711.7	878.4	965.3
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>199.1</b>	<b>275.0</b>	<b>374.1</b>	<b>453.5</b>	<b>553.1</b>
Selling General & Admin Exp.	52.0	68.0	98.3	117.1	124.5
Pre-Opening Costs	2.0	4.1	5.0	5.7	4.0
R & D Exp.	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation & Amort.	28.0	34.3	43.6	52.8	61.3
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	83.0	102.7	112.9	142.0	153.6
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	<b>164.9</b>	<b>209.1</b>	<b>259.7</b>	<b>317.6</b>	<b>343.4</b>

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2007	Reclassified Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>Operating Income</b>	34.1	65.9	114.4	136.0	209.7
Interest Expense	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)
Interest and Invest. Income	0	6.6	6.1	3.5	0.9
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>0.5</b>
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>120.2</b>	<b>139.1</b>	<b>210.2</b>
Impairment of Goodwill	0	0	0	0	0
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets	(3.1)	(4.0)	(6.2)	(9.3)	(6.0)
Other Unusual Items	0	0	0	(2.6)	0
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>114.0</b>	<b>127.2</b>	<b>204.2</b>
Income Tax Expense	(7.5)	26.8	43.4	49.0	77.4
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>37.7</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>78.2</b>	<b>126.8</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0	0	0	0	0
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>37.7</u></b>	<b><u>41.4</u></b>	<b><u>70.6</u></b>	<b><u>78.2</u></b>	<b><u>126.8</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	62.1	100.2	157.9	188.7	271.0
EBITA	34.1	65.9	114.4	136.0	209.7
EBIT	34.1	65.9	114.4	136.0	209.7
EBITDAR	103.0	148.7	228.0	279.7	372.3
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	10.7	13.9	0	0	0
Marketing Exp.	0	0	18.6	22.1	21.0
Selling and Marketing Exp.	0	0	18.6	22.1	21.0

(Continued)

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**Income Statement**


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For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Reclassified Dec-31- 2007	Reclassified Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
General and					
Administrative Exp.	52.0	65.3	75.0	89.2	99.1
Net Rental Exp.	40.9	48.5	70.0	90.9	101.3
Imputed Oper. Lease					
Interest Exp.	64.9	27.5	40.7	55.0	83.7
Imputed Oper. Lease					
Depreciation	(24.0)	21.0	29.3	36.0	17.6

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**Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. (NasdaqGS:BWLD)**
*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*


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**Income Statement**


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For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-25- 2005	Reclassified Dec-31- 2006	Dec-30- 2007	Dec-28- 2008	Dec-27- 2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	209.7	278.2	329.7	422.4	538.9
Cost of Goods Sold	158.1	207.7	245.8	313.2	402.9
	51.6	70.5	83.8	109.2	136.0
Selling General &					
Admin Exp.	22.3	30.4	35.7	40.2	49.4
Pre-Opening Costs	2.6	3.1	4.5	7.9	7.7
R & D Exp.	—	0	0	0	0
Depreciation & Amort.	11.8	14.5	17.0	23.6	32.6
Other Operating					
Expense/(Income)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Other Operating Exp.,   Total</b>	36.7	47.9	57.2	71.7	89.7
<b>Operating Income</b>	15.0	22.5	26.6	37.5	46.3
Interest Expense	0	0	0	0	0
Interest and Invest.					
Income	1.3	2.3	2.9	1.0	1.1
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	1.3	2.3	2.9	1.0	1.1



Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-25- 2005	Reclassified Dec-31- 2006	Dec-30- 2007	Dec-28- 2008	Dec-27- 2009
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>47.4</b>
Restructuring Charges	(2.0)	(1.0)	0	0	0
Impairment of Goodwill	0	0	0	0	0
Asset Writedown	0	0	(1.0)	(2.1)	(1.9)
Other Unusual Items	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>45.4</b>
Income Tax Expense	5.4	7.6	8.9	11.9	14.8
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>30.7</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0	0	0	0	0
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>8.9</u></b>	<b><u>16.3</u></b>	<b><u>19.7</u></b>	<b><u>24.4</u></b>	<b><u>30.7</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	26.8	36.9	43.5	61.1	78.9
EBITA	15.1	22.5	26.5	37.7	46.9
EBIT	15.0	22.5	26.6	37.5	46.3
EBITDAR	38.9	52.1	60.9	83.5	106.8
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp. General and	5.8	9.1	10.5	13.5	17.8
Administrative Exp.	22.3	30.4	35.7	40.2	49.4
Net Rental Exp.	12.1	15.1	17.3	22.4	27.9

## California Pizza Kitchen Inc. (NasdaqGS:CPKI)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Jan-01-2006	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Dec-28-2008	Jan-03-2010
<b>Total Revenue</b>	479.6	554.6	632.9	677.1	664.7
Cost of Goods Sold	385.1	444.2	507.1	553.2	543.5
<b>Gross Profit</b>	94.5	110.5	125.8	123.9	121.2
Selling General & Admin Exp.	36.3	43.3	48.4	52.4	52.4
Pre-Opening Costs	4.1	7.0	7.2	4.5	1.8
R & D Exp.	0	0	0	0	0
Depreciation & Amort.	25.4	29.5	37.1	40.3	40.2
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	65.8	79.8	92.7	97.2	94.4
<b>Operating Income</b>	28.8	30.7	33.1	26.8	26.8
Interest Expense	0	0	(0.1)	(1.3)	(0.8)
Interest and Invest. Income	0.7	0.7	0	0	0
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	0.7	0.7	(0.1)	(1.3)	(0.8)
Income/(Loss) from Affiliates	0	0	0	0	0
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	29.5	31.4	33.0	25.4	26.0
Restructuring Charges	(0.2)	(0.7)	(9.3)	(1.0)	(0.5)
Impairment of Goodwill	0	0	0	0	0
Asset Writedown	(1.2)	0	0	(13.3)	(22.9)
Legal Settlements	(0.6)	0	(2.3)	0	0
Other Unusual Items	1.1	0	0	0	0
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	28.7	30.7	21.4	11.1	2.5
Income Tax Expense	9.2	9.7	6.7	2.4	(2.1)
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	19.5	21.0	14.8	8.7	4.6

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Jan-01-2006	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Dec-28-2008	Jan-03-2010
Earnings of					
Discontinued Ops.	0	0	0	0	0
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>19.5</u></b>	<b><u>21.0</u></b>	<b><u>14.8</u></b>	<b><u>8.7</u></b>	<b><u>4.6</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	54.2	60.2	70.2	67.0	66.9
EBITA	28.8	30.7	33.1	26.9	26.9
EBIT	28.8	30.7	33.1	26.8	26.8
EBITDAR	77.0	87.6	101.8	105.0	105.0
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	4.2	4.9	5.5	6.6	7.4
General and Administrative Exp.	36.3	43.3	48.4	52.4	52.4
Net Rental Exp.	22.8	27.4	31.6	38.0	38.1
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	0	0	0	14.0	5.4
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	0	0	0	24.0	32.7

## Denny's Corporation (NasdaqCM:DENN)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-28-2005	Reclassified Dec-27-2006	Restated Dec-26-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-30-2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>978.7</b>	<b>994.0</b>	<b>939.4</b>	<b>760.3</b>	<b>608.1</b>
Cost of Goods Sold	695.9	696.5	668.9	519.4	396.9
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>282.8</b>	<b>297.5</b>	<b>270.4</b>	<b>240.9</b>	<b>211.2</b>
Selling General & Admin Exp.	91.3	96.3	94.8	84.2	77.4
R & D Exp.	0	0	0	0	0

*(Continued)*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-28- 2005	Reclassified Dec-27- 2006	Restated Dec-26- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-30- 2009
Depreciation & Amort. Other Operating Expense/(Income)	56.1	55.3	49.3	39.8	32.3
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	<b>223.0</b>	<b>233.2</b>	<b>218.1</b>	<b>184.0</b>	<b>152.8</b>
<b>Operating Income</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>56.8</b>	<b>58.4</b>
Interest Expense Interest and Invest. Income	(56.8)	(59.5)	(44.3)	(36.7)	(34.3)
	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.7
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>(55.2)</b>	<b>(57.7)</b>	<b>(43.0)</b>	<b>(35.5)</b>	<b>(32.6)</b>
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.4	(0.9)	(0.6)	(7.5)	2.2
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>28.0</b>
Restructuring Charges	(5.2)	(6.2)	(6.9)	(9.0)	(4.0)
Impairment of Goodwill	0	0	0	0	0
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Invest.	0.2	0.5	0.5	(1.7)	1.0
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets	3.3	56.8	39.0	18.7	19.4
Asset Writedown	(1.2)	(2.7)	(1.1)	(3.3)	(1.0)
Legal Settlements	(8.3)	(1.7)	(3.6)	(2.3)	(0.4)
Other Unusual Items	0	(7.6)	(0.5)	0	(0.1)
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>(6.1)</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>43.0</b>
Income Tax Expense	1.2	14.7	6.7	3.5	1.4
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>(7.3)</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>41.6</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0	0	0	0	0
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0	0.2	0	0	0
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>(7.3)</u></b>	<b><u>30.3</u></b>	<b><u>29.5</u></b>	<b><u>12.7</u></b>	<b><u>41.6</u></b>

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-28- 2005	Reclassified Dec-27- 2006	Restated Dec-26- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-30- 2009
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Marketing Exp.	28.4	29.9	27.5	23.2	20.1
Selling and Marketing Exp.	28.4	29.9	27.5	23.2	20.1
General and Administrative Exp.	62.9	66.4	67.4	61.0	57.3
Net Rental Exp.	51.2	50.7	50.0	49.8	48.8
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	42.1	47.9	44.0	43.0	43.9
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	9.2	2.7	6.0	6.8	4.9
Maintenance & Repair Exp.	18.7	18.3	18.3	14.6	9.9

4. For the firms listed below, determine the stage of growth based an analysis of their financial statements.

**L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (NYSE:ID)**

*In Millions USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Restated Dec-31- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	72.4	5.0	8.2	20.4	6.6
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>6.6</b>
Accounts Receivable	14.6	61.5	90.2	105.6	116.4
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>61.5</b>	<b>90.2</b>	<b>105.6</b>	<b>116.4</b>
Inventory	4.9	11.0	21.5	34.5	29.4
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	—	—	13.3	11.1	11.5
Other Current Assets	0.9	4.5	3.9	9.6	9.2
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>92.9</b>	<b>82.0</b>	<b>137.1</b>	<b>181.3</b>	<b>173.1</b>

*(Continued)*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Restated Dec-31- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	60.6	58.5	69.5	133.5	190.3
Accumulated Depreciation	(41.1)	(38.6)	(46.0)	(52.3)	(74.8)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>115.5</b>
Goodwill	152.2	951.4	1,054.3	891.0	889.8
Other Intangibles	27.3	170.1	184.2	108.3	102.4
Deferred Tax Assets, LT	—	—	37.3	23.6	26.7
Other Long-Term Assets	2.3	3.8	9.3	24.4	16.3
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>294.1</u></b>	<b><u>1,227.2</u></b>	<b><u>1,445.6</u></b>	<b><u>1,309.8</u></b>	<b><u>1,323.8</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	9.4	24.5	48.5	72.5	73.4
Accrued Exp.	2.0	30.3	33.1	45.6	36.7
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	—	—	—	19.3	27.1
Unearned Revenue, Current	2.6	10.3	12.3	17.0	19.9
Other Current Liabilities	1.4	5.2	2.4	2.6	6.7
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>96.2</b>	<b>156.9</b>	<b>163.7</b>
Long-Term Debt	—	80.0	259.0	429.2	419.3
Minority Interest	—	—	—	—	0.3
Unearned Revenue, Non-Current	1.7	3.7	4.7	13.3	6.7
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	2.0	4.4	—	—	—
Other Non-Current Liabilities	0.4	1.7	1.0	1.9	3.7
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>160.1</b>	<b>360.9</b>	<b>601.3</b>	<b>593.6</b>
Pref. Stock, Convertible	—	—	—	15.1	—
<b>Total Pref. Equity</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>—</b>
Common Stock	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Additional Paid in Capital	333.5	1,153.8	1,217.8	1,393.8	1,432.9
Retained Earnings	(56.4)	(87.5)	(69.8)	(623.3)	(627.4)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Restated Dec-31- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
Treasury Stock	—	—	—	(6.2)	(6.2)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(2.4)	0.7	(63.4)	(71.1)	(69.2)
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>274.7</b>	<b>1,067.1</b>	<b>1,084.7</b>	<b>693.4</b>	<b>730.2</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>274.7</u></b>	<b><u>1,067.1</u></b>	<b><u>1,084.7</u></b>	<b><u>708.5</u></b>	<b><u>730.2</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>294.1</u></b>	<b><u>1,227.2</u></b>	<b><u>1,445.6</u></b>	<b><u>1,309.8</u></b>	<b><u>1,323.8</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Filing Date	29.0	72.6	75.2	86.5	92.3

**L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (NYSE:ID)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Analysis (selected items)					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>164.4</b>	<b>389.5</b>	<b>562.9</b>	<b>650.9</b>
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>148.2</b>	<b>192.7</b>	<b>200.1</b>
Selling General & Admin Exp.	19.9	44.4	90.0	123.8	133.9
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>(7.4)</b>	<b>(31.0)</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>(551.6)</b>	<b>(4.2)</b>
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>41.0</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>60.6</b>
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>(42.9)</b>	<b>(162.4)</b>	<b>(151.9)</b>	<b>(350.9)</b>	<b>(66.2)</b>
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>99.6</b>	<b>82.3</b>	<b>114.1</b>	<b>310.8</b>	<b>(8.5)</b>
<b>Total Debt Issued</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>179.0</b>	<b>295.0</b>	<b>24.9</b>
<b>Total Debt Repaid</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>(88.8)</b>	<b>(35.1)</b>
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>(10.9)</b>	<b>(23.1)</b>	<b>(32.7)</b>

*(Continued)*

Analysis (selected items)					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
Issuance of Common Stock	99.6	7.2	11.9	109.4	2.6
Capital Expenditure	(4.4)	(6.8)	(13.0)	(22.5)	(55.0)
Depreciation & Amort.	6.3	9.1	9.1	18.1	23.5
Cash Acquisitions	(38.7)	(154.7)	(132.8)	(320.5)	(3.7)
Amort. of Goodwill and Intangibles	6.1	14.3	30.1	31.3	13.6
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>92.9</b>	<b>82.0</b>	<b>137.1</b>	<b>181.3</b>	<b>173.1</b>
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>96.2</b>	<b>156.9</b>	<b>163.7</b>
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>23.5</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>115.5</b>
<b>Goodwill</b>	<b>152.2</b>	<b>951.4</b>	<b>1,054.3</b>	<b>891.0</b>	<b>889.8</b>
Other Intangibles	27.3	170.1	184.2	108.3	102.4
Additional Paid In Capital	333.5	1,153.8	1,217.8	1,393.8	1,432.9
Retained Earnings	(56.4)	(87.5)	(69.8)	(623.3)	(627.4)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(2.4)	0.7	(63.4)	(71.1)	(69.2)
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>274.7</b>	<b>1,067.1</b>	<b>1,084.7</b>	<b>693.4</b>	<b>730.2</b>

**L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (NYSE:ID)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>(7.4)</b>	<b>(31.0)</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>(551.6)</b>	<b>(4.2)</b>
Depreciation & Amort.	6.3	9.1	9.1	18.1	23.5
Amort. of Goodwill and Intangibles	6.1	14.3	30.1	31.3	13.6
<b>Depreciation &amp; Amort., Total</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>23.4</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>37.1</b>



Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Restated Dec-31- 2007	Restated Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
Other Amortization	—	0.1	4.3	8.7	12.1
(Gain) Loss from Sale of Assets	0	—	—	—	—
Asset Writedown & Restructuring Costs	—	17.4	5.0	528.6	—
Stock-Based Compensation	0.3	8.1	11.3	18.1	23.7
Tax Benefit from Stock Options	—	—	(2.7)	(0.7)	(0.1)
Other Operating Activities	1.1	2.4	(25.8)	7.9	(2.6)
Change in Acc. Receivable	3.0	(20.8)	(9.3)	0.2	(10.0)
Change in Inventories	(1.5)	(0.4)	(9.5)	(7.9)	4.9
Change in Acc. Payable	(5.5)	14.5	11.6	4.8	(0.8)
Change in Unearned Rev.	0.3	0.7	0.4	1.7	(3.9)
Change in Other Net Operating Assets	1.6	(1.7)	0.7	(6.4)	4.4
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>41.0</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>60.6</b>
Capital Expenditure	(4.4)	(6.8)	(13.0)	(22.5)	(55.0)
Sale of Property, Plant & Equipment	0.5	—	—	—	—
Cash Acquisitions	(38.7)	(154.7)	(132.8)	(320.5)	(3.7)
Divestitures	—	—	—	—	—
Sale (Purchase) of Intangible assets	(0.3)	(1.3)	(6.3)	(8.0)	(7.5)
Invest. in Marketable & Equity Secur.	—	—	—	—	—
Net (Inc.) Dec. in Loans Originated/Sold	—	—	—	—	—
Other Investing Activities	—	0.4	0.2	0	0
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>(42.9)</b>	<b>(162.4)</b>	<b>(151.9)</b>	<b>(350.9)</b>	<b>(66.2)</b>
Short-Term Debt Issued	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Issued	0.2	80.0	179.0	295.0	24.9
<b>Total Debt Issued</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>179.0</b>	<b>295.0</b>	<b>24.9</b>

(Continued)

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
Short-Term Debt Repaid	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Repaid	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(88.8)	(35.1)
<b>Total Debt Repaid</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>(88.8)</b>	<b>(35.1)</b>
Issuance of Common Stock	99.6	7.2	11.9	109.4	2.6
Repurchase of Common Stock	—	—	—	(6.2)	—
Issuance of Pref. Stock	—	—	—	15.1	—
<b>Total Dividends Paid</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>
Special Dividend Paid	—	—	—	—	—
Other Financing Activities	—	(4.6)	(76.1)	(13.7)	(0.9)
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>99.6</b>	<b>82.3</b>	<b>114.1</b>	<b>310.8</b>	<b>(8.5)</b>
Foreign Exchange Rate Adj.	0	0.2	0.1	(0.4)	0.3
<b>Net Change in Cash</b>	<b><u>61.1</u></b>	<b><u>(67.4)</u></b>	<b><u>3.2</u></b>	<b><u>12.2</u></b>	<b><u>(13.8)</u></b>

**AVEO Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGM:AVEO)**

*In Millions USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	Sep-30-2010
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	—	21.083	20.814	45.289	40.046
Short-Term Investments	—	40.659	11.550	6.011	46.976
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>61.742</b>	<b>32.364</b>	<b>51.301</b>	<b>87.022</b>
Accounts Receivable	—	0.621	2.081	0.487	0.220
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>0.621</b>	<b>2.081</b>	<b>0.487</b>	<b>0.22</b>

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009	Sep-30- 2010
Prepaid Exp.	—	0.982	1.162	1.306	3.598
Other Current Assets	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>63.345</b>	<b>35.607</b>	<b>53.094</b>	<b>90.84</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	—	9.918	11.237	12.971	—
Accumulated Depreciation	—	(6.192)	(7.485)	(8.774)	—
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>3.727</b>	<b>3.752</b>	<b>4.197</b>	<b>4.488</b>
Other Long-Term Assets	—	0.582	0.728	2.553	1.184
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>—</b>	<b><u>67.654</u></b>	<b><u>40.087</u></b>	<b><u>59.844</u></b>	<b><u>96.512</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	—	2.417	3.854	7.490	8.797
Accrued Exp.	—	2.991	3.409	7.389	9.111
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	—	6.443	5.037	7.467	3.398
Unearned Revenue, Current	—	8.810	7.092	11.782	11.945
Other Current Liabilities	—	0.142	0.141	0.176	0.264
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>20.803</b>	<b>19.533</b>	<b>34.305</b>	<b>33.515</b>
Long-Term Debt	—	8.635	16.018	12.278	19.742
Unearned Revenue, Non-Current	—	10.937	6.048	23.320	16.736
Other Non-Current Liabilities	—	1.112	2.245	2.069	3.108
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>41.488</b>	<b>43.844</b>	<b>71.972</b>	<b>73.101</b>
Pref. Stock, Convertible	—	123.720	123.720	156.705	—
Pref. Stock, Other	—	0.905	1.211	1.459	—
<b>Total Pref. Equity</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>124.625</b>	<b>124.931</b>	<b>158.163</b>	<b>—</b>
Common Stock	—	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.031
Additional Paid In Capital	—	2.579	4.924	7.432	249.580

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009	Sep-30- 2010
Retained Earnings	—	(101.158)	(133.631)	(177.725)	(226.200)
Treasury Stock	—	—	—	—	—
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	—	0.115	0.018	0	—
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	—	(98.458)	(128.688)	(170.291)	23.411
<b>Total Equity</b>	<u>—</u>	<u>26.167</u>	<u>(3.757)</u>	<u>(12.127)</u>	<u>23.411</u>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<u>—</u>	<u>67.654</u>	<u>40.087</u>	<u>59.844</u>	<u>96.512</u>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	1.33	1.434	1.586	1.641	30.935

**AVEO Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGM:AVEO)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Analysis (selected items)					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009	12 months Sep-30-2010
Total Revenue	7.783	11.034	19.660	20.719	38.761
Gross Profit	5.452	9.009	16.824	17.759	36.001
Selling General & Admin Exp.	5.161	6.502	9.165	10.120	12.815
R & D Exp.	24.514	27.223	38.985	48.832	79.573
Net Income	(24.905)	(24.982)	(32.473)	(44.093)	(59.191)
Total Cash & ST Investments		61.742	32.364	51.301	87.022
Net Property, Plant & Equipment		3.727	3.752	4.197	4.488
<b>Total Assets</b>		<u>67.654</u>	<u>40.087</u>	<u>59.844</u>	<u>96.512</u>
Total Current Liabilities		20.803	19.533	34.305	33.515
Cash from Ops.	(21.716)	(8.604)	(35.301)	(9.973)	(57.827)
Cash from Investing	18.917	(39.894)	28.151	3.414	(26.947)
Cash from Financing	12.840	52.834	6.881	31.035	84.636

Analysis (selected items)					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	12 months Sep-30-2010
Total Debt Issued	14.835	—	20.795	—	7.555
Total Debt Repaid	(2.042)	(4.620)	(13.948)	(1.986)	(4.039)
Issuance of Common Stock	0.047	0.078	0.034	0.159	81.120
Issuance of Pref. Stock	—	57.497	—	32.925	0.063
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	1.33	1.434	1.586	1.641	30.935

**AVEO Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGM:AVEO)**
*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	12 months Sep-30-2010
Net Income	(24.905)	(24.982)	(32.473)	(44.093)	(59.191)
Depreciation & Amort.	1.355	1.334	1.321	1.289	1.296
<b>Depreciation &amp; Amort., Total</b>	<b>1.355</b>	<b>1.334</b>	<b>1.321</b>	<b>1.289</b>	<b>1.296</b>
(Gain) Loss from Sale of Assets	—	—	0.010	—	0.001
(Gain) Loss on Sale of Invest. Stock-Based	0.072	(1.025)	(0.496)	0.373	0.198
Compensation	0.243	0.788	2.306	2.387	3.605
Other Operating Activities	0.224	0.541	0.717	1.019	0.662
Change in Acc. Receivable	—	(0.621)	(1.46)	1.594	0.321
Change in Acc. Payable	(0.076)	1.285	1.437	3.636	4.688

*(Continued)*

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009	12 months Sep-30-2010
Change in Unearned Rev.	(2.366)	18.329	(6.607)	21.962	(8.350)
Change in Other Net Operating Assets	3.736	(4.254)	(0.056)	1.860	(1.057)
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>(21.716)</b>	<b>(8.604)</b>	<b>(35.301)</b>	<b>(9.973)</b>	<b>(57.827)</b>
Capital Expenditure	(0.333)	(0.375)	(1.357)	(1.734)	(1.796)
Cash Acquisitions	—	—	—	—	—
Divestitures	—	—	—	—	—
Invest. in Marketable & Equity Secur.	19.250	(39.519)	29.507	5.148	(25.151)
Net (Inc.) Dec. in Loans Originated/Sold	—	—	—	—	—
Other Investing Activities	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>18.917</b>	<b>(39.894)</b>	<b>28.151</b>	<b>3.414</b>	<b>(26.947)</b>
Short-Term Debt Issued	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Issued	14.835	—	20.795	—	—
<b>Total Debt Issued</b>	<b>14.835</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>20.795</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>7.555</b>
Short-Term Debt Repaid	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Repaid	(2.042)	(4.620)	(13.948)	(1.986)	—
<b>Total Debt Repaid</b>	<b>(2.042)</b>	<b>(4.620)</b>	<b>(13.948)</b>	<b>(1.986)</b>	<b>(4.039)</b>
Issuance of Common Stock	0.047	0.078	0.034	0.159	81.120
Issuance of Pref. Stock	—	57.497	—	32.925	0.063
<b>Total Dividends Paid</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>
Special Dividend Paid	—	—	—	—	—
Other Financing Activities	—	(0.121)	—	(0.063)	(0.063)
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>12.840</b>	<b>52.834</b>	<b>6.881</b>	<b>31.035</b>	<b>84.636</b>
<b>Net Change in Cash</b>	<b><u>10.040</u></b>	<b><u>4.335</u></b>	<b><u>(0.269)</u></b>	<b><u>24.476</u></b>	<b><u>(0.138)</u></b>

## United Therapeutics Corp. (NasdaqGS:UTHR)

In Millions USD, except per share items.

	Balance Sheet				
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	69.2	91.1	139.3	129.5	100.4
Short-Term Investments	56.3	136.7	150.7	106.6	129.1
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>125.5</b>	<b>227.7</b>	<b>290.1</b>	<b>236.0</b>	<b>229.5</b>
Accounts Receivable	13.9	22.5	25.7	28.3	50.6
Other Receivables	5.1	3.2	4.0	2.3	2.6
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>53.3</b>
Inventory	11.3	12.0	13.2	14.4	26.4
Prepaid Exp.	6.4	9.2	5.9	11.6	8.2
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	4.6	2.7	13.6	4.8	7.2
Other Current Assets	0	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>166.8</b>	<b>277.4</b>	<b>352.5</b>	<b>297.4</b>	<b>324.5</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	29.4	43.9	79.7	236.5	327.2
Accumulated Depreciation	(7.6)	(9.3)	(10.4)	(13.7)	(23.3)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>69.4</b>	<b>222.7</b>	<b>303.9</b>
Long-term Investments	53.1	41.1	11.0	108.0	154.4
Goodwill	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	8.8
Other Intangibles	5.5	3.1	1.0	0.4	9.7
Loans Receivable					
Long-Term	0	—	—	—	—
Deferred Tax Assets, LT	15.1	65.3	93.7	178.8	201.0
Other Long-Term Assets	21.7	47.9	52.1	59.7	49.4
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>291.4</u></b>	<b><u>477.0</u></b>	<b><u>587.0</u></b>	<b><u>874.5</u></b>	<b><u>1,051.5</u></b>

(Continued)

Balance Sheet					
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31- 2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Dec-31- 2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	4.0	3.1	2.0	20.3	18.8
Accrued Exp.	10.4	15.3	17.9	29.4	29.8
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	—	0	250.0	—	220.3
Curr. Port. of Cap. Leases	0	—	—	—	—
Other Current Liabilities	0.1	0.9	2.8	8.0	61.4
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>272.8</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>330.2</b>
Long-Term Debt	0	250.0	—	205.7	—
Capital Leases	—	—	—	29.3	30.3
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	—	—	4.9	9.2	14.5
Other Non-Current Liabilities	1.8	3.1	13.6	17.4	23.5
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>272.4</b>	<b>291.2</b>	<b>319.2</b>	<b>398.5</b>
Common Stock	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6
Additional Paid In Capital	393.5	408.8	548.3	722.3	798.9
Retained Earnings	(115.3)	(41.4)	(21.5)	(93.9)	(74.7)
Treasury Stock	(6.9)	(164.6)	(231.6)	(67.4)	(67.4)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	3.6	1.5	0.3	(5.9)	(4.3)
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>275.1</b>	<b>204.6</b>	<b>295.8</b>	<b>555.3</b>	<b>653.0</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b><u>275.1</u></b>	<b><u>204.6</u></b>	<b><u>295.8</u></b>	<b><u>555.3</u></b>	<b><u>653.0</u></b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b><u>291.4</u></b>	<b><u>477.0</u></b>	<b><u>587.0</u></b>	<b><u>874.5</u></b>	<b><u>1,051.5</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	46.6	43.0	44.5	52.9	54.2



## United Therapeutics Corp. (NasdaqGS:UTHR)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Analysis					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Restated Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31- 2009
Total Revenue	115.9	159.6	210.9	281.5	369.8
Gross Profit	103.6	142.6	188.7	251.4	324.5
Selling General & Admin Exp.	24.7	54.0	99.0	91.2	172.1
R & D Exp.	36.1	57.6	83.4	89.2	122.2
Net Income	65.0	74.0	12.4	(49.3)	19.5
Cash from Ops.	43.2	49.3	48.9	(49.2)	97.6
Cash from Investing	(70.7)	(101.6)	(21.7)	(172.5)	(160.5)
Cash from Financing	14.2	74.1	20.9	213.0	36.5
Capital Expenditure	(6.1)	(15.6)	(38.7)	(124.4)	(95.4)
Depreciation & Amort.	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.9	10.7
Cash Acquisitions	—	—	—	—	(3.6)
Total Debt Issued	—	242.0	—	—	—
Issuance of Common Stock	15.0	14.4	58.3	191.9	32.1
Repurchase of Common Stock	—	(157.7)	(67.1)	—	—
Stock-Based Compensation	1.0	24.1	48.7	28.7	101.0
Tax Benefit from Stock Options	—	(10.8)	(29.6)	(21.1)	(4.4)

## United Therapeutics Corp. (NasdaqGS:UTHR)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Restated Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31- 2009
Net Income	65.0	74.0	12.4	(49.3)	19.5
Depreciation & Amort.	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.9	10.7
Amort. of Goodwill and Intangibles	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7
Depreciation & Amort., Total	2.5	2.7	3.4	4.5	11.4

(Continued)

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Restated Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31- 2009
Other Amortization	—	—	13.7	14.7	15.7
(Gain) Loss from Sale of Assets	0.1	—	—	—	—
(Gain) Loss on Sale of Invest.	(0.1)	0.8	(0.5)	0.6	6.0
(Income) Loss on Equity Invest.	0.8	0.6	1.5	(2.5)	(1.8)
Stock-Based Compensation	1.0	24.1	48.7	28.7	101.0
Tax Benefit from Stock Options	—	(10.8)	(29.6)	(21.1)	(4.4)
Provision & Write-Off of Bad Debts	0.1	0.3	2.0	0.6	4.7
Other Operating Activities	(17.9)	(37.0)	3.1	(34.4)	(1.0)
Change in Acc. Receivable	(0.2)	(8.9)	(4.0)	(2.3)	(22.0)
Change in Inventories	(3.5)	(1.0)	(2.3)	(2.6)	(9.1)
Change in Acc. Payable	(2.1)	(1.1)	(1.1)	18.5	(3.6)
Change in Other Net Operating Assets	(2.4)	5.7	1.6	(4.5)	(18.7)
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>(49.2)</b>	<b>97.6</b>
Capital Expenditure	(6.1)	(15.6)	(38.7)	(124.4)	(95.4)
Cash Acquisitions	—	—	—	—	(3.6)
Divestitures	—	—	—	—	—
Invest. in Marketable & Equity Secur.	(64.6)	(86.0)	17.0	(48.1)	(61.6)
Net (Inc.) Dec. in Loans Originated/Sold	—	—	—	—	—
Other Investing Activities	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>(70.7)</b>	<b>(101.6)</b>	<b>(21.7)</b>	<b>(172.5)</b>	<b>(160.5)</b>
Short-Term Debt Issued	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Issued	—	242.0	—	—	—
<b>Total Debt Issued</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>242.0</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>
Short-Term Debt Repaid	—	—	—	—	—
Long-Term Debt Repaid	(0.8)	0	—	—	—
<b>Total Debt Repaid</b>	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Restated Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Restated Dec-31-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-31- 2009
Issuance of Common Stock	15.0	14.4	58.3	191.9	32.1
Repurchase of Common Stock	—	(157.7)	(67.1)	—	—
<b>Total Dividends Paid</b>	—	—	—	—	—
Special Dividend Paid	—	—	—	—	—
Other Financing Activities	—	(24.6)	29.6	21.1	4.4
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>74.1</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>213.0</b>	<b>36.5</b>
Foreign Exchange Rate Adj.	—	0.1	0.1	(1.2)	(2.7)
<b>Net Change in Cash</b>	<b><u>(13.4)</u></b>	<b><u>21.9</u></b>	<b><u>48.3</u></b>	<b><u>(9.9)</u></b>	<b><u>(29.1)</u></b>

5. Perform a Du Pont analysis for the firms in the table below.

#### Du Pont Analysis of Packaged Foods and Meats 2009

Company Name	Sales	Total Assets	Net Income (Loss)	Total Equity
Campbell Soup Co. (NYSE:CPB)	7,570.0	6,152.0	806.0	1,023.0
ConAgra Foods, Inc. (NYSE:CAG)	12,176.8	11,566.5	773.5	4,984.6
Dean Foods Co. (NYSE:DF)	11,158.4	7,843.9	240.3	1,351.9
General Mills Inc. (NYSE:GIS)	14,743.7	18,561.3	1,633.8	6,088.9
Hershey Co. (NYSE:HSY)	5,298.7	3,675.0	436.0	720.5
HJ Heinz Co. (NYSE:HNZ)	10,262.5	10,071.2	847.7	1,823.7
Hormel Foods Corp. (NYSE:HRL)	6,572.0	3,730.7	372.6	2,209.9
Kellogg Company (NYSE:K)	12,575.0	11,200.0	1,212.0	2,272.0
Kraft Foods Inc. (NYSE:KFT)	40,386.0	66,714.0	3,021.0	25,876.0
McCormick & Co. Inc. (NYSE:MKC)	3,192.1	3,387.8	299.8	1,334.6
Mead Johnson Nutrition Company (NYSE:MJN)	2,826.5	2,070.3	399.6	(674.9)
Sara Lee Corp. (NYSE:SLE)	12,677.0	9,930.0	806.0	2,753.0
The J. M. Smucker Company (NYSE:SJM)	4,604.8	7,899.4	467.8	5,240.2
Tyson Foods Inc. (NYSE:TSN)	26,818.0	10,851.0	(275.0)	4,543.0

6. Using the information in the financial statements of Advanced Battery Technologies to calculate the following ratios:

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**Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ABAT)**

*Ratios (except as noted)*

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For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
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**PROFITABILITY**

Return on Assets %  
 Return on Capital %  
 Return on Equity %  
 Return on Common Equity %  
  
 Gross Margin %  
 SG&A Margin %  
 EBITDA Margin %  
 EBITA Margin %  
 EBIT Margin %  
 Earnings from Cont. Ops  
 Margin %  
 Net Income Margin %

**ACTIVITY**

Total Asset Turnover  
 Fixed Asset Turnover  
 Receivable Turnover  
 Inventory Turnover

**LIQUIDITY**

Current Ratio  
 Quick Ratio  
 Avg. Days Sales Out.  
 Avg. Days Inventory Out.  
 Avg. Days Payable Out.  
 Avg. Cash Conversion Cycle

**LEVERAGE**

Total Debt/Equity  
 Total Debt/Capital  
 LT Debt/Equity  
 LT Debt/Capital  
 Total Liabilities/Total Assets

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31- 2005	Dec-31- 2006	Dec-31- 2007	Dec-31- 2008	Dec-31- 2009
<b>COVERAGE</b>					
EBIT/Interest Exp.					
EBITDA/Interest Exp.					
(EBITDA-CAPEX)/Interest Exp.					
Total Debt/EBITDA					
Net Debt/EBITDA					
Total Debt/(EBITDA-CAPEX)					
Net Debt/(EBITDA-CAPEX)					

**Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ABAT)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet	Dec- 31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Dec- 31-2007	Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 31-2009
<b>ASSETS</b>					
Cash and Equivalents	0	0	2.7	32.7	52.9
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>52.9</b>
Accounts Receivable	2.0	4.9	16.0	14.7	22.4
Other Receivables	—	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.1
Notes Receivable	—	0.9	—	1.6	1.6
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>16.5</b>	<b>24.1</b>
Inventory	0.4	0.4	1.2	1.7	3.7
Prepaid Exp.	0.9	—	—	—	—
Other Current Assets	—	1.0	1.6	0.2	7.9
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>88.7</b>
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	12.7	—	15.3	19.4	57.7
Accumulated Depreciation	(0.8)	—	(2.0)	(2.8)	(10.5)
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>47.2</b>
Long-Term Investments	—	—	—	1.0	0.8
Goodwill	—	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5
Other Intangibles	0.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	14.3
Other Long-Term Assets	1.5	—	0	4.8	4.3
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b><u>17.2</u></b>	<b><u>24.6</u></b>	<b><u>38.7</u></b>	<b><u>77.8</u></b>	<b><u>157.8</u></b>

(Continued)

Balance Sheet	Dec-31-2005	Restated Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
Accounts Payable	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.7
Accrued Exp.	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.4
Short-Term Borrowings	4.1	—	0.7	0	2.9
Unearned Revenue, Current	0.1	0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Other Current Liabilities	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>5.2</b>
Long-Term Debt	—	0.4	0.4	—	—
Minority Interest	1.9	—	—	—	—
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	—	—	—	—	3.5
Other Non-Current Liabilities	—	—	—	—	17.2
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>25.9</b>
Common Stock	0	0	0	0.1	0.1
Additional Paid in Capital	13.8	17.1	18.0	39.3	74.1
Retained Earnings	(2.9)	5.1	15.3	31.4	52.8
Treasury Stock	—	—	—	(0.3)	(0.5)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(1.8)	1.0	3.1	6.0	5.5
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>76.5</b>	<b>131.9</b>
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>76.5</b>	<b>131.9</b>
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>157.8</b>

**Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ABAT)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

<b>Income Statement</b>					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Reclassified Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
Revenue	4.2	16.3	31.9	45.2	63.6
Other Revenue	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>63.6</b>
Cost of Goods Sold	2.8	7.3	18.0	23.1	35.2
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>28.4</b>

## Income Statement

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-31-2005	Dec- 31-2006	Reclassified Dec-31-2007	Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 31-2009
Selling General & Admin Exp.	1.3	1.4	2.4	3.3	11.2
R & D Exp.	—	0.2	0.4	0	0.3
Depreciation & Amort.	—	—	—	—	—
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>11.5</b>
<b>Operating Income</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>16.9</b>
Interest Expense	(0.2)	(0.2)	—	—	(0.5)
Interest and Invest. Income	—	—	0	0.1	0.3
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>(0.2)</b>	<b>(0.2)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>(0.2)</b>
Income/(Loss) from Affiliates	—	—	—	(0.1)	0
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.1	0	—	0	0
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>16.7</b>
Impairment of Goodwill	—	—	—	—	9.9
Other Unusual Items	—	—	(0.9)	—	1.0
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>27.6</b>
Income Tax Expense	—	(0.9)	—	2.7	6.2
Minority Int. in Earnings	(0.2)	—	—	—	—
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>(0.2)</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>21.4</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	—	—	—	—	—
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Net Income</b>	<b><u>(0.2)</u></b>	<b><u>8.0</u></b>	<b><u>10.2</u></b>	<b><u>16.1</u></b>	<b><u>21.4</u></b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	0.7	7.9	11.8	19.5	19.5
EBITA	0.2	7.5	11.2	18.9	17.5
EBIT	0.1	7.4	11.1	18.8	16.9

## Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ABAT)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	12 months Dec-31- 2005	Restated 12 months Dec-31- 2006	12 months Dec-31- 2007	Restated 12 months Dec-31- 2008	12 months Dec-31- 2009
Net Income	(0.2)	8.0	10.2	16.1	21.4
Depreciation & Amort.	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6	2.0
Amort. of Goodwill and Intangibles	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6
<b>Depreciation &amp; Amort., Total</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Other Amortization	—	0.4	—	—	—
(Gain) Loss from Sale of Assets	—	—	—	0.1	—
(Gain) Loss on Sale of Invest. Asset Writedown & Restructuring Costs	—	—	—	—	(9.9)
(Income) Loss on Equity Invest.	—	—	—	0.1	0
Stock-Based Compensation Provision & Write-Off of Bad Debts	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.9	2.1
Minority Int. in Earnings	—	—	—	0.1	(0.2)
Other Operating Activities	0.2	—	—	—	—
Change in Acc. Receivable	—	0	0.8	—	2.5
Change in Inventories	(1.9)	(3.0)	(11.1)	1.0	(6.5)
Change in Acc. Payable	(0.1)	0	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.3)
Change in Unearned Rev.	1.5	(1.0)	(0.3)	0.2	(7.8)
Change in Inc. Taxes	(0.7)	(0.1)	0	0	(1.2)
Change in Other Net Operating Assets	—	—	—	—	(0.2)
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>(0.5)</b>	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>(5.6)</b>
	<b>(0.8)</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>(2.9)</b>



Cash Flow					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	12 months Dec-31- 2005	Restated 12 months Dec-31- 2006	12 months Dec-31- 2007	Restated 12 months Dec-31- 2008	12 months Dec-31- 2009
Capital Expenditure	(2.5)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(3.2)	(9.3)
Sale of Property, Plant & Equipment	—	—	—	—	—
Cash Acquisitions	—	—	—	(3.0)	(0.6)
Divestitures	—	—	—	—	—
Invest. in Marketable & Equity Secur.	—	—	—	(1.5)	—
Net (Inc.) Dec. in Loans Originated/Sold	—	—	—	(1.6)	—
Other Investing Activities	—	—	—	(1.7)	(2.8)
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>(2.5)</b>	<b>(0.1)</b>	<b>(0.1)</b>	<b>(11.0)</b>	<b>(12.8)</b>
Short-Term Debt Issued	—	—	0.8	—	—
Long-Term Debt Issued	0.9	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Debt Issued</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>
Short-Term Debt Repaid	—	—	—	(0.7)	(4.5)
Long-Term Debt Repaid	0	(3.7)	—	(0.4)	—
<b>Total Debt Repaid</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>(3.7)</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(1.1)</b>	<b>(4.5)</b>
Issuance of Common Stock	—	—	—	20.4	40.8
Repurchase of Common Stock	—	—	—	(0.3)	(0.2)
Repurchase of Preferred Stock	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total Dividends Paid</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>
Special Dividend Paid	—	—	—	—	—
Other Financing Activities	1.7	(0.9)	—	—	—
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>(4.6)</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>18.9</b>	<b>36.1</b>
Foreign Exchange Rate Adj.	0	0.3	1.4	1.7	(0.2)
<b>Net Change in Cash</b>	<b><u>(0.7)</u></b>	<b><u>0</u></b>	<b><u>2.7</u></b>	<b><u>30.0</u></b>	<b><u>20.2</u></b>



# Computational Exercises

## **THE ARITHMETIC OF GROWTH VALUATIONS**

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Using a simple framework we call “the arithmetic of growth valuations,” we explore the consequences for the owner’s wealth of changes in expectations regarding the corporation’s earnings growth. We provide four numerical examples to illustrate this point. The reader will be well served by coming back to these simple examples and work through the consequences of the strategies and schemes presented throughout the book.

### **Case 1**

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$30.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 15 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 25 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation’s earnings have been growing at a 15 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$\_\_\_\_\_ million annually. Applying a multiple of 15 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$\_\_\_\_\_ million. Investors seeking a 25 percent rate of return will pay \$\_\_\_\_\_ million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 20 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$\_\_\_\_\_ million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation’s potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 15 to 25 percent per annum.

The value of corporation’s shares will change from \$\_\_\_\_\_ million to \$\_\_\_\_\_ million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder’s shares are worth \$\_\_\_\_\_ million, a difference of \$\_\_\_\_\_.

**Case 2**

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 20 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 22 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 20 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million annually. Applying a multiple of 20 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Investors seeking a 22 percent rate of return will pay \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 40 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 20 to 18 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, a difference of \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

**Case 3**

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 12 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 25 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 10 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million annually. Applying a multiple of 12 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Investors seeking a 25 percent rate of return will pay \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 20 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 10 to 20 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, a difference of \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

#### Case 4

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 20 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 22 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 12 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million annually. Applying a multiple of 20 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Investors seeking a 22 percent rate of return will pay \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 40 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 12 to 18 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million, a difference of \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

### **MARKET VALUE VERSUS BOOK VALUE OF BONDS**

This is an example of how a liability can be an asset. Long-term bonds that are carried in the books at face value in the liability side of the balance sheet, are in fact an asset when their market value is above their face value; on the other hand, when the market value of a bond is below its book value, the bonds represent a larger liability than accounted for in the balance sheet.

#### Case 1

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$20,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semiannual coupon rate of 12.125 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 15.730 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is

\$ \_\_\_\_\_ and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

### Case 2

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$50,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semi-annual coupon rate of 14.125 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 10.500 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is \$ \_\_\_\_\_, and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

### Case 3

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$35,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semi-annual coupon rate of 6.000 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 10.000 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is \$ \_\_\_\_\_, and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

## **ACQUISITIONS DRIVEN BY P/E MULTIPLES**

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Management can boost sales through techniques that more properly fall into the category of corporate finance. Increasing the rate of revenue increases through mergers and acquisitions is the most common example. A corporation can easily accelerate its sales growth by buying other companies and adding their sales to its own. Creating genuine value for shareholders through acquisitions is more difficult, although unwary investors sometimes fail to recognize the distinction.

In the following fictitious examples, Big Time Corp. is set to acquire Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry. What will be the impact of a stock-for-stock transaction on the price-per-share of Big Corp?

### Case 1

Big Time Corp.'s sales increase by 10.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 10.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption ("Acquisition Scenario") show a \_\_\_\_\_ sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at \_\_\_\_\_ a year is sexier than one growing at only 10.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time’s profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of \_\_\_\_\_ produces a larger company that earns \_\_\_\_\_ on sales.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 1 to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_. With the price-earnings multiple at \_\_\_\_\_ times, equivalent to the average of the company’s industry peers, Big Time’s stock price rises from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share.

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-average earnings multiple of 12 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of \_\_\_\_\_ million. At Big Time’s Year 1 share price of \$ \_\_\_\_\_, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of \_\_\_\_\_ million shares.

**Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc.**

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp.		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp.	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Debt						
Equity						
Big Time Annual Coupon Rate for Debt	10%					
Small Change Annual Coupon Rate for Debt		15%				
(\$000.000) Omitted						
Sales	\$5,000.0		\$238.1		\$5,000.0	
Cost and Expenses						
Cost of Goods Sold	3,422.7		160.6		3,422.7	
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses	1,250.0		61.9		1,250.0	

(Continued)

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp.		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp.	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Interest Expense	100.0		4.8		100.0	
Total Costs and Expenses	4,772.7		227.3		4,772.7	
Income before Income Tax						
Expenses	227.3		10.8		227.3	
Income Taxes	77.3		3.7		77.3	
Net Income						
Year-over-Year Sales Increase	150.0		7.1		150.0	
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales	3.0%		3.0%		3.0%	
Shares Outstanding (million)	125.0				125.0	
Earnings per Share						
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)						
Price per Share						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Market Capitalization						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Debt/Equity Ratio						
Acquisition Price						
Number of Shares						
taxrate		34%				
growth_rate		10%				
industry_PE_mult		12				

With the addition of Small Change's net income, Big Time earns \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased number of shares outstanding ( \_\_\_\_\_ million) produces earnings per share of \$ \_\_\_\_\_. At a price-earnings multiple of 12 times, Big Time is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from \_\_\_\_\_ percent to \_\_\_\_\_ percent has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by \_\_\_\_\_ percent whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.



**Case 2**

Big Time Corp.’s sales increase by 8.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 8.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption (“Acquisition Scenario”) show a \_\_\_\_\_ percent sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at \_\_\_\_\_ percent a year is sexier than one growing at only 8.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time’s profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of \_\_\_\_\_ percent produces a larger company that also earns \_\_\_\_\_ percent on sales. Shareholders do not gain anything in the process, as the figures below demonstrate.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 1 to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_. With the price-earnings multiple at 16 times, equivalent to the average of the company’s industry peers, Big Time’s stock price rises from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share.

**Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc.**

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp.		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp.	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Debt	\$1,000.0		32.0		\$1,000	
Equity	\$1,000.0		25.0		\$1,000	
Big Time Annual Coupon Rate for Debt	10%					
Small Change Annual Coupon Rate for Debt	15%					
(\$000.000) Omitted						
Sales	\$5,000.0		\$238.1		\$5,000.0	
Cost and Expenses						
Cost of Goods Sold	3,422.7		160.6		\$3,422.7	

(Continued)

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp.		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp.	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses	1250.0		61.9		1,250.0	
Interest Expense	100.0		4.8		100.0	
Total Costs and Expenses	4,772.7		227.3		4,772.7	
Income before Income Tax Expenses	227.3		10.8		227.3	
Income Taxes	77.3		3.7		77.3	
Net Income						
Year-over-Year Sales Increase	150.0		7.1		150.0	
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales	3.0%		3.0%		3.0%	
Shares Outstanding (million)	125.0				125.0	
Earnings per Share						
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)						
Price per Share						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Market Capitalization						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Debt/Equity Ratio						
Acquisition Price						
Number of Shares						
taxrate		34%				
growth_rate		8%				
industry_PE_mult		16				

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-average earnings multiple of 16 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. At Big Time's Year 1 share price of \$ \_\_\_\_\_, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million shares. With the addition of Small Change's net income, Big Time earns \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased number of shares outstanding ( \_\_\_\_\_ million) produces earnings per share of \$ \_\_\_\_\_. At a price-earnings multiple of 16 times, Big Time

is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from 8.0 percent to \_\_\_\_\_ percent has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by \_\_\_\_\_ percent whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.

**Case 3**

Big Time Corp.’s sales increase by 16.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 16.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption (“Acquisition Scenario”) show a \_\_\_\_\_ percent sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at \_\_\_\_\_ percent a year is sexier than one growing at only 16.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time’s profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of \_\_\_\_\_ percent produces a larger company that also earns \_\_\_\_\_ percent on sales. Shareholders do not gain anything in the process, as the figures below demonstrate.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 1 to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_. With the price-earnings multiple at 24 times, equivalent to the average of the company’s industry peers, Big Time’s stock price rises from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share.

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**Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc.**

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Debt	\$1,000.0	32.0	\$1,000.0
Equity	\$1,000.0	25.0	\$1,000.0
Big Time Annual Coupon			
Rate for Debt	10%		
Small Change Annual			
Coupon Rate for Debt	15%		
(\$000.000) Omitted			

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(Continued)

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp.		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp.	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Sales	\$5,000.0		\$238.1		\$5,000.0	
Cost and Expenses						
Cost of Goods Sold	3,422.7		160.6		3,422.7	
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses	1250.0		61.9		1,250.0	
Interest Expense	100.0		4.8		100.0	
Total Costs and Expenses	4,772.7		227.3		4,772.7	
Income before Income Tax Expenses	227.3		10.8		227.3	
Income Taxes	77.3		3.7		77.3	
Net Income						
Year-over-Year Sales Increase	150.0		7.1		150.0	
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales	3.0%		3.0%		3.0%	
Shares Outstanding (million)	125.0				125.0	
Earnings per Share						
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)						
Price per Share						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Market Capitalization						
Year-over-Year Increase						
Debt/Equity Ratio						
Acquisition Price						
Number of Shares						
taxrate	34%					
growth_rate	16%					
industry_PE_mult	24					

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-average earnings multiple of 24 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of million. At Big Time's Year 1 share price of \$ \_\_\_\_\_, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of million shares. With the addition of Small Change's net income, Big Time earns \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased

number of shares outstanding (\_\_\_\_\_ million) produces earnings per share of \$ \_\_\_\_\_. At a price-earnings multiple of 24 times, Big Time is worth \$ \_\_\_\_\_ a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from 16.0 percent to \_\_\_\_\_ percent has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by \_\_\_\_\_ percent whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.

**STOCK PRICES AND GOODWILL**

Including goodwill in the calculations of the ratio of Total Assets to Total Liabilities can distort the economic reality of the consequences of acquisitions.

**Case 1**

The shares of Amalgamator and Consolidator are both trading at multiples of 2.5 times book value per share. Shareholders’ equity is \$200 million at Amalgamator and \$60 million at Consolidator. Amalgamator uses stock held in its treasury to acquire Consolidator for \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million.

The purchase price represents a premium of 75 percent above the prevailing market price. Prior to the acquisition, Amalgamator’s ratio of total assets to total liabilities is \_\_\_\_\_ times, while the comparable figure for Consolidator is \_\_\_\_\_ times.

The total-assets-to-total-liabilities ratio after the deal is \_\_\_\_\_ times. By paying a premium to Consolidator’s tangible asset value, Amalgamator creates \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million of goodwill.

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*
Case 1				
Tangible Assets	1,000	400		1,400
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0		
Total Assets	1,000	400		1,603
Liabilities	800	340		1,140
				Premium 75%

(Continued)

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*		
Stockholder Equity (SE)	200	60				
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity	1,000	400		1,603	Multiple	2.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Market Capitalization						
Case 2						
Tangible Assets	1,000	400		1,400		
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0				
Total Assets	1,000	400		1,813	Premium	75%
Liabilities	800	340		1,140		
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	200	60				
Total Liabilities and SE	1,000	400		1,813	Rally Multiple	4.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Market Capitalization						

\*Ignores possible impact of EPS dilution.

**Case 2**

As the scene opens, an explosive stock market rally has driven up both companies' shares to 4.5 times book value. The ratio of total assets to total liabilities, however, remains at \_\_\_\_\_ times for Amalgamator and \_\_\_\_\_ times for Consolidator. As in Case 1, Amalgamator pays a premium of 75 percent above the prevailing market price to acquire Consolidator.

The premium is calculated on a higher market capitalization, however. Consequently, the purchase price rises from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Instead of creating \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million of goodwill, the acquisition gives rise to a \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million intangible asset. Somehow, putting together a company boasting a \_\_\_\_\_ times ratio with another sporting a \_\_\_\_\_ times ratio has produced an entity with a ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ times.

Now, let us exclude goodwill in calculating the ratio of assets to liabilities. Amalgamator's ratio of tangible assets to total liabilities following its acquisition of Consolidator is \_\_\_\_\_ times in both Case 1 and Case 2. This is the outcome that best reflects economic reality.

**Case 3**

The shares of Amalgamator and Consolidator are both trading at multiples of 1.5 times book value per share. Shareholders' equity is \$400 million at Amalgamator and \$260 million at Consolidator. Amalgamator uses stock held in its treasury to acquire Consolidator for \_\_\_\_\_ million.

The purchase price represents a premium of 35.00 percent above the prevailing market price. Prior to the acquisition, Amalgamator's ratio of total assets to total liabilities is \_\_\_\_\_ times, while the comparable figure for Consolidator is \_\_\_\_\_ times.

The total-assets-to-total-liabilities ratio after the deal is \_\_\_\_\_ times. By paying a premium to Consolidator's tangible asset value, Amalgamator creates \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million of goodwill.

**Case 4**

As the scene opens, an explosive stock market rally has driven up both companies' shares to 3.5 times book value. The ratio of total assets to total liabilities, however, remains at \_\_\_\_\_ times for Amalgamator and \_\_\_\_\_ times for Consolidator. As in Case 3, Amalgamator pays a premium of 35.00 percent above the prevailing market price to acquire Consolidator.

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*		
Case 3						
Tangible Assets	1,200	600		1,800		
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0				
Total Assets	1,200	600		2,067		
Liabilities	800	340		1,140	Premium	35%
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	400	260				
Total Liabilities and SE	1,200	600		2,067	Multiple	1.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Market Capitalization						
Case 4						
Tangible Assets	1,200	600		1,800		
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0				
Total Assets	1,200	600		2,769	Premium	35%
Liabilities	800	340		1,140		
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	400	260				
Total Liabilities and SE	1,200	600		2,769	Rally Multiple	3.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities						
Market Capitalization						

\*Ignores possible impact of EPS dilution.



The premium is calculated on a higher market capitalization, however. Consequently, the purchase price rises from \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million to \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million. Instead of creating \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million of goodwill, the acquisition gives rise to a \$ \_\_\_\_\_ million intangible asset. Somehow, putting together a company boasting a \_\_\_\_\_ times ratio with another sporting a \_\_\_\_\_ times ratio has produced an entity with a ratio of \_\_\_\_\_ times.

Now, let us exclude goodwill in calculating the ratio of assets to liabilities. Amalgamator’s ratio of tangible assets to total liabilities following its acquisition of Consolidator is \_\_\_\_\_ times in both Case 3 and Case 4. This is the outcome that best reflects economic reality.

**PROJECTING INTEREST EXPENSE**

For the following three examples, calculate the embedded cost of Long-Term Debt.

Colossal Chemical Corporation (\$000,000 omitted)			
Long-Term Debt (Excluding current maturities)		2010	2011
Notes Payable Due Dates	Rate		
2012	12.000%	82	44
2013	7.500%	56	80
Debentures Due Dates			
2018	12.500%	55	55
2020	10.875%	120	120
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	5.875%	40	40
Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt		Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding	Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

Colossal Chemical Corporation (\$000,000 omitted)			
Long-Term Debt (Excluding current maturities)		2010	2011
Notes Payable Due Dates	Rate		
2012	9.500%	96	65
2013	9.750%	65	90
Debentures Due Dates			
2018	11.880%	50	60
2020	12.125%	90	90
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	5.125%	60	60
Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt		Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding	Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

Colossal Chemical Corporation (\$000,000 omitted)			
Long-Term Debt (Excluding current maturities)		2010	2011
Notes Payable Due Dates	Rate		
2012	6.600%	55	75
2013	5.750%	40	60
Debentures Due Dates			
2018	10.250%	90	90
2020	9.125%	75	75
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	8.500%	80	80
		340	380
Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt		Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding	Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt

## **SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN FORECASTING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS**

1. Given the base case below, calculate the independent effects of a one percent (1%) increase in Gross Margin, a one percent (1%) decline in the tax rate, and a five percent (5%) increase in Sales.

Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case
Sales	\$2,110
Cost of goods sold	1,161
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528
Depreciation	121
Research and development	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217
Interest expense	34
Interest (income)	(5)
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188
Provision for Income Taxes	\$ 64
Net Income	<u>\$ 124</u>

2. Given the base case below, calculate the independent effects of a two percent (2%) increase in Gross Margin, a two percent (2%) decline in the tax rate, and a five percent (5%) decrease in Sales

Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case
Sales	\$2,110
Cost of goods sold	1,161
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528
Depreciation	121
Research and development	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217
Interest expense	34
Interest (income)	(5)
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188
Provision for Income Taxes	\$ 64
Net Income	<u>\$ 124</u>

3. Given the base case below, calculate the composite effects of a five percent (5%) increase in Sales, a two percent (2%) decline in Gross Margin, a five percent (5%) increase in SG&A as % of Sales, and a two percent (2%) decline in the tax rate.

**Colossal Chemical Corporation**  
**Year Ended December 31, 2011**  
 (\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case
Sales	\$2,110
Cost of goods sold	1,161
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528
Depreciation	121
Research and development	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217
Interest expense	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 64</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 124</u></u>

4. Given the base case below, calculate the independent effects of a one percent (1%) increase in Gross Margin, a one percent (1%) decline in the tax rate, and a five percent (5%) increase in Sales

**Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement**

**Colossal Chemical Corporation**  
**Year Ended December 31, 2011**  
 (\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case
Sales	\$2,110
Cost of goods sold	1,477
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 253
Depreciation	121
Research and development	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,935</u>
Operating Income	\$ 175
Interest expense	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 146
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 50</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 96</u></u>

5. Given the base case below, calculate the composite effects of a five percent (5%) increase in Sales, a two percent (2%) decline in Gross Margin, a five percent (5%) increase in SG&A as % of Sales, and a two percent (2%) decline in the tax rate.

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**Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement**

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**Colossal Chemical Corporation**  
**Year Ended December 31, 2011**  
(\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case
Sales	\$2,110
Cost of goods sold	1,477
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 253
Depreciation	121
Research and development	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,935</u>
Operating Income	\$ 175
Interest expense	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 146
Provision for Income Taxes	\$ 50
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 96</u></u>

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PART

# Two

## Answers





# Answers to Questions on Each Chapter

## CHAPTER 1: THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING

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1. Three ways that corporations can use financial reporting to enhance their value are:
  - a. *Reduce their cost of capital*
  - b. *Improve their credit ratings*
  - c. *Increase their price-earnings multiple*
2. The true purpose of financial reporting is *to obtain cheap capital*.
3. Corporations routinely *smooth their earnings* because the appearance of *smooth growth* receives a higher *price-earnings* multiple.
4. According to the “*big bath*” hypothesis, reversals of the excess write-offs offer an artificial means of *stabilizing earnings* in subsequent periods.
5. The following are some of the powerful limitations to continued growth faced by companies:
  - a. *Entry of competition*
  - b. *Increasing base*
  - c. *Markets share constraints*
6. Some of the commonly heard rationalizations for declining growth are:
  - a. *Our year-over-year comparisons were distorted*
  - b. *New products will get growth back on track*
  - c. *We’re diversifying away from mature markets*
7. *Diversification* reached its zenith of popularity during the “*conglomerate*” movement of the 1960s. However, by the 1980s, the stock market had converted the *diversification premium* into a *conglomerate discount*.
8. *Cross-selling* is one of the ways that the notion of diversification as a means of maintaining *high earnings growth* is revived from time to time.
9. The surprise element in Manville Corporation’s 1982 bankruptcy was, in part, a function of *disclosure*.
10. The analysts’ heightened awareness of legal risks are a result of bankruptcies associated with:

- a. *Asbestos exposure*
  - b. *Silicone gel breast implants*
  - c. *Assorted environmental hazards*
11. Some of the stories used to sell stocks to individual investors are:
- a. *A new product with unlimited sales potential*
  - b. *A “play” in some current economic trend such as*
    - i. *Declining interest rates*
    - ii. *Step-up in defense spending*
  - c. *Possible corporate takeovers*
12. When the story used to sell stocks to individual investors originates among stockbrokers or even *in the executive offices of the issuer itself*, the zeal with which the story is disseminated may depend more on *its narrative appeal* than the *solidity of the supporting analysis*.
13. The ostensible purpose of financial reporting is *the accurate portrayal* of a corporation’s earnings.
14. Over a two-year period BGT paid L&H \$35 million to develop translation software. L&H then bought BGT and the translation product along with it. The net effect was that instead of *booking a \$35 million research and development expense*, L&H recognized *\$35 million of revenue*.

## **CHAPTER 2: THE BALANCE SHEET**

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1. A study conducted on behalf of Big Five accounting firm Arthur Andersen showed that between 1978 and 1999, book value fell from 95 percent to 71 percent of the stock market value of public companies in the United States.
2. As noted by Baruch Lev of New York University, two examples of how traditional accounting systems are at a loss to capture most of what is going on today are:
  - a. *The rise in value resulting from a drug passing a key clinical test*
  - b. *A computer software program being successfully beta-tested*
3. In the examples in Question 2 there is no accounting event because *no money changes hands*.
4. Some of the distinct approaches that have evolved for assessing real property are:
  - a. *Capitalization of rents*
  - b. *Inferring a value based on sales of comparable properties*
  - c. *Estimating the value a property would have if put to its highest and best use*
5. Some financial assets are unaffected by the difficulties of evaluating physical assets because *they trade daily in well-organized markets*.

6. Under the compromise embodied in SFAS 115, financial instruments are valued according to *their intended use* by the *company issuing the financial statements*.
7. If a company wrote off a billion dollars worth of goodwill, its ratio of assets to liabilities would *decline*. Its ratio of *tangible assets to liabilities* would not change, however.
8. Through stock-for-stock acquisitions, the sharp rise in equity prices during the late 1990s was transformed into *increased balance sheet values*, despite the usual assumption that *fluctuations in a company's stock price do not alter its stated net worth*.
9. Unlike *inventories or accounts receivable*, goodwill is not an asset that can be readily *sold or factored* to raise cash. Neither can a company enter into a *sale-leaseback* of its goodwill, as it can with its plant and equipment. In short, goodwill is not *a separable asset* that management can either *convert into cash* or *use to raise cash* to extricate itself from a financial tight spot.
10. A reasonable estimate of a low-profit company's true equity value would be *the amount that produces a return on equity equivalent to the going rate*.
11. Determining the cost of capital is a notoriously controversial subject in the financial field, complicated by *thorny tax considerations* and *risk adjustments*.
12. Among the advantages of market capitalization as a measure of equity are:
  - a. *It represents the consensus of investors and analysts who monitor companies' future earnings prospects*
  - b. *It can be calculated any day that the stock exchange is open*
  - c. *It adjusts instantaneously to news*
13. A limitation of the peer-group approach to valuation is that *it fails to capture company-specific factors* and therefore *does not reap* one major benefit of using *market capitalization* as a gauge of actual equity value.
14. Instead of striving for theoretical purity on the matter, analysts should adopt a *flexible attitude*, using the measure of equity value *most useful to a particular application*.
15. Historical-cost-based balance sheet figures are the ones that matter in *estimating the risk* that a company will violate *a loan covenant* requiring *maintenance of a minimum ratio of debt to net worth*.
16. Users of financial statements can process only *the information they have*, and they do not always have *the information they need*.
17. Deterioration in a company's financial position may catch investors by surprise because it *occurs gradually* and is *reported suddenly*.

## CHAPTER 3: THE INCOME STATEMENT

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1. Students of financial statements must keep up with *the innovations* of the past few years in transforming *rising stock values* into *revenues of dubious quality*.
2. In the *percentage income statement*, each income statement item is expressed as *a percentage of the “top line”* (sales or revenues), which is represented as *100 percent*.
3. Besides facilitating comparisons between a company’s present and past results, the *percentage income statement* can highlight important facts *about a company’s competitive standing*.
4. Even within an industry, the breakdown of expenses can vary from company to company as a function of *differing business models* and *financial policies*.
5. Percentage breakdowns are also helpful for comparing a single company’s performance with *its results in previous years* and for comparing *two different companies on the basis of their effectiveness in controlling costs*.
6. In essence, Peet’s is more of *a coffee roaster* and Starbucks is more involved in *brewing coffee to serve to consumers on premise*.
7. Costs as percentages of sales also vary among companies within an industry for *reasons other* than differences *in business models*.
8. The more widely diversified pharmaceutical manufacturers can be expected to have *higher* percentage *product costs*, as well as *lower* percentage *research and development* expenses, than industry peers that focus exclusively on *prescription drugs*.
9. Analysts must take care not to mistake difference that is actually *a function of business strategy* as evidence of *inferior or superior managerial skills*. A subtler explanation may be available at the modest cost of *contacting some long-established industry watchers*.
10. Executives whose bonuses rise *in tandem with earnings-per-share* have a strong incentive not only *to generate bona fide earnings*, but also to use *every lawful means of inflating the figures through accounting sleight of hand*.
11. On a retrospective basis, a surge *in credit losses* or *an unexpected shortfall in revenues* may indicate that *revenues were inflated in an earlier period*.
12. Along with *employee retirement costs*, another major expense category that can be controlled through *assumptions* is *depreciation*.
13. An unusually low ratio of *depreciation* to *property, plant, and equipment* with the ratios of its industry peers may indicate that management

- is being unrealistic in acknowledging the pace of wear and tear on fixed assets. Understatement of *expenses* and overstatement of *earnings* would result.
14. A company knows that creating *more favorable* expectations about *the future* can raise *its stock price* and lower *its borrowing cost*.
  15. One way persuading investors that a major development that hurt earnings last year will *not adversely* affect earnings *in future years* is to suggest that any *large loss* suffered by the company was somehow *outside the normal course of business*, and, by implication, *unlikely to recur*.
  16. An extraordinary item is reported on an *after-tax* basis, below *the line of income (or loss)* from continuing operations.
  17. The accounting rules prohibit corporate officials from displaying certain hits to earnings “above the line,” that is, *on a pretax basis*, and from using the label “*extraordinary*.” Accordingly they employ designations such as “*nonrecurring*” or “*unusual*.” These terms have *no official standing under GAAP*, but *foster the impression that* the highlighted items are *exceptional in nature*.
  18. In recent years, “*restructuring*” has become a catchall for charges that companies wish analysts to consider *outside the normal course of business*, but which do not qualify for *below-the-line treatment*.
  19. Corporate managers commonly perceive that *the damage to their stock price* will be *no greater* if they take (for sake of argument) a \$1.5 billion write-off than if *they write-off \$1.0 billion*. The benefit of exaggerating the damage is that in subsequent years, *the overcharges can be reversed in small amounts that do not generate any requirement for specific disclosure*.
  20. The most dangerous trap that users of financial statements must avoid walking into, however, is inferring that the term “restructuring” connotes *finality*.
  21. The purpose of providing pro forma results was to help analysts *to project future financial results* accurately when some event *outside the ordinary course of business* caused *the unadjusted historical results* to convey a misleading impression.
  22. Computer software producers got into the act by *omitting amortization of purchased research and development* from the expenses considered in calculating *pro forma earnings*.
  23. Unlike operating income, a concept addressed by FASB standards, *operating earnings* is a number that subjectively *excludes* many *above-the-line “one-time events”* that lack any standing under GAAP.

24. In fact, analysts who hope to forecast future financial results accurately *must* apply *common sense* and set aside genuinely *out-of-the-ordinary-course-of-business events*.
25. Analysts must exercise judgment when considering pro forma earnings; however, they must make sure to examine *the actual SEC filings*, instead of *saving time* by relying solely on *company communications*.
26. An older, but not obsolete, device for beefing up reported income is *capitalization of selected expenditures*.
27. A comparatively *high* ratio of PP&E to *sales* or *cost of goods sold* is another sign of potential trouble.
28. Management can *boost sales* through techniques that more properly fall into the category of *corporate finance*.
29. One way to increase profitability through *external growth* involves *economies of scope*.
30. A corporation can easily accelerate its sales growth by *buying other companies* and *adding their sales to its own*. Creating genuine value for shareholders through *acquisitions* is more difficult, although unwary investors sometimes fail to recognize the distinction.
31. Analysts need to distinguish between *internal growth* and *external growth*. *Internal growth* consists of sales increases generated from a company's existing operations, while *external growth* represents incremental sales brought in through *acquisitions*.
32. If Company A generates external growth by acquiring Company B and neither Company nor its new subsidiary increases its profitability, then *the intrinsic value* of the merged companies is *no greater* than the sum of the two companies' values.
33. In general, the *less closely related* the combining businesses are, the *less certain* it is that the hoped-for economies of scope *will be realized*.
34. As synergies go, projections of economies of scale in combinations of companies *within the same business* tend to be more plausible than economies of scope purportedly available to companies in *tangentially connected* businesses.
35. A company with relatively large *fixed costs* has a *high* breakeven level. Even a modest economic downturn will reduce *its capacity utilization* below the rate required to keep the company profitable.
36. Deals that work on paper have often foundered on
  - a. *incompatible information systems*
  - b. *disparate distribution channels*
  - c. *clashes of personality among senior executives*
  - d. *contrasting corporate culture*

37. Financial statements cannot capture certain *nonquantitative factors* that may be essential to *an evaluation*. These include
- industry conditions*
  - corporate culture*
  - management's ability to anticipate and respond effectively to change*

## **CHAPTER 4: THE STATEMENT OF CASH**

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- The present version of the statement that traces the flow of funds in and out of the firm, the statement of cash flows, became mandatory, under *SFAS 95*, for issuers with fiscal years ending after *July 15, 1988*.
- For financial-reporting (as opposed to *tax-accounting*) purposes, a publicly owned company generally seeks to maximize *its reported net income*, which investors use as a basis for valuing its shares.
- A privately held company, unlike a *public company*, which shows one set of statements to the public and another to the Internal Revenue Service, a private company typically prepares *one set* of statements, with *the tax authorities* foremost in its thinking. Its incentive is not to *maximize*, but to *minimize*, the income it reports, thereby *minimizing* its tax bill as well.
- In a classic LBO, a group of investors acquires a business by *putting up a small amount of equity* and *borrowing* the balance.
- The amount attributable to depreciation *does not represent an outlay of cash* in the current year. Rather, it is a bookkeeping entry intended to represent the *gradual reduction in value*, through use, of *physical assets*.
- Viewed in terms of cash inflows and outflows, rather than earnings, *the leveraged buyout* begins to look like *a sound venture*.
- Analysts evaluating the investment merits of the LBO proposal would miss the point if they focused on *earnings* rather than *cash flow*.
- In an LBO, the equity investors do not reap spectacular gains without incurring significant *risk*. There is a danger that everything *will not go according to plan* and that they will lose *their entire investment*. Specifically, there is a risk that *sales and operating earnings* will fall short of expectations, perhaps as a result of *a recession* or because the investors' expectations *were unrealistically high at the outset*.
- The *cash flow statement*, rather than the *income statement*, provides the best information about a highly leveraged firm's financial health.



10. Among the applications and uses of the Statement of Cash Flows are:
  - a. *Determining where a company is in its life cycle*
  - b. *Assessing a company's financial flexibility*
  - c. *Analyzing a troubled company*
11. When a company is *verging on bankruptcy*, its balance sheet may *overstate its asset value*, as a result of *write-offs* having lagged the *deterioration in profitability* of the company's operations.
12. Revenues build gradually during the *start-up* phase, during which time the company is just *organizing itself* and *launching its products*.
13. Growth and profits accelerate rapidly during the *emerging growth* phase, as the company's products begin to penetrate the market and the *production reaches a profitable scale*.
14. During the *established growth* period, growth in sales and earnings decelerates as the *market nears saturation*. In the *mature industry* phase, sales opportunities are limited to the replacement of products previously sold, plus *new sales derived from growth in the population*.
15. Price competition often intensifies at this stage, as companies *seek sales growth through increased market share*. The *declining industry* stage does not automatically follow maturity, but over long periods some industries do get swept away by *technological change*.
16. Sharply declining sales and earnings, ultimately resulting in *corporate bankruptcies*, characterize industries in decline.
17. *Start-up companies* are typically voracious cash users.
18. *Emerging growth companies* are start-ups that survive long enough to reach the stage of entering the public market.
19. For a company at *the introductory stage*, it may take several years for sales to reach *a level sufficient to cover* sizable fixed costs that are *essential to its operations*.
20. Unlike a *mature company*, Green Mountain is *not self-financing*. It issues substantial *amounts of debt and equity* each year to fund its *growing needs for working capital and acquisitions*.
21. *Established growth companies* are in a less precarious state in terms of cash flow than their emerging growth counterparts.
22. Reflecting the *mature state* of its business, Kimberly-Clark generates a *high and steady* level of *cash from operations*.
23. Far from depending *on external capital*, this mature company *returned capital to investors*, giving them the opportunity to *reinvest* it in higher-growth, *cash-hungry businesses*.
24. Some *mature companies* choose instead to *reinvest their positive cash flow* internally. They either launch or acquire businesses with *higher growth potential than their original, core operations*. The older businesses become "*cash cows*" *to be milked* for funding the newer activities.



25. *Mature industry companies*, are past the cash strain faced by growth companies that must fund large *construction* programs.
26. *Declining industry companies* struggle to generate sufficient cash as a consequence of meager earnings.
27. By studying the cash flow statement, an analyst can make informed judgments on such questions as:
  - a. *How safe (that is, likely to continue being paid) is the company's dividend?*
  - b. *Could the company fund its needs internally if external sources of capital suddenly become scarce or prohibitively expensive?*
  - c. *Would the company be able to continue meeting its obligations if its business turned down sharply?*
28. In difficult times, when a company must cut back on various expenditures *to conserve cash*, management faces many difficult choices. A key objective is to *avoid damage to the company's long-term health*.
29. At times, *new financing* becomes *painfully expensive*, as a function of *high interest rates* or *depressed stock prices*. During the "*credit crunches*" that occasionally befall the business world, *external financing* is unavailable at any price.
30. If a corporation's financial strain becomes acute, the board of directors may take the comparatively extreme step of *cutting or eliminating the dividend*.
31. Reducing *the dividend* is a step that corporations try very hard to avoid, for fear of *losing favor with investors* and consequently suffering an increase in *cost of capital*.
32. A final factor in assessing financial flexibility is the change in adjusted working capital. Unlike conventional working capital (*current assets minus current liabilities*), this figure excludes *notes payable*, as well as *cash* and *short-term investments*.
33. A company with a strong balance sheet can fund much of that cash need by increasing its *trade payables* (credit extended by vendors). External financing may be needed, however, if accumulation of unsold goods causes *inventories* to rise disproportionately to *sales*. Similarly, if customers begin paying more slowly than formerly, *receivables* can widen the gap between *working capital requirements* and *trade credit availability*.
34. One typical consequence of violating *debt covenants* or striving to head off *bankruptcy* is that management reduces discretionary expenditures to avoid *losing control*.
35. Overinvestment has unquestionably led, in many industries, to prolonged periods of *excess capacity*, producing in turn chronically *poor profitability*. In retrospect, the firms involved would have served their

- shareholders better if they had *increased their dividend payouts* or *repurchased stock*, instead of *constructing new plants*.
36. Keeping cash “trapped” in marketable securities can enable a firm *to gain an edge* over “lean-and-mean” competitors when *tight credit conditions* make it difficult to *finance working capital needs*.
  37. Another less obvious risk of eschewing financial flexibility is the danger of permanently losing *experienced skilled workers* through *temporary layoffs* occasioned by recessions.
  38. The income statement is a dubious measure of the success of a *highly leveraged* company that is being managed to *minimize*, rather than *maximize*, reported profits.
  39. The cash flow statement is the best tool for measuring *flexibility*, which, contrary to a widely held view, is not merely a security blanket for *squeamish investors*.
  40. In the hands of an aggressive but prudent management, a cash flow cushion can enable a company to *sustain essential long-term investment spending* when competitors are forced to cut back.

## **CHAPTER 5: WHAT IS PROFIT?**

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1. Profitability is a yardstick by which businesspeople can measure their *achievements* and justify *their claims to compensation*.
2. When calculating *bona fide* profits, the analyst must take care to consider only genuine revenues and deduct all relevant costs.
3. There can be no bona fide profit without *an increase in wealth*. Bona fide profits are the only kind of profits *that truly matter* in financial analysis.
4. Merely *circulating funds*, it is clear, does not increase wealth.
5. An essential element of genuinely useful financial statement analysis is *the willingness to take accounting profits at something other than face value*.
6. The issuer of the statements can *raise* or *lower* its reported earnings simply by using its latitude to assume shorter or longer *average lives for its depreciable assets*.
7. The rate at which the tax code allows owners to write-off property overstates *actual wear-and-tear*.
8. In the *broadcasting business*, companies typically record depreciation and amortization expense that far exceeds physical wear-and-tear on assets.
9. In many industries, fixed assets consist mainly of *machines or vehicles that really do diminish in value through use*. The major risk of

analytical error does not arise from the possibility that *reported depreciation expense will substantially exceed economic depreciation*, but the reverse.

## CHAPTER 6: REVENUE RECOGNITION

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1. Many corporations employ **highly aggressive recognition** practices that comply with GAAP yet **distort the underlying economic reality**.
2. Under intense pressure to maintain their stock prices, companies characterized by *extremely rapid sales growth* seem particularly prone to *take liberties*.
3. To seasoned investors, *an abrupt departure* by a senior manager represents *a telltale sign of trouble*.
4. Bonus-seeking managers may initially veer off the straight-and-narrow by *“borrowing”* a small amount from *future revenue*, intending to *“pay it back”* the following year, but they instead fall further and further behind. Eventually, the gap between *reported revenues* and *economic reality* grows too large to sustain.
5. Even when an independent accounting firm certifies that a company’s financials *have been prepared in accordance* with generally accepted accounting principles; the analyst must stay alert for evidence *that the numbers misrepresent the economic reality*.
6. Staying alert to evidence of flawed, *or possibly fraudulent*, reporting is essential, even when the auditors *put their blessing on the numbers*.
7. As a rule, distorting one section of the financial statements *throws the numbers out of whack in some other section*. Assiduous tracking of a variety of *financial ratios* should raise serious questions about a company’s reporting, at a minimum.
8. The explanation for the sudden drop in projected earnings was that in 2001 Bristol-Myers *gave wholesalers discounts* to induce them to *buy its products* at a much faster rate than necessary to *fill prescriptions at pharmacies*.
9. *“Channel-stuffing”* is a security analysts’ term for the financial reporting gimmick that Bristol-Myers employed to *accelerate future revenues to the current period*.
10. Along with other pharmaceutical producers, Bristol-Myers was feeling profit pressures due to *difficulties in developing new drugs* to replace sales of products *on which patent protection was expiring*.
11. Haydon was known for speaking candidly about Bristol-Myers’s declining sales prospects. Consequently, his reassignment was *taken as a message that executives must meet their sales quotas at all costs*.

12. Also suspect was Bristol-Myers's repeated practice of *establishing restructuring reserves* that exactly equaled *gains on asset sales*.
13. The Bristol-Myers Squibb case study nevertheless illustrates the value of *testing a company's reported earnings* against *independently provided information*.
14. According to Take-Two management, the adjustment arose because the company *recorded revenue* on some games it sold to "*certain independent third-party distributors*" but which were later *returned to or repurchased* by Take-Two.
15. *Contrary* to the lesson taught by many other cases of financial misreporting, it paid to accept the Take-Two *discredited management's* assurances that the company's business prospects *looked bright*.
16. Take-Two shipped hundreds of thousands of video games to distributors *who were under no obligation to pay for them*, *fraudulently* booked the shipments *as if they were sales*, then *accepted returns of the products* in later periods.
17. Encouragingly for users of financial statements, managers *who improperly recognize revenues* are often betrayed by *the number trails they create*.
18. In layaway sales, customers reserve goods *with down payments*, and then make additional payments over a specified period, *receiving their merchandise* when they have paid in full.
19. Prior to the change in accounting practice, which FAS 101 made mandatory, Wal-Mart booked layaway sales *as soon as it placed the merchandise on layaway*. Under the new and more conservative method, the company began to recognize the sales *only when customers completed the required payments and took possession of the goods*.
20. On the whole, Bally's reported profit margins benefited from the increase in *financed memberships* as a percentage of total revenues. The reported earnings, however, rested on assumptions regarding the percentage of customers who *would ultimately fail to make all of the scheduled installments*.
21. As in any sales situation, aggressive pursuit of new business could result in *acceptance of more marginally qualified customers*. On average, the newer members might prove to be *less financially capable* or less committed to physical fitness than *the previous purchasers of financed memberships*.
22. There was no change in the accounting principle, namely, *the matching concept*. In the case of a health club, members' upfront fees represent *payments for services received over the terms of their membership*. Club operators should therefore recognize the revenue over the period in which *they render the service*.

23. Under GAAP, the general requirement was to spread membership fees *over the full membership period*. If a company offered refunds, it could not *book any of the revenue* until the refund period expired, unless there was *a sufficiently long history* to enable management to estimate *future experience* with reasonable confidence.
24. Under certain circumstances, a company engaged in long-term contract work can *book revenue before billing its customer*. This result arises from GAAP's solution to a mismatch commonly observed *at construction firms*.
25. GAAP addresses the problem through the **percentage-of-completion method**, which permits the company to recognize revenue in *proportion to the amount of work completed*, rather than in line with its billing.
26. As is generally the case with *artificial acceleration*, taking liberties with the percentage-of-completion borrows *future revenues*, making a surprise *shortfall inevitable* at some point.
27. The SEC claimed that management at Sequoia Systems inflated revenue and profits by:
  - a. *Booking letters of intent as revenue*
  - b. *Backdating some purchase orders*
  - c. *Granting customers special terms that Sequoia never disclosed*
28. The SEC also claimed that management at Sequoia Systems profited from the scheme by *selling stock before a true picture of the company's financial condition emerged*.
29. Loading the distribution channels consists of *inducing distributors or retailers* to accept larger shipments of goods than *their near-term sales expectations warrant*.
30. Loading does not boost *physical sales volume*, but merely shifts the timing of its *recognition as reported revenues*.
31. Inevitably, the underlying trend of final sales to consumers slows down, at least temporarily. At that point, the manufacturer's growth in reported revenue will maintain its trend only *if its distributors take on even bigger inventories*, relative to their sales. If the distributors balk, *the loading scheme will unravel*, forcing a *sizeable write-off* of previously recorded profits.
32. Krispy Kreme revised its senior executive compensation plan.<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, officers would receive *no bonuses* unless the company *reported earnings* in each quarter *that exceeded its earnings per share* guidance *by at least \$0.01*.

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<sup>1</sup>SEC v. Scott A. Livengood, John W. Tate, and Randy S. Casstevens; SEC Complaint against Scott A. Livengood, John W. Tate, and Randy S. Casstevens, May 4, 2009.

33. In essence, according to the *Wall Street Journal*'s story, Krispy Kreme *manufactured earnings* by taking money *out of one pocket and putting it into another*.
34. Had Krispy Kreme instead *repurchased the franchises and then closed the stores*, it would have *incurred an expense*. The catch is that an asset is supposed to be *something that creates future economic value*. Terminated stores would not seem *to satisfy that definition*.
35. Most, if not all, of the *cash* on Krispy Kreme's *balance sheet* appeared to have come from a *sale-and-leaseback* transaction, rather than from *operations*.
36. Krispy Kreme increased the size of the corrections to its fiscal 2004 results. The previously undisclosed problems involved *derivatives transactions, errors in accounting for leases and improvements related to leases, and reversal of income related to equipment sold to a franchisee before Krispy Kreme bought that operation*.
37. Krispy Kreme was *not a case of massively fictitious earnings*. Rather, the SEC complaint depicted *a process of nickel-and-diming*, through a wide range of *financial statement items*, to beat *earnings guidance by \$0.01 in every single quarter*.
38. An exceptionally long record of *beating guidance or posting year-over-year gains in quarterly earnings* is a reason to *suspect earnings management*.
39. A second lesson of the Krispy Kreme case is that *related-party transactions* and *deceptive financial reporting* often go hand in hand.
40. It is impossible to assess the quality of an internal investigation without information on the *methods employed* and the basis *for its conclusions*.
41. Users of financial statements should not be intimidated by corporate *press releases* that denounce allegedly irresponsible *securities analysts and journalists*.
42. In 2001, Halliburton adopted an even more aggressive approach to *recognizing revenue*. For some projects, Halliburton began reporting sales *months before billing customers for the work*. Previously, the policy was to book revenues *only if the company expected to bill clients within one month*. In addition, the company began keeping some disputed bills on the books *for over a year instead of writing them off and reporting losses*. The previous policy was to refrain from a write-off *only if it believed it would collect most of the claim within one year*.
43. Halliburton became more aggressive about *booking revenues before getting paid*, a classic technique for *pumping up reported earnings*.

44. If earnings look suspiciously *strong* during a *rough patch* for the company's industry, users of financial statements should *never automatically rule out the possibility that manipulative accounting* explains the disparity.
45. A stock's value is a function of expected *future earnings*, which partly depend on the *popularity of the company's products* vis-à-vis its competitors'.
46. Generally, the initial response of corporate executives caught in a lie is *to dig themselves a deeper hole*, but gratifyingly often, *the truth ultimately emerges*.
47. Analysts who strive to go beyond routine *number-crunching* can profit by seeking *independent verification* of corporate disclosure, even when *the auditors* have already placed *their stamp of approval on it*.
48. Sometimes, management *delays* revenue recognition in order to *understate* short-run profits. The motive for this paradoxical behavior is a desire to report the sort of *smooth year-to-year earnings growth* that equity investors reward with *high price-earnings multiples*.
49. Grace executives reckoned that with earnings already meeting Wall Street analysts' forecasts, a windfall *would not help* the company's stock price. Such an inference would have been consistent with investors' customary *downplaying of profits and losses* that they perceive to be generated by *one-time events*.
50. Grace's 1998 statement that its auditors had raised no objections to its accounting for the Medicare reimbursement windfall was true only *in the technical sense* that Price Waterhouse issued clean financials, based on materiality considerations. As a spokeswoman for the auditing firm pointed out, such an opinion *does not imply agreement with everything in the statements*.
51. According to Michael Jensen: "Tell a manager that he will get a bonus when targets are realized and two things will happen":
  - a. *Managers will attempt to set easy targets.*
  - b. *Once these are set, they will do their best to see that they are met even if it damages the company.*
52. All too often, companies wouldn't be able to accomplish the frauds without *the assistance of their customers*.
53. According to Jensen, almost every company uses a budget system that *rewards* employees for *lying* and punishes them *for telling the truth*. He proposes reforming the system by severing the link between *budget targets* and *compensation*.
54. Even in the case of the bluest of the blue chips, watching for rising levels of *accounts receivable* or *inventory*, relative to *sales*, should be standard operating procedure.



55. When the revenues derived from *wishful thinking* fail to materialize, the managers may resort to *fraud to maintain the illusion*. The positive mental attitude that overstates revenues in the early stage *is no less damaging*, however, than *the fraud responsible* at a later point.

## CHAPTER 7: EXPENSE RECOGNITION

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1. Corporate managers are just as creative *in minimizing and slowing down* the recognition of *expenses* as they are in maximizing and speeding up the *recognition of revenues*.
2. Investors attach little significance to *nonrecurring* profits and losses in valuing stocks. Therefore, a public company has a strong incentive to *aggregate cumulative losses* into a one-time event and to *break up a unique, nonrecurring gain* into smaller pieces and *recognize it over several years*.
3. Nortel Networks illustrated *the distorting power of accruals*, one of the most *abused features* of financial reporting.
4. Between September 2000 and *August 2002*, Nortel's market capitalization sank *by 99 percent*, devastating *Canadian pension plans* that were heavily invested in its shares.
5. The company had to wave a *classic red flag* with respect to *the credibility of its financial statements* by *delaying the filing of its 2003* financial reports.
6. In addition to dashing hopes *that the new round of accounting statements would be minor*, Nortel rattled the market by *firing CEO Dunn, CFO Beatty, and controller Gollogly*.
7. Nortel's management's credibility *continued to shrink* as the *company kept pushing back its target date* for producing definitive *earnings restatements*.
8. Nortel's investigation, which previously had focused on *accruals and provisions*, had turned to *revenue recognition*.
9. Incorrect recognition of that amount resulted from a combination of:
  - a. *Non-transfer of legal title to customers*
  - b. *Failure to meet criteria for recognizing revenue prior to shipment*
  - c. *The collectibility questions*
  - d. *Other incorrect steps*
10. Nortel followed a strategy of *taking a "big bath"* in its money-losing period of 2001–2002. *Overstating losses* created "*cookie cutter*" reserves that could be taken *into profits in later years*.
11. Nortel's experience shows that if a company *uses accruals to understate profits*, it will have no compunction about *overstating profits* through *aggressive revenue recognition*.



12. An important takeaway from the Nortel case is that *seemingly small items* can prove *highly significant*.
13. *Rebates* are another frequently abused element of *expense recognition*. General Motors's fiddling with this device *shows the important role of corporate culture* in the *integrity* of financial reporting.
14. At issue in GM's restatement was *the recording of rebates and other credits* from *suppliers*.
15. GM said that some cash flows from *its mortgage subsidiary* that should have been classified among its *investing activities* were instead booked as *operating activities*.
16. This revelation puzzled accounting experts because the applicable rules were unambiguous. *Extending a loan* or *receiving repayment* fell into *investing activities*; *interest payments* were included in *operating cash flow*.
17. GM Management said it had *prematurely increased the value of vehicles* it was leasing to car-rental companies, assuming they would be *worth more* after those companies *were through with them*.
18. Ordinarily, a company's stock price *rises* when its reported earnings *unexpectedly increase*.
19. Freddie Mac steadfastly *denied* that its handling of *derivatives* was aimed at *smoothing its earnings*.
20. Even if it was true that *intentional misrepresentations* represented the *lesser part of the earnings understatement*, Freddie Mac's *questionable practices* had a huge impact that even *conscientious analysts* could not detect *from the outside*.
21. Freddie Mac's manipulation did not end there. Another ploy to *hide earnings* consisted of ceasing to use *market prices for certain derivatives*.
22. Companies can follow a variety of approaches in downplaying expenses such as:
  - a. *Making liberal assumptions about costs that may be capitalized*
  - b. *Diluting expenses with one-time gains*
  - c. *Jumping the gun in booking rebates from suppliers*
  - d. *Understating expenses through sheer sloppiness in their book-keeping*

## **CHAPTER 8: THE APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF EBITDA**

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1. The impetus for trying to redirect investors' focus to *operating income* or other variants has been *the minimal net profits* recorded by many "new economy" companies.

2. Users of financial statements had discovered certain limitations in net income as a *valuation tool*. They observed that two companies in the same industry could report similar *income*, yet have substantially different *total enterprise values*.
3. Net income is not, to the disappointment of analysts, a standard by which every company's *value* can be compared.
4. The accounting standards leave companies considerable discretion regarding the *depreciable lives* they assign to their *property, plant, and equipment*. The same applies to amortization schedules for *intangible assets*.
5. For some companies, the sum of net income, income taxes, and interest expense is not equivalent to EBIT, reflecting the presence of such factors as *extraordinary items and minority interest* below *the pretax income line*.
6. Shifting investors' attention away from traditional fixed-charge coverage and toward *EBITDA coverage of interest* was particularly beneficial during the 1980s, when some buyouts were so *highly leveraged* that *projected EBIT* would not cover pro forma interest expense even in a good year.
7. Capital spending is likely to exceed depreciation over time as the company *expands its productive capacity* to accommodate *rising demand*. Another reason that capital spending may run higher than depreciation is that newly acquired equipment may be *costlier* than the old equipment being written off, as a function of *inflation*.
8. Delaying equipment purchases and repairs that are needed but not *urgent*, should inflict no lasting damage on the company's *operations* provided the *profit slump* lasts for only a few quarters.
9. Depreciation is not available as a long-run source of cash for *interest payments*. This was a lesson applicable not only to extremely *leveraged* deals of the 1980s, but also to the more *conservatively* capitalized transactions of later years.
10. Beaver's definition of cash flow was more stringent than *EBITDA* since he did not add back either *taxes* or *interest* to net income.
11. Beaver did not conclude that analysts should rely solely on the *cash-flow-to-debt ratio*, but merely that it was the single best *bankruptcy predictor*.
12. Some investment managers consider that the single ratio of *cash flow* (as they define it) to *fixed charges* predicts bankruptcy better than all of *the rating agencies'* quantitative and qualitative considerations combined.
13. Aside from *seasonal variations*, the amount of working capital needed to run a business represents a fairly constant *percentage* of a company's

- sales. Therefore, if inventories or receivables *increase* materially as a percentage of sales, analysts should strongly suspect that the earnings are *overstated*, even though management will invariably offer a *more benign* explanation.
14. If a company resorts to stretching out its payables, two other ratios that will send out warning signals are:
    - a. *Receivables to sales*
    - b. *Inventories to cost of goods sold*
  15. Merrill Lynch investment strategist Richard Bernstein points out that *operating* earnings tend to be more stable than *reported* earnings, EBIT tends to be more stable than *operating* earnings, and *EBITDA* tends to be more stable than EBIT.
  16. Strategist Bernstein found that by attempting to *filter out the volatility* inherent in companies' earnings, investors reduced the *effectiveness* of their stock selection.

## **CHAPTER 9: THE RELIABILITY OF DISCLOSURE AND AUDITS**

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1. Fear of the consequences of breaking the law keeps corporate managers in line. *Bending* the law is another matter, though, in the minds of many executives. If their bonuses depend on *presenting results in an unfairly favorable light*, they can usually see their way clear to adopting that course.
2. Technically, *the board of directors* appoints the auditing firm, but *management* is the point of contact in hashing out the details of presenting financial events for *external consumption*.
3. At some point, *resigning the account* becomes a moral imperative, but in the real world, accounting firms must be *pushed rather far to reach that point*.
4. It is common for front-line auditors to balk at an *aggressive accounting treatment* proposed by a company's managers, only to be overruled by *their senior colleagues*.
5. *Fraud* is an unambiguous violation of accounting standards, but audits do not *invariably catch it*.
6. Extremely clever scamsters may even succeed in undermining the auditors' efforts to select *their samples at random*, a procedure designed to foil concealment of fraud.
7. When challenged on inconsistencies in their numbers, companies sometimes *blame error*, rather than any intention to *mislead the users of financial statements*.

8. Seasoned followers of the corporate scene realize that companies are not always as *forthcoming* as investors *might reasonably expect*.
9. According to president and chief executive of Trump World's Fair Casino Hotel, the firm's focus in 1999 was threefold:
  - a. *To increase our operating margins at each operating entity*
  - b. *To decrease our marketing costs*
  - c. *To increase our cash sales from our non-casino operations*
10. Investors who relied solely on *the disclosure* by Trump World's Fair Casino Hotel were burned if they bought into the rally that followed the *bullish-sounding* press release.
11. Abundant evidence has emerged over the years of corporate managers *leaning on auditors* to paint as rosy a picture as possible.
12. To say that *no perfect system can be designed*, however, is quite different from saying that
  - a. *Existing provisions for issuing financial accounting standards*
  - b. *Conducting audits*
  - c. *Policing fraud are as good as real-world conditions permit*
13. Popular outrage over the *post-Tech Wreck* accounting scandals created *political momentum* to eliminate *the auditing-consulting conflict*.
14. Systematic problems in the audit process arise not only *from the regulatory structure* but also from *the business strategies of profit-maximizing accounting firms*.
15. In the 1990s, "*risk-based audits*" emerged as a means of keeping a lid on costs. Instead of focusing on *details of individual transactions*, they identified the areas that in *their judgment* presented the greatest risk of error or fraud, such as *complex derivatives*. Incredibly, these judgments in some cases were based on *management's advice*.
16. In WorldCom's early days, Arthur Andersen audited the company in *a meticulous, bottom-up way*. As the company grew, however, Andersen migrated toward *a risk-based process*. If a question arose about controls or procedures, Andersen relied on the *answers provided by management*.
17. Congress's unwillingness to give the SEC *the resources it needed to do its job* reflected more than *competing claims on the federal budget*.
18. One final line of defense for users of a company's financial statements is *the audit committee of its board of directors*. This protection has *not proven infallible* over the years.
19. In one of the few encouraging notes of recent years, the SEC has imposed a "*financial literacy*" requirement on audit committee members.
20. Many companies are either *stingy with information* or *slippery about the way they present it*. Rather than laying down the law (or GAAP), the auditors typically wind up *negotiating with management* to arrive

at a point where they can convince themselves that *the bare minimum requirements of good practice* have been satisfied.

21. Given the observed gap between *theory* and *practice* in financial reporting, users of financial statements must provide themselves *an additional layer of protection* through tough *scrutiny of the numbers*.

## **CHAPTER 10: MERGERS-AND-ACQUISITIONS ACCOUNTING**

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1. Choosing a method of accounting for a merger or acquisition does not affect the combined companies' subsequent *competitive strength* or *ability to generate cash*. The discretionary accounting choices can have a *substantial impact*, however, on *reported earnings*.
2. Meyer emphasized that he was *not accusing* Tyco of *fraud*, but merely of *aggressive accounting*. Nevertheless, the diversified manufacturer responded in the *classic of manner of a company criticized for tricky financial reporting*; Tyco angrily denounced Meyer's report, stating that "*rumors relating to the company are false, unfounded, and malicious*."
3. Alert analysts had suspected something was going on behind the scenes. They questioned why in the most recent fiscal year, *debt attributable* to Tyco's *industrial businesses* doubled to \$21.6 billion even though the company reported \$4.8 billion *in free cash flow*.
4. Swartz acknowledged that the amount spent on *unannounced deals* was not determinable from Tyco's financial statements because it reported *acquisition expenditures net of cash on the acquired companies' balance sheets* and did not disclose the *aggregate amount of that cash*.
5. The investigators concluded that Tyco repeatedly used aggressive, *albeit legal, accounting gimmicks*, including *depressing the reported profits of acquired companies* immediately before acquisition, in order to generate *profit surges in the first quarter after closing*. Company officials referred to such practices as "*financial engineering*" and ordered employees to "create stories" to justify *accounting changes that would hype Tyco's reported earnings*.
6. Tyco's financial reporting aggressiveness involved *distortion of reported free cash flow* through a nonstandard definition of the term. Tyco excluded *cash received from sales of receivables* and *cash outlays for the purchase of customer accounts* for its ADT security-alarm business, labeling the latter "*acquisitions*."
7. Although the pooling-of-interests method has been abolished, M&A accounting remains an area in which analysts must be on their toes.

Companies have developed *increasingly subtle strategies* for exploiting the discretion afforded by the rules. *Maximizing reported earnings* in the post-acquisition period remains a key objective.

8. For example, one M&A-related gambit entails the GAAP-sanctioned use, for financial reporting purposes, of *an acquisition date other than the actual date on which a transaction is consummated*. Typically, companies use this discretion to simplify the closing of their books at month- or quarter-end.
9. Under Securities and Exchange Commission rules, companies do not have to *restate previous statements* to reflect the revenues and earnings of acquired businesses *deemed immaterial in size*.
10. There can be no guarantee of loans secured by stock issued in the combination, which would effectively *negate the transfer of risk* implicit in a bona fide *exchange of securities*. *Reacquisitions* of stock, and *special distributions* are likewise prohibited.
11. Regulators may tighten up rules that can be abused, such as the *standards for materiality*, but corporate managers usually manage to stay one step ahead. Analysts who hope to keep pace would do well to study *the classic gambits employed in the M&A area*, in order to understand the thought process of the field's most notorious innovators.
12. Clues to hanky-panky may include:
  - a. *An unusually large number of special items*
  - b. *A mysterious buildup of cash despite large reported free cash flow*  
*If an acquired company was a public reporter prior to its acquisition*
  - c. *A drop in earnings just prior to closing*

## **CHAPTER 11: IS FRAUD DETECTABLE?**

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1. Beneish defines manipulation to include both *actual fraud* and *the management of earnings or disclosure within GAAP*.
2. Beneish finds, by statistical analysis, that the presence of any of the following five factors increases the probability of earnings manipulation:
  1. *Increasing days sales in receivables*
  2. *Deteriorating gross margins*
  3. *Decreasing rates of depreciation*
  4. *Decreasing asset quality (defined as the ratio of noncurrent assets other than property, plant, and equipment to total assets)*
  5. *Growing sales*
3. The evidence of criminal misrepresentation *often appears obvious after the fact*, but *not even the most skilled analysts* definitively identified

- some of the most famous frauds *until the schemes became unsustainable* and the companies *collapsed*.
4. In studying these notorious frauds, readers should pay close attention *not only to the suspicious financial statement items*, but also *to the behavior of senior managers* as the validity of their stated profits is challenged.
  5. Unexpected *turnover in senior management* is a classic warning sign of financial misrepresentation.
  6. When Enron at long last conceded that it was overly indebted, management tried to:
    - a. *Restructure existing debt*
    - b. *Arrange additional borrowings*
    - c. *Obtain equity infusions*
    - d. *Raise cash by selling overseas assets*
  7. Enron also misled investors by aggressively exploiting wiggle room in the accounting rules. The company booked revenue from its energy-related derivatives contracts on the basis of *gross value*, rather than *net value*, as is the norm for *other securities transactions*.
  8. Excessive liberties with *mark-to-market* accounting rules constituted yet one more element of Enron's misrepresentation.
  9. On a conference call dealing with Enron's earnings, analyst Richard Grubman complained that the company was *unique* in refusing to include a *balance sheet* in its earnings release.
  10. Still, the *off-balance-sheet* vehicles, combined with *non-transparent disclosures*, enabled Enron to make itself look less *debt-laden* than it really was.
  11. While Enron grossly misled investors by *stretching the rules*, a large part of its deception consisted of *outright violation of* basic accounting standards, with *the acquiescence* of its auditor.
  12. Equally crude was a scheme in which Enron reportedly borrowed \$500 million from a bank and *bought Treasury bills*. A few days later it sold the *Treasury bills* and repaid the bank, reporting the proceeds from the meaningless transaction as *operating cash flow*.
  13. The *opacity* of Enron's *fair value assumptions* was a major concern. "Ultimately they're telling you *what they think the answer is*, but they're not telling you *how they got to that answer*," Business Valuation Services analyst Stephen Campbell complained. "That is essentially saying '*trust me*.'"
  14. Off Wall Street consulting group recommended a short sale of Enron based on two factors identifiable from the financial statements, namely, *the mark-to-market on non-traded assets* and *related-party transactions* with *private partnerships*.



15. Analysts should be especially wary when *a strong likelihood of financial manipulation*, as indicated by tools such as *the Beneish model*, coincides with *non-transparent* financial reporting.
16. According to the SEC's complaint, HealthSouth's falsification began *shortly after the company went public in 1986*.
17. Flat denial by Scrusby, regardless of *the evidence that emerged*, was a consistent theme as the *HealthSouth story* unfolded.
18. The complaint stated that when HealthSouth officials and accountants urged Scrusby *to cease inflating profits*, he replied, in effect, "*not until I sell my stock.*"
19. The "Sarbox" provision requiring CFOs and CEOs to attest to the accuracy of financial statements gave prosecutors a powerful weapon to wield against falsifiers, but *HealthSouth's fraud* dispelled any notion that the tough new law *would end financial misreporting altogether*.
20. HealthSouth exaggerated its earnings by understating the gap between *the cost of a treatment* and *the amount that the patient's insurance would cover*.
21. If the auditors did question an accounting entry, HealthSouth executives reportedly *created a phony document* to validate the item.
22. HealthSouth also propped up profits by *failing to write-off receivables* with *little chance of being collected*. In addition, the company *did not recognize losses* when it sold assets *that had declined in value*.
23. Compounding Scrusby's legal problems, federal prosecutors disclosed in July 2003 that they had uncovered evidence of:
  - a. *Tax fraud*
  - b. *Obstruction of justice*
  - c. *Witness intimidation*
  - d. *Money laundering*
  - e. *Public corruption*
24. The most dismaying aspect of the performance of HealthSouth's auditor, Ernst & Young LLP, was *its failure* to challenge a *sudden, large increase* in cash.
25. In the view of experts in the field, internal checks and balances also broke down at HealthSouth. The board's audit committee met *only once* during 2001, *three times less* than the minimum recommended by the SEC.
26. Investors had little official warning of trouble until *the month before* Parmalat's collapse. As late as October 2003, Deutsche Bank's equity research group rated the company's stock *a BUY*, highlighting *its strong reported cash flow*, and Citibank put out *an optimistic* report in November. Furthermore, the company's debt carried



- an *investment grade* rating up until *nine days before* the bankruptcy filing.
27. A major red flag was Parmalat's *voracious appetite for debt*, despite claiming to have a *huge cash balance*.
  28. Merrill Lynch analysts downgraded Parmalat to SELL, saying that the company's *frequent recourse to the bond market*, while reporting *high cash balances*, threw into question *its cash-generating ability*.
  29. Another hazard signal emerged on February 26, 2003, when Parmalat suddenly canceled its plan *to sell 30-year bonds*. The company said it would instead *issue bonds with maturities of just seven years*, suggesting the market had less confidence in Parmalat's *long-run stability* than management had thought.
  30. Oddly, the person who achieved the greatest renown for early recognition of the Parmalat's house of cards was not *a financial analyst*, but *a comedian*.

## CHAPTER 12: FORECASTING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

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1. It is *future earnings and dividends* that determine the value of a company's stock and the *relative likelihood of future timely payments of debt service* that determines credit quality.
2. The process of financial projections is an extension of *historical patterns* and *relationships*, based on assumptions about future *economic conditions, market behavior, and managerial action*.
3. Sales projections for the company's business can be developed with the help of such sources as *trade publications, trade associations*, and firms that sell *econometric forecasting* models.
4. Basic industries such as *chemicals, paper, and capital goods* tend to lend themselves best to the *macroeconomic-based approach* described here. In technology-driven industries and "hits-driven" businesses such as *motion pictures* and *toys*, the connection between *sales* and the *general economic trend* will tend to be looser.
5. The expected intensity of industry competition, which affects a company's *ability to pass cost increases* on to customers or to retain *cost decreases*, influences the *gross margin* forecast.
6. Since the segment information in may show only operating income, and not *gross margin*, the analyst must add *segment depreciation* to operating income, then make assumptions about the allocation of *selling, general, and administrative expense* and *research and development* expense by segment.

7. The R&D percentage may change if, for example, the company *makes a sizable acquisition* in an industry that is either significantly more, or significantly less, *research-intensive* than its existing operations.
8. The key to the forecasting interest expense method employed here is to estimate the firm's embedded cost of debt, that is, the *weighted average interest rate* on the company's *existing long-term debt*.
9. Accurately projecting interest expense for *highly leveraged* companies is important because *their financial viability* may depend on the size of *the interest expense "nut"* they must cover each quarter.
10. The completed income statement projection supplies *the first two lines* of the projected statement of cash flows.
11. Before assuming a constant-percentage relationship, the analyst must verify that *the most recent year's ratios are representative of experience over several years*.
12. A sizable *net cash provision* might be presumed to be directed toward share repurchase, reducing *shareholders' equity*, if management has indicated a desire to *buy stock* and is *authorized to do so* by its board of directors.
13. Typically, the analyst must modify the underlying *economic* assumptions, and therefore the projections, several times during the year as *business activity* diverges from *forecasted levels*.
14. A firm may have considerable room to cut *its capital spending* in the short run if it suffers a decline in funds provided by *operations*. A projection that ignored this *financial flexibility* could prove overly pessimistic.
15. An interest rate decline will have limited impact on a company for which interest costs represent a *small percentage of expenses*. The impact will be greater on a company with a large interest cost component and with much of its debt at *floating rates*. This assumes the return on the company's assets is *not similarly rate-sensitive*.
16. Analysts are generally not arrogant enough to try to forecast the figures accurately to the first decimal place, that is, to the *hundred-thousands* for a company with revenues in the *hundreds of millions*.
17. It is generally inappropriate to compare a *quarterly income statement* item (EBITDA) with a balance sheet figure, especially in the case of a *highly seasonal* company.
18. It is unwise to base an investment decision on historical statements that antedate a major financial change such as:
  - a. *Stock repurchase*
  - b. *Write-off*
  - c. *Acquisition*
  - d. *Divestment*

19. A pro forma income statement for a single year provides no information about *the historical growth* in sales and earnings of *the subsidiary* that is being spun off.
20. Pro forma adjustments for a divestment do not capture the potential benefits of increased *management focus* on the company's *core operations*.
21. The earnings shown in a merger-related pro forma income statement may be higher than the company can sustain because:
  - a. The acquired company's owners may be shrewdly selling out at top dollar, anticipating a *deceleration in earnings growth* that is foreseeable by *industry insiders*, but not to the acquiring corporation's management.
  - b. Mergers of companies in the same industry often work out poorly due to *clashes of corporate culture*.
  - c. Inappropriately applying *its management style* to an industry with very different requirements.
22. A *fixed-income* investor buying a 30-year bond is certainly interested in the issuer's financial prospects beyond *a 12-month horizon*. Similarly, a substantial percentage of the present value of future dividends represented by a stock's price lies *in years beyond the coming one*.
23. Radical financial restructurings such as *leveraged buyouts*, *megamergers* *massive stock*, and *buybacks* necessitate *multiyear* projections.
24. Of the various types of analysis of financial statements, projecting *future results* and *ratios* requires the greatest skill and produces *the most valuable findings*.
25. The lack of *predictable patterns* is what makes financial forecasting so *valuable*. When betting huge sums in the face of *massive uncertainty*, it is essential that investors understand *the odds* as fully as they possibly can.

## CHAPTER 13: CREDIT ANALYSIS

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1. Financial statements tell much about a borrower's *ability* to repay a loan, but disclose little about the equally important *willingness* to repay.
2. If a company is dependent on raw materials provided by a subsidiary, there may be a *reasonable* presumption that it will stand behind the subsidiary's *debt*, even *in the absence of a formal guarantee*.
3. Illiquidity manifests itself as an excess of current *cash payments due*, over *cash currently available*. The *current* ratio gauges the risk of this

- occurring by comparing the claims against the company that will become payable during *the current operating cycle (current liabilities)* with the assets that are already in the form of cash or that will be converted to cash during *the current operating cycle (current assets)*.
4. The greater the amount by which asset values could deteriorate, the greater the “*equity cushion*,” and the greater the creditor’s sense of *being protected*. Equity is by definition *total assets* minus *total liabilities*.
  5. Aggressive *borrowers* frequently try to satisfy the letter of a *maximum* leverage limit imposed by lenders, without fulfilling the *conservative spirit* behind it.
  6. A firm that “zeros out” its *short-term debt* at some point in each operating cycle can legitimately argue that its “true” leverage is represented by the *permanent (long-term) debt* on its balance sheet.
  7. Current maturities of long-term debt should enter into the calculation of *total debt*, based on a conservative assumption that the company will replace maturing debt with *new long-term borrowings*.
  8. Exposure to interest rate fluctuations can also arise from long-term *floating-rate debt*. Companies can limit this risk by using *financial derivatives*.
  9. Public financial statements typically provide *only general* information about the extent to which the issuer has *limited* its exposure to interest rate fluctuations through *derivatives*.
  10. Analysts should remember that the ultimate objective is not to *calculate ratios* but to *assess credit risk*.
  11. In general, the credit analyst must recognize the heightened level of risk implied by the presence of preferred stock in the *capital structure*. One formal way to take this risk into account is to calculate the ratio of *total fixed obligations* to *total capital*.
  12. In addition to including capital leases in the total debt calculation, analysts should also take into account the *off-balance-sheet* liabilities represented by contractual payments on *operating leases*, which are reported as *rental expense* in the *Notes* to Financial Statements.
  13. A corporation can employ leverage yet avoid showing debt on its consolidated balance sheet by *entering joint ventures* or forming *partially owned subsidiaries*.
  14. Under SFAS 87, balance sheet recognition is now given to pension liabilities related to employees’ service to date. Similarly, SFAS 87 requires recognition of postretirement health care benefits as an on-balance sheet liability.
  15. The precise formula for *calculating* a ratio is less important than the assurance that it is *calculated consistently* for all companies being evaluated.

16. In general, credit analysts should assume that the achievement of *higher* bond ratings is a *secondary* goal of corporate management.
17. The contemporary view is that profits are ultimately what sustain *liquidity* and *asset values*. High profits keep plenty of cash flowing through the system and confirm the value of productive assets such as *plant and equipment*.
18. The cumulative effect of a change in accounting procedures will appear “*below the line*,” or after *income taxes* have already been deducted. The sum of net income and provision for income taxes will then differ from the *pretax income figure* that appears in the income statement.
19. Operating margin shows how well management has run the business *buying and selling* wisely, controlling *selling and administrative expenses* before taking into account financial policies, which largely determine *interest expense*, and *the tax rate*, which is outside management’s control.
20. Fixed-charge coverage is an *income-statement* ratio of major interest to credit analysts. It measures the ability of a company’s *earnings* to meet the *interest payments* on its debt, the lender’s most direct concern. In its simplest form, the fixed-charge coverage ratio indicates the *multiple* by which *operating earnings* suffice to pay *interest charges*.
21. Regardless of whether it is *expensed* or *capitalized*, however, all interest accrued must be covered by *earnings* and should therefore appear in the *denominator* of the fixed-charge coverage calculation.
22. The two complications that arise in connection with incorporating operating lease payments into the fixed-charge coverage calculation are:
  - a. *The SEC does not require companies to report rental expense in quarterly statements*
  - b. *Retailers in particular often negotiate leases with rents that are semifixed, tied in part to revenues of the leased stores*
23. Companies sometimes argue that the denominator of the fixed-charge coverage ratio should include only *net interest* expense, that is, the difference between *interest expense* and income derived from *interest-bearing assets*, generally consisting of marketable securities.
24. Ratios related to sources and uses of funds measure credit quality at the most elemental level—a company’s ability to *generate sufficient cash to pay its bills*.
25. Given corporations’ general reluctance to sell new equity, a recurrent cash shortfall is likely to be made up with *debt* financing, leading to a rise in *the total-debt-to-total-capital* ratio.
26. A company that suffers a prolonged downtrend in its ratio of *cash flow to capital expenditures* is likely to get more deeply into debt, and therefore become *financially riskier* with each succeeding year.

27. Unlike earnings, *depreciation* is essentially a programmed item, a cash flow assured by the accounting rules. The higher the percentage of cash flow derived from *depreciation*, the higher is the *predictability* of a company's cash flow, and the *less dependent* its financial flexibility on the vagaries of the marketplace.
28. Analysts cannot necessarily assume that all is well simply because capital expenditures consistently exceed depreciation. Among the issues to consider are:
  - a. *Persistent inflation means that a nominal dollar spent on plant and equipment today will not buy as much capacity as it did when the depreciating asset was acquired*
  - b. *Technological advances in production processes may mean that the cost in real terms of producing one unit may have declined since the company purchased the equipment now being replaced*
  - c. *Depreciation may be understated, with respect either to wear-and-tear or to obsolescence*
  - d. *In a growth industry, a company that fails to expand its capacity at roughly the same rate as its competitors may lose essential economies of scale and fall victim to a shakeout*
29. A limitation of combination ratios that incorporate balance-sheet figures is that they have little meaning if *calculated for portions of years*.
30. The underlying notion of a turnover ratio is that a company requires a certain level of *receivables* and *inventory* to support a given volume of sales.
31. A *drop in sales* is a possible explanation of declining inventory turnover. In this case, the inventory may not have suffered a severe reduction in value, but there are nevertheless unfavorable implications for *credit quality*. Until the inventory glut can be worked off by *cutting back production* to match the lower *sales volume*, the company may have to borrow to finance its unusually high working capital, thereby increasing its *financial leverage*.
32. Fixed-charge coverage, too, has a weakness, for it is based on *earnings*, which are subject to considerable manipulation.
33. Built from two comparatively hard numbers, the ratio of *total debt* to *cash flow* provides one of the best single measures of *credit quality*.
34. Expected *recoveries* have an important bearing on the decision to *extend* or *deny* credit, as well as on the *valuation* of debt securities.
35. Line of business is another basis for defining a *peer group*.
36. Beyond a certain point, calculating and comparing companies on the basis of *additional* financial ratios contributes little *incremental insight*.

37. *Improving* or *deteriorating* financial ratios can have different implications for different companies.
38. Quantitative models such as Zeta, as well as others that have been devised using various mathematical techniques, have several distinct benefits such as:
  - a. *They are developed by objectively correlating financial variables with defaults*
  - b. *The record of quantitative models is excellent from the standpoint of classifying as troubled credits most companies that subsequently defaulted*
  - c. *The scores assigned to nondefaulted companies by these models correlate fairly well with bond ratings*
39. Like the quantitative models consisting of *financial ratios*, the default risk models based on stock prices provide useful, but *not infallible*, signals.

## CHAPTER 14: EQUITY ANALYSIS

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1. In this chapter, the discussion focuses primarily on the use of financial statements in *fundamental analysis*.
2. Of the methods of fundamental common stock analysis, no other approach matches the intuitive appeal of regarding the stock price as the *discounted value* of expected *future* dividends. This approach is analogous to the *yield-to-maturity* calculation for a bond and therefore facilitates the comparison of different *securities* of a single *issuer*.
3. By thinking through the logic of the *discounting* method, the analyst will find that value always comes back to *dividends*.
4. The company's earnings growth rate may diverge from its sales growth due to changes in its *operating margins*.
5. As a rule, a *cyclical* company will not increase its dividend on a regular, annual basis.
6. Many analysts argue that *cash flow*, rather than *earnings*, is the true determinant of dividend-paying capability.
7. Cash generated from *operations*, which is generally more difficult for companies to manipulate than *earnings*, can legitimately be viewed as the preferred measure of future *dividend-paying capability*.
8. The ability to vary the *discount rate*, and therefore to assign a *lower* or *higher* multiple to a company's earnings, is the equity analyst's defense against earnings *manipulation* by management.



9. It is appropriate to assign an *above-average* discount factor to the earnings of a company that competes against larger, better-capitalized firms. A small company *may also suffer the disadvantages of lack of depth in management and concentration of its production in one or two plants.*
10. A building-materials manufacturer may claim to be cushioned against fluctuations in housing starts because of a strong emphasis in its product line on *the remodeling and repair markets.*
11. Analysts should be especially wary of companies that have tended to jump on the bandwagon of “*concepts*” associated with the *hot stocks* of the moment.
12. Earnings per share will not grow merely because *sales increase.*
13. Leverage reaches a limit, since lenders will not continue advancing funds beyond a certain point as *financial risk increases.*
14. One way to increase earnings per share is to *reduce the number of shares outstanding.*
15. To the extent that the company funds share buybacks with idle cash, the increase in *earnings per share* is offset by a reduction arising from *forgone income on investments.*
16. Like most ratio analysis, the Du Pont Formula is valuable not only for *the questions it answers* but also for *the new ones it raises.*
17. Besides introducing greater volatility into the *rate of return*, adding debt to the balance sheet demonstrates *no management skill in improving operations.*
18. Some companies have the potential to raise their share prices by *utilizing their assets more efficiently*, while others can increase their value by *increasing their financial leverage.*
19. Management’s main adversaries in battles over “*corporate governance*” were aggressive *financial operators.*
20. At least in the early stages, before some raiders became overly aggressive in their financial forecast assumptions, it was feasible to extract value without creating undue bankruptcy risk, simply by *increasing the ratio of debt to equity.*
21. In future bear markets, when stocks again sell at depressed price-earnings multiples, investors will probably renew their focus on *companies’ values as LBO candidates.*
22. A leveraged buyout can bring about improved profitability for either of two reasons:
  - a. *A change in ownership results in a fresh look at the company’s operations*
  - b. *Management may obtain a significantly enlarged stake in the firm’s success as the result of the buyout*



23. Today's *profit improvement* may be a precursor of tomorrow's bankruptcy by a company that has economized its way to *an uncompetitive state*.
24. A focus on *price-earnings* multiples, the best-known form of fundamental analysis, is not the investor's *sole alternative* to relying on technicians' stock charts.
25. For the investor who takes a longer view, *financial statement analysis* provides an invaluable reference point for valuation.



# Financial Statement Exercises

1. Indicate in which of the principal financial statements each item appears.  
a.

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accounts Payable	×		
Accumulated Depreciation	×		
Adjusted Net Income		×	
Capital Expenditures			×
Cash and Equivalents—Change		×	
Common Shares Outstanding	×		
Current Debt—Changes		×	
Direct Operating Activities			×
Earnings per Share (Fully Diluted)		×	
Earnings per Share (Primary)		×	
Equity in Net Loss (Earnings)			×
Extraordinary Items		×	
Financing Activities—Net Cash Flow			×
Gross Plant, Property, and Equipment	×		
Income before Extraordinary Items		×	×
Indirect Operating Activities			×
Interest Paid—Net			×
Investing Activities			×
Investment Tax Credit	×		
Long-Term Debt Due in One Year	×		
Minority Interest	×	×	
Net Receivables	×		
Operating Activities—Net Cash Flow			×
Other Assets and Liabilities—Net Change			×
Other Investments	×		
Preferred Stock—Nonredeemable	×		
Pretax Income		×	
Retained Earnings	×		
Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipment			×

(Continued)

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Selling, General, and Administrative Expense		×	
Stock Equivalents		×	
Total Current Assets	×		
Total Income Taxes		×	
Total Preferred Stock	×		

b.

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accrued Expenses	×		
Adjusted Available for Common		×	
Available for Common		×	
Cash and Equivalents	×		
Common Equity	×		
Cost of Goods Sold		×	
Deferred Taxes	×		×
Dividends per Share		×	
Earnings per Share (Primary)		×	
Equity	×		
Financing Activities			×
Funds from Operations—Other			×
Income Taxes Paid			×
Interest Expense		×	
Inventory—Decrease (Increase)			×
Investing Activities—Other			×
Investments at Equity	×		
Long-Term Debt	×		
Long-Term Debt—Reduction			×
Net Plant, Property, and Equipment	×		
Notes Payable	×		
Other Assets	×		
Other Current Liabilities	×		
Preferred Dividends		×	
Prepaid Expenses	×		
Receivables—Decrease (Increase)			×
Sale of Investments			×
Savings Due to Common		×	
Special Items		×	
Total Assets	×		
Total Equity	×		
Total Liabilities and Equity	×		

c.

Item	Balance Sheet	Income Statement	Statement of Cash Flows
Accounts Payable and Accrued Liabilities—Increase (Decrease)			×
Acquisitions			×
Assets	×		
Capital Surplus	×		
Cash Dividends			×
Common Stock	×		
Deferred Charges	×		
Discontinued Operations		×	
Earnings per Share (Fully Diluted)		×	
EPS from Operations		×	
Exchange Rate Effect			×
Financing Activities—Other			×
Gross Profit		×	
Income Taxes—Accrued—Increase (Decrease)			×
Intangibles	×		
Inventories	×		
Investing Activities—Net Cash Flow			×
Investments—Increase			×
Liabilities	×		
Long-Term Debt—Issuance			×
Minority Interest		×	
Non-Operating Income/Expense		×	
Operating Profit		×	
Other Current Assets	×		
Other Liabilities	×		
Preferred Stock—Redeemable	×		
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock			×
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock			×
Sales		×	
Short-Term Investments—Change			×
Taxes Payable	×		
Total Current Liabilities	×		
Total Liabilities	×		
Treasury Stock	×		

## 2. The common size form of the Balance Sheet

## Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CBRL)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Aug- 03-2007	Aug- 01-2008	Jul- 31-2009	Jul- 30-2010	5-Yr Avg.
<b>ASSETS</b>						
Cash and Equivalents	5.22%	1.13%	0.91%	0.93%	3.69%	
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	5.22%	1.13%	0.91%	0.93%	3.69%	
Accounts Receivable	0.68%	0.93%	1.03%	1.02%	1.05%	
Other Receivables	0.00%	0.00%	0.53%	0.33%	0.00%	
<b>Total Receivables</b>	0.68%	0.93%	1.55%	1.35%	1.05%	
Inventory	7.63%	11.42%	11.87%	11.04%	11.15%	
Prepaid Exp.	0.26%	1.00%	0.84%	0.74%	0.67%	
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	1.04%	0.99%	1.38%	1.87%	1.73%	
Other Current Assets	24.05%	0.37%	0.25%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	38.89%	15.83%	16.80%	15.93%	18.29%	
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	84.18%	118.59%	119.65%	126.28%	125.50%	
Accumulated Depreciation	(25.75)%	(38.04)%	(40.09)%	(45.83)%	(47.78)%	
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>58.44%</b>	<b>80.55%</b>	<b>79.56%</b>	<b>80.45%</b>	<b>77.71%</b>	<b>75%</b>
Other Long-Term Assets	2.67%	3.62%	3.64%	3.62%	4.00%	
<b>Total Assets</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
<b>LIABILITIES</b>						
Accounts Payable	4.22%	7.36%	7.09%	7.40%	8.99%	
Accrued Exp.	8.30%	10.61%	8.44%	8.90%	9.16%	
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	0.48%	0.65%	0.66%	0.59%	0.52%	
Curr. Port. of Cap. Leases	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	1.27%	1.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.59%	
Unearned Revenue, Current	1.12%	1.67%	1.72%	1.81%	2.13%	
Other Current Liabilities	4.26%	0.00%	2.24%	2.58%	2.55%	
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	19.66%	21.71%	20.15%	21.28%	23.96%	

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Aug- 03-2007	Aug- 01-2008	Jul- 31-2009	Jul- 30-2010	5-Yr Avg.
Long-Term Debt	54.21%	59.79%	62.32%	56.16%	49.53%	
Capital Leases	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.01%	
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	4.87%	4.94%	4.14%	4.47%	4.42%	
Other Non-Current Liabilities	3.28%	5.34%	6.33%	7.20%	5.25%	
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>82.02%</b>	<b>91.77%</b>	<b>92.94%</b>	<b>89.11%</b>	<b>85.17%</b>	
Common Stock	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	
Additional Paid in Capital	0.25%	0.00%	0.06%	1.04%	0.48%	
Retained Earnings	17.98%	8.92%	9.09%	13.43%	18.11%	
Treasury Stock	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(0.27)%	(0.71)%	(2.11)%	(3.60)%	(3.78)%	
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>17.98%</b>	<b>8.23%</b>	<b>7.06%</b>	<b>10.89%</b>	<b>14.83%</b>	
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>17.98%</b>	<b>8.23%</b>	<b>7.06%</b>	<b>10.89%</b>	<b>14.83%</b>	
<b>Total Liabilities   and Equity</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>Supplemental Items</b>						
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	1.84%	1.87%	1.70%	1.82%	1.76%	
Total Debt	54.69%	60.43%	62.99%	56.76%	50.06%	
Net Debt	49.47%	59.31%	62.08%	55.83%	46.37%	
<b>Debt Equivalent Oper.   Leases</b>	<b>25.86%</b>	<b>35.11%</b>	<b>35.24%</b>	<b>38.81%</b>	<b>40.78%</b>	<b>35%</b>
Finished Goods Inventory	6.80%	8.69%	10.81%	10.05%	10.16%	
Other Inventory Accounts	0.84%	2.73%	1.06%	0.98%	0.99%	
Land	16.51%	22.76%	22.81%	22.98%	22.26%	
Buildings	57.55%	54.31%	54.12%	55.15%	54.05%	
Machinery	0.00%	26.63%	27.33%	30.47%	31.76%	
Construction in Progress	1.07%	1.56%	1.15%	1.29%	0.89%	
<b>Leasehold Improvements</b>	<b>8.87%</b>	<b>13.08%</b>	<b>13.99%</b>	<b>16.12%</b>	<b>16.28%</b>	<b>14%</b>
Assets under Cap. Lease, Gross	0.20%	0.26%	0.25%	0.26%	0.25%	

## Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	5-Yr Avg.
<b>ASSETS</b>						
Cash and Equivalents	0.02%	25.43%	20.94%	10.67%	22.84%	
Short-Term Investments	0.00%	0.00%	2.77%	12.12%	5.20%	
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>0.02%</b>	<b>25.43%</b>	<b>23.70%</b>	<b>22.79%</b>	<b>28.04%</b>	
Accounts Receivable	0.49%	0.81%	0.74%	0.44%	0.50%	
Other Receivables	0.57%	1.45%	1.32%	0.03%	0.00%	
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>1.07%</b>	<b>2.26%</b>	<b>2.06%</b>	<b>0.48%</b>	<b>0.50%</b>	
Inventory	0.67%	0.58%	0.60%	0.58%	0.58%	
Prepaid Exp.	2.19%	1.18%	1.25%	1.43%	1.50%	
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	0.60%	0.15%	0.34%	0.31%	0.33%	
Other Current Assets	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>4.54%</b>	<b>29.60%</b>	<b>27.95%</b>	<b>25.58%</b>	<b>30.94%</b>	
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	108.82%	86.46%	89.45%	94.23%	91.74%	
Accumulated Depreciation	(22.01)%	(19.46)%	(20.91)%	(23.21)%	(25.55)%	
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>86.80%</b>	<b>66.99%</b>	<b>68.54%</b>	<b>71.02%</b>	<b>66.19%</b>	<b>72%</b>
Goodwill	4.52%	2.94%	3.04%	2.66%	2.28%	
Deferred Tax Assets, LT	3.46%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Other Long-Term Assets	0.68%	0.48%	0.47%	0.74%	0.59%	
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>LIABILITIES</b>						
Accounts Payable	3.36%	3.24%	2.75%	2.90%	2.62%	
Accrued Exp.	5.91%	5.47%	6.14%	5.43%	6.59%	
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%	
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0.00%	0.25%	0.00%	0.00%	0.44%	
Unearned Revenue, Current	0.95%	1.16%	1.25%	0.97%	0.97%	
Other Current Liabilities	0.46%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>10.70%</b>	<b>10.13%</b>	<b>10.15%</b>	<b>9.31%</b>	<b>10.62%</b>	
Long-Term Debt	0.89%	0.67%	0.55%	0.47%	0.39%	
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	0.00%	3.09%	2.28%	3.62%	4.04%	
Other Non-Current Liabilities	9.60%	7.67%	9.18%	11.14%	11.78%	
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>21.18%</b>	<b>21.56%</b>	<b>22.16%</b>	<b>24.53%</b>	<b>26.84%</b>	



Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	5-Yr Avg.
Common Stock	0.07%	0.05%	0.05%	0.04%	0.03%	
Additional Paid in Capital	95.73%	77.90%	67.76%	60.85%	56.15%	
Retained Earnings	(9.81)%	0.49%	10.04%	18.27%	28.86%	
Treasury Stock	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	(3.66)%	(11.89)%	
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(7.18)%	0.00%	0.00%	(0.02)%	0.00%	
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>78.82%</b>	<b>78.44%</b>	<b>77.84%</b>	<b>75.47%</b>	<b>73.16%</b>	
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>78.82%</b>	<b>78.44%</b>	<b>77.84%</b>	<b>75.47%</b>	<b>73.16%</b>	
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>Supplemental Items</b>						
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	6.70%	5.39%	4.54%	3.90%	3.27%	
Total Debt	0.90%	0.68%	0.56%	0.48%	0.40%	
Net Debt	0.88%	(24.74)%	(23.14)%	(22.32)%	(27.63)%	
<b>Debt Equivalent</b>						
Oper. Leases	83.30%	64.18%	77.59%	88.19%	84.28%	80%
Land	1.67%	1.36%	1.14%	1.00%	0.93%	
Buildings	81.77%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Machinery	25.38%	19.89%	20.49%	21.80%	21.53%	
Leasehold Improvements	81.77%	65.21%	67.82%	71.43%	69.29%	71%
Employees	3,312.14%	2,482.59%	2,603.46%	2,472.77%	2,314.08%	

**Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. (NasdaqGS:BWLD)**
*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-25-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Reclassified Dec-28-2008	Dec-27-2009	5-Yr Avg.
<b>ASSETS</b>						
Cash and Equivalents	2.99%	7.29%	0.77%	3.42%	3.10%	
Short-Term Investments	36.37%	32.78%	33.75%	14.83%	14.12%	
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>39.37%</b>	<b>40.07%</b>	<b>34.52%</b>	<b>18.25%</b>	<b>17.22%</b>	

*(Continued)*

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec- 25-2005	Dec- 31-2006	Dec- 30-2007	Reclassified Dec-28-2008	Dec- 27-2009	5-Yr Avg.
Accounts Receivable	0.55%	0.58%	0.45%	0.37%	0.69%	
Other Receivables	2.78%	3.23%	4.50%	3.02%	2.99%	
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>3.33%</b>	<b>3.81%</b>	<b>4.95%</b>	<b>3.39%</b>	<b>3.68%</b>	
Inventory	1.13%	1.10%	1.20%	1.27%	1.18%	
Prepaid Exp.	1.48%	0.65%	1.55%	1.35%	0.96%	
Deferred Tax Assets, Curr.	0.58%	0.87%	0.66%	0.71%	0.95%	
Other Current Assets	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.15%	7.89%	
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>45.88%</b>	<b>46.50%</b>	<b>42.88%</b>	<b>28.12%</b>	<b>31.88%</b>	
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	83.21%	82.41%	86.11%	96.63%	96.44%	
Accumulated Depreciation	(31.62)%	(33.94)%	(33.99)%	(33.30)%	(35.07)%	
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>51.60%</b>	<b>48.48%</b>	<b>52.13%</b>	<b>63.34%</b>	<b>61.36%</b>	<b>55%</b>
Goodwill	0.28%	0.23%	0.19%	4.50%	3.64%	
Other Intangibles	0.21%	0.23%	0.21%	3.00%	2.16%	
Other Long-Term Assets	2.03%	4.56%	4.60%	1.04%	0.97%	
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>LIABILITIES</b>						
Accounts Payable	4.98%	3.64%	5.42%	6.85%	4.35%	
Accrued Exp.	8.02%	10.24%	9.55%	7.61%	8.44%	
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0.08%	0.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Unearned Revenue, Current	1.65%	1.46%	1.18%	1.03%	0.88%	
Other Current Liabilities	0.45%	0.49%	0.33%	4.28%	7.92%	
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>15.18%</b>	<b>15.99%</b>	<b>16.48%</b>	<b>19.77%</b>	<b>21.58%</b>	
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	3.57%	1.96%	1.10%	3.66%	4.83%	
Other Non-Current Liabilities	8.50%	9.94%	10.54%	6.20%	5.69%	
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>27.25%</b>	<b>27.90%</b>	<b>28.12%</b>	<b>29.62%</b>	<b>32.11%</b>	

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Dec-25-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Reclassified Dec-28-2008	Dec-27-2009	5-Yr Avg.
Common Stock	55.97%	46.55%	41.01%	35.40%	30.38%	
Additional Paid in Capital	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Retained Earnings	18.71%	25.55%	30.87%	34.97%	37.51%	
Treasury Stock	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(1.95)%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>72.75%</b>	<b>72.10%</b>	<b>71.88%</b>	<b>70.38%</b>	<b>67.89%</b>	
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>72.75%</b>	<b>72.10%</b>	<b>71.88%</b>	<b>70.38%</b>	<b>67.89%</b>	
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>Supplemental Items</b>						
Net Debt	(39.36)%	(40.08)%	(34.50)%	(18.25)%	(17.21)%	
<b>Debt Equivalent</b>						
Oper. Leases	72.65%	75.00%	70.37%	73.43%	72.21%	73%
Buildings	48.48%		0.81%	2.72%	5.93%	
Machinery	34.01%	33.50%	35.50%	39.15%	39.20%	
Construction in Progress	0.72%	0.64%	0.94%	4.39%	2.08%	
<b>Leasehold Improvements</b>	<b>48.48%</b>	<b>48.26%</b>	<b>48.87%</b>	<b>50.36%</b>	<b>49.21%</b>	<b>49%</b>

## Denny's Corporation (NasdaqCM:DENN)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec-28-2005	Restated Dec-27-2006	Restated Dec-26-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-30-2009	5-Yr Avg.
<b>ASSETS</b>						
Cash and Equivalents	5.52%	5.90%	5.71%	6.16%	8.48%	
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST Investments</b>	<b>5.52%</b>	<b>5.90%</b>	<b>5.71%</b>	<b>6.16%</b>	<b>8.48%</b>	

(Continued)

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec- 28-2005	Restated Dec- 27-2006	Restated Dec- 26-2007	Restated Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 30-2009	5-Yr Avg.
Accounts Receivable	3.29%	3.38%	3.60%	4.43%	5.79%	
Notes Receivable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Receivables</b>	<b>3.29%</b>	<b>3.38%</b>	<b>3.60%</b>	<b>4.43%</b>	<b>5.79%</b>	
Inventory	1.61%	1.85%	1.72%	1.60%	1.33%	
Prepaid Exp.	1.64%	2.04%	2.52%	2.79%	3.05%	
Other Current Assets	0.00%	1.07%	1.78%	0.67%	0.00%	
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>12.06%</b>	<b>14.23%</b>	<b>15.34%</b>	<b>15.64%</b>	<b>18.66%</b>	
Gross Property, Plant & Equipment	131.03%	138.52%	130.29%	130.17%	124.81%	
Accumulated Depreciation	(74.66)%	(85.36)%	(81.36)%	(83.35)%	(82.75)%	
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp; Equipment</b>	<b>56.36%</b>	<b>53.17%</b>	<b>48.92%</b>	<b>46.80%</b>	<b>42.06%</b>	<b>49%</b>
Goodwill	9.82%	11.27%	11.25%	10.13%	10.38%	
Other Intangibles	14.02%	16.56%	18.27%	18.83%	19.04%	
Loans Receivable						
Long-Term	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Deferred Charges, LT	3.08%	1.42%	1.35%	1.13%	0.86%	
Other Long-Term Assets	4.67%	3.35%	4.88%	7.46%	9.01%	
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>LIABILITIES</b>						
Accounts Payable	9.31%	9.49%	11.46%	7.39%	7.31%	
Accrued Exp.	13.81%	11.81%	15.58%	15.33%	14.05%	
Curr. Port. of LT Debt	0.37%	1.24%	0.55%	0.41%	0.29%	
Curr. Port. of Cap. Leases	1.22%	1.57%	1.07%	1.03%	1.19%	
Curr. Income Taxes Payable	0.00%	2.65%	2.57%	2.59%	2.54%	
Other Current Liabilities	4.32%	3.80%	3.60%	4.59%	4.08%	
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>29.03%</b>	<b>30.56%</b>	<b>34.84%</b>	<b>31.34%</b>	<b>29.46%</b>	
Long-Term Debt	101.08%	93.57%	86.38%	87.95%	82.81%	
<b>Capital Leases</b>	<b>5.65%</b>	<b>5.61%</b>	<b>5.52%</b>	<b>6.46%</b>	<b>6.30%</b>	<b>6%</b>
Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0.00%	0.00%	0.97%	4.44%	3.17%	

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Restated Dec- 28-2005	Restated Dec- 27-2006	Restated Dec- 26-2007	Restated Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 30-2009	5-Yr Avg.
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr.	0.00%	2.73%	3.07%	3.61%	4.16%	
Other Non-Current Liabilities	16.38%	17.84%	17.51%	18.69%	14.88%	
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>152.13%</b>	<b>150.32%</b>	<b>148.29%</b>	<b>152.50%</b>	<b>140.78%</b>	
Common Stock Additional Paid in Capital	0.18%	0.21%	0.25%	0.28%	0.31%	
Retained Earnings	101.29%	118.80%	141.41%	157.67%	173.55%	
Treasury Stock	(149.79)%	(165.41)%	(186.46)%	(203.16)%	(208.81)%	
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Common Equity</b>	<b>(3.81)%</b>	<b>(3.92)%</b>	<b>(3.47)%</b>	<b>(7.29)%</b>	<b>(5.82)%</b>	
<b>Total Equity</b>	<b>(52.13)%</b>	<b>(50.32)%</b>	<b>(48.28)%</b>	<b>(52.49)%</b>	<b>(40.78)%</b>	
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	
<b>Supplemental Items</b>						
Total Debt	108.31%	102.00%	93.53%	95.86%	90.59%	
Net Debt	102.79%	96.10%	87.82%	89.70%	82.11%	
<b>Debt Equivalent Oper. Leases</b>	<b>80.15%</b>	<b>91.20%</b>	<b>106.04%</b>	<b>116.53%</b>	<b>124.88%</b>	<b>104%</b>
Finished Goods Inventory	0.00%	0.00%	1.72%	1.60%	1.33%	
Land	11.12%	8.44%	7.62%	6.93%	5.76%	
<b>Buildings</b>	<b>92.88%</b>	<b>88.48%</b>	<b>74.04%</b>	<b>71.15%</b>	<b>66.86%</b>	<b>79%</b>
Machinery	27.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Assets under Cap. Lease, Gross	7.35%	8.90%	5.47%	5.66%	3.94%	
Assets under Cap. Lease, Accum. Depr.	(3.33)%	(4.55)%	(3.23)%	(3.07)%	(1.89)%	
Assets on Oper. Lease, Gross	0.00%	0.00%	12.74%	16.54%	19.52%	
Assets on Oper. Lease, Accum. Depr.	0.00%	0.00%	(9.30)%	(10.83)%	(12.79)%	

## California Pizza Kitchen Inc. (NasdaqGS:CPKI)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

Balance Sheet as of:	Balance Sheet					5-Yr Avg.
	Jan- 01-2006	Reclassified Dec- 31-2006	Reclassified Dec- 30-2007	Dec- 28-2008	Jan- 30-2010	
<b>ASSETS</b>						
Cash and Equivalents	4.11%	2.64%	2.94%	3.91%	6.12%	
Short-Term						
Investments	4.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Cash &amp; ST</b>						
<b>Investments</b>	8.27%	2.64%	2.94%	3.91%	6.12%	
Accounts Receivable	1.50%	2.54%	0.56%	0.75%	0.92%	
Other Receivables	0.00%	0.00%	2.81%	1.93%	2.66%	
<b>Total Receivables</b>	1.50%	2.54%	3.36%	2.68%	3.58%	
Inventory	1.38%	1.53%	1.41%	1.47%	1.59%	
Prepaid Exp.	2.00%	1.74%	1.59%	0.51%	2.00%	
Deferred Tax Assets,						
Curr.	3.08%	3.77%	1.91%	1.63%	2.02%	
Other Current Assets	0.52%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	16.74%	12.21%	11.22%	10.19%	15.30%	
Gross Property, Plant						
& Equipment	145.58%	150.69%	148.05%	160.42%	172.14%	
Accumulated						
Depreciation	(67.78)%	(68.44)%	(66.92)%	(80.21)%	(99.21)%	
<b>Net Property, Plant &amp;</b>						
<b>  Equipment</b>	77.81%	82.25%	81.13%	80.21%	72.92%	79%
Goodwill	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.25%	1.32%	
Other Intangibles	2.18%	2.50%	2.39%	1.32%	1.35%	
Deferred Tax Assets,						
LT	1.65%	1.89%	3.75%	5.62%	7.14%	
Other Long-Term						
Assets	1.62%	1.16%	1.51%	1.41%	1.97%	
<b>Total Assets</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
<b>LIABILITIES</b>						
Accounts Payable	2.57%	4.84%	5.46%	3.35%	3.22%	
Accrued Exp.	12.99%	13.80%	13.52%	13.45%	15.25%	
Curr. Port. of LT						
Debt	0.00%	0.00%	5.72%	0.00%	0.00%	
Curr. Income Taxes						
Payable	0.00%	1.16%	0.26%	1.12%	0.00%	

Balance Sheet						
Balance Sheet as of:	Jan- 01-2006	Reclassified Dec- 31-2006	Reclassified Dec- 30-2007	Dec- 28-2008	Jan- 30-2010	5-Yr Avg.
Unearned Revenue, Current	0.00%	0.00%	2.18%	2.63%	5.89%	
Other Current Liabilities	1.48%	1.46%	2.50%	1.04%	1.16%	
<b>Total Current   Liabilities</b>	17.04%	21.27%	29.66%	21.58%	25.52%	
Long-Term Debt Pension & Other Post-Retire. Benefits	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.09%	6.37%	
Other Non-Current Liabilities	11.01%	11.63%	10.93%	10.63%	13.63%	
<b>Total Liabilities</b>	28.05%	32.90%	40.58%	52.63%	45.97%	
Common Stock	0.07%	0.09%	0.08%	0.06%	0.07%	
Additional Paid in Capital	84.29%	71.19%	58.85%	44.47%	49.68%	
Retained Earnings	(12.40)%	(4.19)%	0.49%	2.84%	4.28%	
Treasury Stock	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Total Common   Equity</b>	71.95%	67.10%	59.42%	47.37%	54.03%	
<b>Total Equity</b>	71.95%	67.10%	59.42%	47.37%	54.03%	
<b>Total Liabilities and   Equity</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
<b>Supplemental Items</b>						
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	10.76%	9.32%	7.72%	6.48%	6.91%	
Total Debt	0.00%	0.00%	5.72%	20.09%	6.37%	
Net Debt	(8.28)%	(2.64)%	2.78%	16.18%	0.25%	
<b>Debt Equivalent</b>						
Oper. Leases	66.64%	70.59%	68.86%	82.52%	87.02%	75%
Land	2.11%	1.86%	1.58%	1.57%	1.65%	
Buildings	86.60%	3.24%	2.74%	2.87%	3.22%	
Machinery	50.85%	48.91%	47.58%	53.41%	54.94%	
Construction in Progress	6.03%	13.03%	10.19%	9.67%	1.82%	
<b>Leasehold   Improvements</b>	82.93%	83.65%	85.97%	92.90%	110.52%	91%

## 3. The common size form of the Income Statement.

## Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CBRL)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Reclassified Aug-03-2007	Aug- 01-2008	Jul- 31-2009	Jul- 30-2010
<b>Total Revenue</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Cost of Goods Sold	69.34%	69.62%	70.59%	71.02%	68.79%
<b>Gross Profit</b>	30.66%	30.38%	29.41%	28.98%	31.21%
Selling General & Admin. Exp.	23.07%	23.29%	23.05%	22.89%	24.25%
R & D Exp.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Depreciation & Amort.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	23.07%	23.29%	23.05%	22.89%	24.25%
<b>Operating Income</b>	7.59%	7.09%	6.36%	6.10%	6.96%
Interest Expense	(1.00)%	(2.53)%	(2.41)%	(2.21)%	(2.04)%
Interest and Invest. Income	0.03%	0.33%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	(0.96)%	(2.20)%	(2.40)%	(2.21)%	(2.04)%
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	6.62%	4.90%	3.96%	3.89%	4.93%
Restructuring Charges	(0.30)%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Impairment of Goodwill	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Asset Writedown	0.00%	0.00%	(0.04)%	(0.09)%	(0.12)%
Legal Settlements	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Unusual Items	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	6.32%	4.95%	3.92%	3.80%	4.81%
Income Tax Expense	2.02%	1.72%	1.18%	1.02%	1.27%
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	4.30%	3.23%	2.74%	2.79%	3.55%
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0.94%	3.66%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Income</b>	5.24%	6.89%	2.75%	2.78%	3.55%
Dividends per Share	0.02%	0.02%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%
Payout Ratio %	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%



Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Jul-28-2006	Reclassified Aug-03-2007	Aug- 01-2008	Jul- 31-2009	Jul- 30-2010
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	10.17%	9.51%	8.78%	8.60%	9.50%
EBITA	7.59%	7.09%	6.36%	6.10%	6.96%
EBIT	7.59%	7.09%	6.36%	6.10%	6.96%
EBITDAR	12.61%	11.87%	11.21%	11.15%	12.24%
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	1.72%	1.72%	1.77%	1.79%	1.88%
General and Administrative Exp.	5.80%	5.79%	5.34%	5.08%	6.07%
Net Rental Exp.	2.45%	2.36%	2.43%	2.55%	2.74%
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	0.78%	1.35%	1.42%	1.40%	1.59%
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	1.67%	1.01%	1.01%	1.15%	1.15%

**Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG)**

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec- 31-2005	Dec- 31-2006	Reclassified Dec-31-2007	Reclassified Dec-31-2008	Dec- 31-2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	100%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.0%
Cost of Goods Sold	68%	66.58%	65.55%	65.95%	63.6%
<b>Gross Profit</b>	32%	33.42%	34.45%	34.05%	36.4%
Selling General & Admin. Exp.	8%	8.26%	9.05%	8.79%	8.2%
Pre-Opening Costs	0%	0.50%	0.46%	0.43%	0.3%
R & D Exp.	0%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.0%
Depreciation & Amort.	4%	4.16%	4.02%	3.96%	4.0%
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	13%	12.49%	10.40%	10.66%	10.1%
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	26%	25.40%	23.92%	23.84%	22.6%
<b>Operating Income</b>	5%	8.01%	10.53%	10.21%	13.8%
Interest Expense	0%	(0.04)%	(0.03)%	(0.02)%	0.0%
Interest and Invest. Income	0%	0.80%	0.56%	0.26%	0.1%
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	0%	0.77%	0.54%	0.24%	0.0%
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.0%

*(Continued)*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Reclassified Dec-31-2007	Reclassified Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	5%	8.78%	11.07%	10.45%	13.8%
Impairment of Goodwill	0%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.0%
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets	0%	(0.49)%	(0.57)%	(0.70)%	(0.4)%
Other Unusual Items	0%	0.00%	0.00%	(0.20)%	0.0%
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	5%	8.29%	10.50%	9.55%	13.4%
Income Tax Expense	(1)%	3.26%	4.00%	3.68%	5.1%
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	6%	5.03%	6.50%	5.87%	8.4%
Earnings of Discontinued Ops. Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.0%
<b>Net Income</b>	6%	5.03%	6.50%	5.87%	8.4%
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	10%	12.17%	14.55%	14.17%	17.8%
EBITA	5%	8.01%	10.53%	10.21%	13.8%
EBIT	5%	8.01%	10.53%	10.21%	13.8%
EBITDAR	16%	18.06%	21.00%	21.00%	24.5%
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	2%	1.69%	0.00%	0.00%	0.0%
Marketing Exp.	0%	0.00%	1.72%	1.66%	1.4%
Selling and Marketing Exp.	0%	0.00%	1.72%	1.66%	1.4%
General and Administrative Exp.	8%	7.93%	6.91%	6.69%	6.5%
Net Rental Exp.	7%	5.89%	6.45%	6.83%	6.7%
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	10%	3.34%	3.75%	4.13%	5.5%
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	(4)%	2.55%	2.70%	2.70%	1.2%

**Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. (NasdaqGS:BWLD)**
*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-25-2005	Reclassified Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Dec-28-2008	Dec-27-2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Cost of Goods Sold	75.38%	74.67%	74.57%	74.15%	74.77%
<b>Gross Profit</b>	24.62%	25.33%	25.43%	25.85%	25.23%

<b>Income Statement</b>					
<b>For the Fiscal Period Ending</b>	<b>Reclassified Dec-25-2005</b>	<b>Reclassified Dec-31-2006</b>	<b>Dec- 30-2007</b>	<b>Dec- 28-2008</b>	<b>Dec- 27-2009</b>
Selling General & Admin. Exp.	10.64%	10.92%	10.84%	9.51%	9.17%
Pre-Opening Costs	1.24%	1.11%	1.37%	1.88%	1.43%
R & D Exp.		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Depreciation & Amort.	5.61%	5.21%	5.15%	5.59%	6.05%
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	<b>17.49%</b>	<b>17.23%</b>	<b>17.37%</b>	<b>16.97%</b>	<b>16.65%</b>
<b>Operating Income</b>	<b>7.14%</b>	<b>8.09%</b>	<b>8.07%</b>	<b>8.87%</b>	<b>8.59%</b>
Interest Expense	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Interest and Invest. Income	0.64%	0.84%	0.88%	0.23%	0.20%
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	<b>0.64%</b>	<b>0.84%</b>	<b>0.88%</b>	<b>0.23%</b>	<b>0.20%</b>
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>7.78%</b>	<b>8.93%</b>	<b>8.95%</b>	<b>9.10%</b>	<b>8.79%</b>
Restructuring Charges	(0.95)%	(0.36)%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Impairment of Goodwill	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Asset Writedown	0.00%	0.00%	(0.30)%	(0.50)%	(0.35)%
Other Unusual Items	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	<b>6.83%</b>	<b>8.57%</b>	<b>8.65%</b>	<b>8.61%</b>	<b>8.43%</b>
Income Tax Expense	2.59%	2.72%	2.69%	2.82%	2.74%
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	<b>4.23%</b>	<b>5.85%</b>	<b>5.96%</b>	<b>5.78%</b>	<b>5.69%</b>
Earnings of Discontinued Ops. Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>4.23%</b>	<b>5.85%</b>	<b>5.96%</b>	<b>5.78%</b>	<b>5.69%</b>
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	12.79%	13.28%	13.20%	14.46%	14.64%
EBITA	7.18%	8.07%	8.05%	8.92%	8.70%
EBIT	7.14%	8.09%	8.07%	8.87%	8.59%
EBITDAR	18.56%	18.71%	18.46%	19.76%	19.81%
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	2.77%	3.26%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%
General and Administrative Exp.	10.64%	10.92%	10.84%	9.51%	9.17%
Net Rental Exp.	5.77%	5.43%	5.26%	5.30%	5.18%

## California Pizza Kitchen Inc. (NasdaqGS:CPKI)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Jan-01-2006	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Dec-28-2008	Jan-03-2010
<b>Total Revenue</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Cost of Goods Sold	80.29%	80.08%	80.12%	81.70%	81.77%
<b>Gross Profit</b>	19.71%	19.92%	19.88%	18.30%	18.23%
Selling General & Admin. Exp.	7.57%	7.81%	7.65%	7.74%	7.88%
Pre-Opening Costs	0.84%	1.26%	1.13%	0.66%	0.28%
R & D Exp.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Depreciation & Amort.	5.30%	5.32%	5.87%	5.95%	6.05%
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	13.72%	14.38%	14.65%	14.35%	14.21%
<b>Operating Income</b>	6.00%	5.53%	5.23%	3.95%	4.03%
Interest Expense	0.00%	0.00%	(0.02)%	(0.19)%	(0.12)%
Interest and Invest. Income	0.15%	0.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	0.15%	0.13%	(0.02)%	(0.19)%	(0.12)%
Income/(Loss) from Affiliates	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	6.14%	5.66%	5.22%	3.76%	3.91%
Restructuring Charges	(0.04)%	(0.13)%	(1.47)%	(0.15)%	(0.08)%
Impairment of Goodwill	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Asset Writedown	(0.25)%	0.00%	0.00%	(1.96)%	(3.45)%
Legal Settlements	(0.13)%	0.00%	(0.36)%	0.00%	0.00%
Other Unusual Items	0.23%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	5.98%	5.53%	3.39%	1.63%	0.37%
Income Tax Expense	1.91%	1.75%	1.05%	0.35%	(0.32)%
<b>Earnings from Cont. Ops.</b>	4.06%	3.79%	2.34%	1.28%	0.69%
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Income</b>	4.06%	3.79%	2.34%	1.28%	0.69%
<b>Supplemental Items</b>					
EBITDA	11.30%	10.85%	11.10%	9.90%	10.07%
EBITA	6.00%	5.53%	5.23%	3.97%	4.04%
EBIT	6.00%	5.53%	5.23%	3.95%	4.03%
EBITDAR	16.06%	15.79%	16.09%	15.52%	15.80%
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Advertising Exp.	0.87%	0.88%	0.87%	0.97%	1.11%
General and Administrative Exp.	7.57%	7.81%	7.65%	7.74%	7.88%

## Income Statement

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Jan-01-2006	Dec-31-2006	Dec-30-2007	Dec-28-2008	Jan-03-2010
Net Rental Exp.	4.76%	4.94%	4.99%	5.61%	5.73%
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.06%	0.82%
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.55%	4.91%

## Denny's Corporation (NasdaqCM:DENN)

In Millions of USD, except per share items.

## Income Statement

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec-28-2005	Reclassified Dec-27-2006	Restated Dec-26-2007	Restated Dec-31-2008	Dec-30-2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Cost of Goods Sold	71.11%	70.07%	71.21%	68.32%	65.28%
<b>Gross Profit</b>	28.89%	29.93%	28.79%	31.68%	34.72%
Selling General & Admin. Exp.	9.33%	9.69%	10.10%	11.08%	12.72%
R & D Exp.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Depreciation & Amort.	5.73%	5.56%	5.25%	5.23%	5.32%
Other Operating Expense/(Income)	7.71%	8.21%	7.87%	7.90%	7.09%
<b>Other Operating Exp., Total</b>	22.78%	23.46%	23.22%	24.21%	25.13%
<b>Operating Income</b>	6.11%	6.47%	5.57%	7.47%	9.60%
Interest Expense	(5.80)%	(5.99)%	(4.72)%	(4.83)%	(5.64)%
Interest and Invest. Income	0.17%	0.18%	0.15%	0.17%	0.28%
<b>Net Interest Exp.</b>	(5.64)%	(5.80)%	(4.58)%	(4.67)%	(5.36)%
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.)	0.04%	(0.09)%	(0.06)%	(0.99)%	0.37%
<b>EBT Excl. Unusual Items</b>	0.52%	0.57%	0.93%	1.82%	4.60%
Restructuring Charges	(0.53)%	(0.62)%	(0.73)%	(1.18)%	(0.66)%
Impairment of Goodwill	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Invest.	0.02%	0.05%	0.05%	(0.22)%	0.16%
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets	0.34%	5.71%	4.15%	2.46%	3.20%
Asset Writedown	(0.12)%	(0.27)%	(0.12)%	(0.43)%	(0.16)%
Legal Settlements	(0.85)%	(0.17)%	(0.38)%	(0.30)%	(0.07)%
Other Unusual Items	0.00%	(0.76)%	(0.05)%	0.00%	(0.02)%
<b>EBT Incl. Unusual Items</b>	(0.62)%	4.50%	3.85%	2.14%	7.06%
Income Tax Expense	0.12%	1.48%	0.71%	0.46%	0.23%

(Continued)

Income Statement					
For the Fiscal Period Ending	Reclassified Dec- 28-2005	Reclassified Dec- 27-2006	Restated Dec- 26-2007	Restated Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 30-2009
Earnings from Cont. Ops.	(0.75)%	3.03%	3.14%	1.68%	6.83%
Earnings of Discontinued Ops.	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Extraord. Item & Account. Change	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>(0.75)%</b>	<b>3.05%</b>	<b>3.14%</b>	<b>1.68%</b>	<b>6.83%</b>
<b>Supplemental Operating Expense Items</b>					
Selling and Marketing Exp. General and Administrative Exp.	2.91%	3.01%	2.92%	3.06%	3.30%
Net Rental Exp.	6.43%	6.68%	7.17%	8.02%	9.42%
Imputed Oper. Lease Interest Exp.	5.23%	5.10%	5.32%	6.55%	8.03%
Imputed Oper. Lease Depreciation	4.30%	4.82%	4.68%	5.66%	7.21%
Maintenance & Repair Exp.	0.94%	0.28%	0.64%	0.89%	0.81%
	1.91%	1.84%	1.95%	1.92%	1.63%

4. Does the decision to franchise or to own and operate show up in an analysis of the firm's financial statements?

As of March 17, 2010, **California Pizza Kitchen, Inc. (CPKI)** owned, licensed, or franchised 252 locations in 32 states and 9 foreign countries, of which 205 are company-owned and 47 operate under franchise or license arrangements. The company offers its frozen products to points of distribution through select grocers.

As of December 30, 2009, **Denny's Corporation (DENN)** operated 1,551 restaurants, including 1,318 franchised/licensed restaurants and 233 company-owned and operated restaurants.

As of September 21, 2010, **Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc (CBRL)** operated 595 full-service restaurants and gift shops in 41 states.

As of June 23, 2010, **Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc (CMG)** operated 1,000 restaurants.

As of December 27, 2009, **Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc (BWL D)** owned and operated 232 restaurants; and franchised an additional 420 Buffalo Wild Wings Grill & Bar restaurants in 42 states.

### Discussion

The five companies show a wide range of operational strategies (franchise or own/operate). However, looking at common form Balance Sheet and Income Statements does not give the analyst a clear picture of the implications of these operational decisions.

The five-year average of items selected to highlight the implications of the operational strategies paints a muddled picture.

	CPKI	DENN	CBRL	CMG	BWLD
Net PP&E	79%	49%	75%	72%	55%
Debt Equivalent Operating Leases	75%	104%	35%	80%	73%
Leasehold Improvements	91%	NR	14%	71%	49%
Gross Profit	19%	31%	30%	34%	25%
Net Income	2%	3%	4%	6%	6%
Advertising Expense	1%	3%	2%	1%	3%

The reader must keep in mind that the decision to own and operate versus franchising is only one of the elements of the business model. For example, CBRL includes gift shops in its stores, CPKI has a line of frozen products distributed via grocers, and BWLD serves wine and beer along with food services.

Finally, the leasing arrangements and the franchising agreements have an important and wide-ranging influence in the financial statements. They should be studied as well in order to present a clear picture of the prospects of the firm.

This illustrates one of the main themes of the approach to financial statement analysis we champion in the book; namely, that mere calculation of ratios and trends is the beginning, not the end of the quest.

5. For the three firms listed below, the stage of growth based an analysis of their financial statements are:
  1. L-1 Identity Solutions (ID)

ID is in the growth stage. Sales are increasing at a rapid pace fueled by acquisitions. Operating cash flows are still negligible, and external financing covers most of the investing, which goes to pay for cash acquisitions. Note the large and increasing amounts of goodwill indicating that most of the value of the acquisition comes from intangible capital.

## L-1 Identity Solutions Inc. (NYSE:ID)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Analysis (selected items)				
	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
Total Revenue	66.2	164.4	389.5	562.9	650.9
Gross Profit	23.7	64.7	148.2	192.7	200.1
Selling General & Admin Exp.	19.9	44.4	90.0	123.8	133.9
Net Income	(7.4)	(31.0)	15.8	(551.6)	(4.2)
Cash from Ops.	4.4	12.6	41.0	52.8	60.6
Cash from Investing	(42.9)	(162.4)	(151.9)	(350.9)	(66.2)
Cash from Financing	99.6	82.3	114.1	310.8	(8.5)
Total Debt Issued	0.2	80.0	179.0	295.0	24.9
Total Debt Repaid	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(88.8)	(35.1)
Net Interest Exp.	0.2	0.2	(10.9)	(23.1)	(32.7)
Issuance of Common Stock	99.6	7.2	11.9	109.4	2.6
Capital Expenditure	(4.4)	(6.8)	(13.0)	(22.5)	(55.0)
Depreciation & Amort.	6.3	9.1	9.1	18.1	23.5
Cash Acquisitions	(38.7)	(154.7)	(132.8)	(320.5)	(3.7)
Amort. of Goodwill and Intangibles	6.1	14.3	30.1	31.3	13.6
Total Current Assets	92.9	82.0	137.1	181.3	173.1
Total Current Liabilities	15.4	70.3	96.2	156.9	163.7
Net Property, Plant & Equipment	19.5	19.9	23.5	81.3	115.5
Goodwill	152.2	951.4	1,054.3	891.0	889.8
Other Intangibles	27.3	170.1	184.2	108.3	102.4
Additional Paid in Capital	333.5	1,153.8	1,217.8	1,393.8	1,432.9
Retained Earnings	(56.4)	(87.5)	(69.8)	(623.3)	(627.4)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other	(2.4)	0.7	(63.4)	(71.1)	(69.2)
Total Common Equity	274.7	1,067.1	1,084.7	693.4	730.2



## 2. Aveo Pharmaceuticals (AVEO)

AVEO is in the startup stage. Sales are increasing at an increasing rate. Net Income and Operating Cash Flows are negative. As a pharma/biotech firm, most expenditures are in R&D. Early on the company was financed by issuing debt and preferred stock (Private Equity and/or Venture Capital). In 2010, the company issued an IPO, and the preferred stock was converted to common.

## AVEO Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NasdaqGM:AVEO)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Analysis (selected items)				
	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009	12 months Sep-30-2010
Total Revenue	7.783	11.034	19.66	20.719	38.761
Gross Profit	5.452	9.009	16.824	17.759	36.001
Selling General & Admin Exp.	5.161	6.502	9.165	10.12	12.815
R & D Exp.	24.514	27.223	38.985	48.832	79.573
Net Income	(24.905)	(24.982)	(32.473)	(44.093)	(59.191)
Total Cash & ST Investments	NA	61.742	32.364	51.301	87.022
Net Property, Plant & Equipment	NA	3.727	3.752	4.197	4.488
Total Assets	NA	67.654	40.087	59.844	96.512
Total Current Liabilities	NA	20.803	19.533	34.305	33.515
Cash from Ops.	(21.716)	(8.604)	(35.301)	(9.973)	(57.827)
Cash from Investing	18.917	(39.894)	28.151	3.414	(26.947)
Cash from Financing	12.84	52.834	6.881	31.035	84.636
Total Debt Issued	14.835	0	20.795	0	7.555
Total Debt Repaid	(2.042)	(4.62)	(13.948)	(1.986)	(4.039)
Issuance of Common Stock	0.047	0.078	0.034	0.159	81.12
Issuance of Pref. Stock	0	57.497	0	0	0.063
Total Shares Out. on Balance Sheet Date	1.33	1.434	1.586	1.641	30.935

## 3. United Therapeutics (UTHR)

UTHR is in the established growth stage. Sales are increasing fueled by organic growth. Capital expenditures are significant and growing. Net Income and Operating Cash Flows are becoming positive and significant. Of particular interest is the issuance of debt to repurchase stock, followed by issuance of stock. The mystery is resolved when we bring stock-based compensation into the picture. In what is typical of growth companies, UTHR, attracts high-level executives using stock-based compensation and conserves cash not paid in salaries and bonuses.

## United Therapeutics Corp. (NasdaqGS:UTHR)

*In Millions of USD, except per share items.*

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Analysis				
	Restated Dec- 31-2005	Restated Dec- 31-2006	Restated Dec- 31-2007	Restated Dec- 31-2008	Dec- 31-2009
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>115.9</b>	<b>159.6</b>	<b>210.9</b>	<b>281.5</b>	<b>369.8</b>
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>103.6</b>	<b>142.6</b>	<b>188.7</b>	<b>251.4</b>	<b>324.5</b>
Selling General & Admin Exp.	24.7	54.0	99.0	91.2	172.1
R & D Exp.	36.1	57.6	83.4	89.2	122.2
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>65.0</b>	<b>74.0</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>(49.3)</b>	<b>19.5</b>
<b>Cash from Ops.</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>(49.2)</b>	<b>97.6</b>
<b>Cash from Investing</b>	<b>(70.7)</b>	<b>(101.6)</b>	<b>(21.7)</b>	<b>(172.5)</b>	<b>(160.5)</b>
<b>Cash from Financing</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>74.1</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>213.0</b>	<b>36.5</b>
Capital Expenditure	(6.1)	(15.6)	(38.7)	(124.4)	(95.4)
Depreciation & Amort.	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.9	10.7
Cash Acquisitions	—	—	—	—	(3.6)
Total Debt Issued	—	242.0	—	—	—
Issuance of Common Stock	15.0	14.4	58.3	191.9	32.1
Repurchase of Common Stock	—	(157.7)	(67.1)	—	—
Stock-Based Compensation	1.0	24.1	48.7	28.7	101.0
Tax Benefit from Stock Options	—	(10.8)	(29.6)	(21.1)	(4.4)

## 6. Du Pont Analysis

## Du Pont Analysis of Packaged Foods and Meats

Industry's 2009 Results									
Company Name	Asset Turnover (×)	×	Return on Sales (%)	=	Return on Assets (%)	×	Financial Leverage (×)	=	Return on Equity
Campbell Soup Co. (NYSE:CPB)	1.23		10.65%		13.10%		6.01		78.79%
ConAgra Foods, Inc. (NYSE:CAG)	1.05		6.35%		6.69%		2.32		15.52%
Dean Foods Co. (NYSE:DF)	1.42		2.15%		3.06%		5.80		17.77%
General Mills Inc. (NYSE:GIS)	0.79		11.08%		8.80%		3.05		26.83%
Hershey Co. (NYSE:HSY)	1.44		8.23%		11.86%		5.10		60.51%
HJ Heinz Co. (NYSE:HNZ)	1.02		8.26%		8.42%		5.52		46.48%
Hormel Foods Corp. (NYSE:HRL)	1.76		5.67%		9.99%		1.69		16.86%
Kellogg Company (NYSE:K)	1.12		9.64%		10.82%		4.93		53.35%
Kraft Foods Inc. (NYSE:KFT)	0.61		7.48%		4.53%		2.58		11.67%
McCormick & Co. Inc. (NYSE:MKC)	0.94		9.39%		8.85%		2.54		22.46%
Mead Johnson Nutrition Company (NYSE:MJN)	1.37		14.14%		19.30%		(3.07)		(59.21)%
Sara Lee Corp. (NYSE:SLE)	1.28		6.36%		8.12%		3.61		29.28%
The J. M. Smucker Company (NYSE:SJM)	0.58		10.16%		5.92%		1.51		8.93%
Tyson Foods Inc. (NYSE:TSN)	2.47		(1.03)%		(2.53)%		2.39		(6.05)%

Note that while both Tyson Food and Mead Johnson show negative return on equity, the reasons are very different. Tyson Food's negative ROE is a result of a Loss from Operations, while Mead Johnson's negative ROE is a result of negative (accounting) shareholders' equity.

## Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqCM:ABAT)

Ratios (except as noted)

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>PROFITABILITY</b>					
Return on Assets %	0.6%	22.1%	21.9%	20.2%	9.0%
Return on Capital %	0.7%	23.9%	22.6%	20.6%	10.0%
Return on Equity %	(2.1)%	49.8%	34.2%	28.5%	20.5%
Return on Common Equity %	(2.1)%	49.8%	34.2%	28.5%	20.5%
Gross Margin %	32.9%	55.0%	43.4%	48.8%	44.7%
SG&A Margin %	29.7%	8.7%	7.5%	7.2%	17.5%
EBITDA Margin %	15.9%	48.4%	36.9%	43.3%	30.7%
EBITA Margin %	3.6%	45.7%	35.0%	41.8%	27.5%
EBIT Margin %	3.2%	45.2%	34.8%	41.6%	26.6%
Earnings from Cont. Ops Margin %	(3.7)%	49.2%	32.0%	35.6%	33.6%
Net Income Margin %	(3.7)%	49.2%	32.0%	35.6%	33.6%
<b>ACTIVITY</b>					
Total Asset Turnover	0.3×	0.8×	1.0×	0.8×	0.5×
Fixed Asset Turnover	0.4×	1.3×	2.4×	3.0×	2.0×
Receivable Turnover	4.3×	4.7×	3.0×	2.9×	3.4×
Inventory Turnover	9.2×	17.9×	22.6×	15.9×	13.0×
<b>LIQUIDITY</b>					
Current Ratio	0.5×	8.1×	11.8×	39.5×	17.0×
Quick Ratio	0.3×	5.7×	10.3×	36.8×	14.5×
Avg. Days Sales Out.	84.6	77.2	120.0	124.5	106.6
Avg. Days Inventory Out.	39.6	20.4	16.2	23.0	28.2
Avg. Days Payable Out.	63.8	40.0	10.0	6.3	5.3
Avg. Cash Conversion Cycle	60.4	57.5	126.2	141.2	129.4
<b>LEVERAGE</b>					
Total Debt/Equity	45.3%	1.7%	3.1%	0.0%	2.2%
Total Debt/Capital	27.3%	1.6%	3.0%	0.0%	2.2%
LT Debt/Equity	NA	1.7%	1.1%	NA	NA
LT Debt/Capital	NA	1.6%	1.1%	NA	NA
Total Liabilities/Total Assets	47.0%	5.6%	5.8%	1.7%	16.4%

For the Fiscal Period Ending	Dec-31-2005	Dec-31-2006	Dec-31-2007	Dec-31-2008	Dec-31-2009
<b>COVERAGE</b>					
EBIT / Interest Exp.	0.7×	31.1×	NA	NA	33.7×
EBITDA / Interest Exp.	3.4×	33.3×	NA	NA	39.0×
(EBITDA-CAPEX) / Interest Exp.	NM	32.9×	NA	NA	20.3×
Total Debt/EBITDA	6.1×	0.0×	0.1×	0.0×	0.1×
Net Debt/EBITDA	6.1×	0.0×	NM	NM	NM
Total Debt/ (EBITDA-CAPEX)	NM	0.0×	0.1×	0.0×	0.3×
Net Debt/(EBITDA-CAPEX)	NM	0.0×	NM	NM	NM



# Computational Exercises

## THE ARITHMETIC OF GROWTH VALUATIONS

### Case 1

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$30.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 15 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 25 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 15 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

No dividends for the next five years

		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	30.0		
Growth Rate	15%	1	34.5		
Required Rate	25%	2	39.7		
		3	45.6		
		4	52.5		
		5	60.3	905.1107	296.6
Multiple	15				
Owner's Share	20%				59.3

		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	30.0		
Growth Rate	25%	1	37.5		
Required Rate	25%	2	46.9		
		3	58.6		
		4	73.2		
		5	91.6	1,373.3000	450.0
Multiple	15				
Owner's Share	20%				90.0
				Difference	30.7

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$60.3 million annually. Applying a multiple of 15 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$905.1 million. Investors seeking a 25 percent rate of return will pay \$296.6 million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 20 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$59.3 million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 15 to 25 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$296.6 million to \$450.0 million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$90.0 million, a difference of \$30.7.

## Case 2

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 20 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 22 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 20 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$49.8 million annually. Applying a multiple of 20 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$995.3 million. Investors seeking a 22 percent rate of return will pay \$368.3 million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 40 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$147.3 million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 20 to 18 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$368.3 million to \$338.6 million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$135.4 million, a difference of \$(11.9).

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### No dividends for the next five years

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	Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings	0	20.0		
Growth Rate	20%	1	24.0	
Required Rate	22%	2	28.8	



		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
		3	34.6		
		4	41.5		
Multiple	20	5	49.8	995.3	368.3
Owner's Share	40%				147.3
		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	20.0		
Growth Rate	18%	1	23.6		
Required Rate	22%	2	27.8		
		3	32.9		
		4	38.8		
Multiple	20	5	45.8	915.1	338.6
Owner's Share	40%				135.4
				Difference	(11.9)

### Case 3

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 12 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 25 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 10 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$32.2 million annually. Applying a multiple of 12 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$386.5 million. Investors seeking a 25 percent rate of return will pay \$126.7 million today for that future value.

Say the founder still owns 20 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$25.3 million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 10 to 20 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$126.7 million to \$195.7 million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$39.1 million, a difference of \$13.8.

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 No dividends for the next five years
 

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		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	20.0		
Growth Rate	10%	1	22.0		
Required Rate	25%	2	24.2		
		3	26.6		
		4	29.3		
		5	32.2	386.5	126.7
Multiple	12				
Owner's Share	20%				25.3

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		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	20.0		
Growth Rate	20%	1	24.0		
Required Rate	25%	2	28.8		
		3	34.6		
		4	41.5		
		5	49.8	597.2	195.7
Multiple	12				
Owner's Share	20%				39.1
				Difference	13.8

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**Case 4**

A corporation is currently reporting annual net earnings of \$20.0 million. Assume that five years from now, when its growth has leveled off somewhat, the corporation will be valued at 20 times earnings.

Further assume that the company will pay no dividends over the next five years and that investors in growth stocks currently seek returns of 22 percent (before considering capital gains taxes). Suppose the corporation's earnings have been growing at a 12 percent annual rate and appear likely to continue increasing at the same rate over the next five years.

At the end of that period, earnings (rounded) will be \$35.2 million annually. Applying a multiple of 20 times to that figure produces a valuation at the end of the fifth year of \$704.9 million. Investors seeking a 22 percent rate of return will pay \$260.8 million today for that future value.

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 No dividends for the next five years
 

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		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	20.0		
Growth Rate	12%	1	22.4		

		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Required Rate	22%	2	25.1		
		3	28.1		
		4	31.5		
Multiple	20	5	35.2	704.9	260.8
Owner's Share	40%				104.3

  

		Year	Earnings	Valuation	Present Value
Current Net Earnings		0	20.0		
Growth Rate	18%	1	23.6		
Required Rate	22%	2	27.8		
		3	32.9		
		4	38.8		
Multiple	20	5	45.8	915.1	338.6
Owner's Share	40%				135.4
				Difference	31.1

Say the founder still owns 40 percent of the shares outstanding, which means she is worth \$104.3 million. Suppose investors conclude for some reason that the corporation's potential for increasing its earnings has changed from 12 to 18 percent per annum.

The value of corporation's shares will change from \$260.8 million to \$338.6 million, keeping previous assumptions intact. Now the founder's shares are worth \$135.4 million, a difference of \$31.1.

## **MARKET VALUE VERSUS BOOK VALUE OF BONDS**

This is an example of how a Liability can be an Asset. Long-term bonds that are carried in the books at face value in the Liability side of the balance sheet, are, in fact, an asset when their market value is above their face value.

### **Market Value versus Book Value of Debt**

		Period	Cash Flow	Present Value
Face Value	\$20,000,000	0		
Maturity (Years)	8	1	\$1,212,500	1,124,090

(Continued)

		Period	Cash Flow	Present Value
Coupon Rate	12.125%	2	\$ 1,212,500	1,042,127
Yield	15.730%	3	\$ 1,212,500	966,140
		4	\$ 1,212,500	895,694
Price	\$16,781,355	5	\$ 1,212,500	830,384
		6	\$ 1,212,500	769,836
Bond Price =	\$16,781,355	7	\$ 1,212,500	713,704
Present Value of Coupons	\$10,825,540	8	\$ 1,212,500	661,664
Present Value of Principal	\$ 5,955,815	9	\$ 1,212,500	613,418
	\$16,781,355	10	\$ 1,212,500	568,691
		11	\$ 1,212,500	527,225
Difference	\$ 3,218,645	12	\$ 1,212,500	488,782
		13	\$ 1,212,500	453,142
		14	\$ 1,212,500	420,101
		15	\$ 1,212,500	389,470
		16	\$ 1,212,500	361,071
		16	\$20,000,000	5,955,815
			Bond Price	16,781,355

### Case 1

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$20,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semi-annual coupon rate of 12.125 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 15.730 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is **\$16,781,355** and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is **\$3,218,645**.

### Case 2

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$50,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semi-annual coupon rate of 14.125 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 10.500 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is **\$16,781,355**, and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is **\$(9,649,269)**.

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**Market Value versus Book Value of Debt**


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		Period	Cash Flow	Present Value
Face Value	\$50,000,000	0		
Maturity (Years)	8	1	\$ 3,531,250	3,355,107
Coupon Rate	14.125%	2	\$ 3,531,250	3,187,750
Yield	10.500%	3	\$ 3,531,250	3,028,741
		4	\$ 3,531,250	2,877,664
Price	\$59,649,269	5	\$ 3,531,250	2,734,122
		6	\$ 3,531,250	2,597,741
Bond Price = Present Value	\$59,649,269	7	\$ 3,531,250	2,468,162
of Coupons	\$37,598,876	8	\$ 3,531,250	2,345,047
Present Value of Principal	\$22,050,393	9	\$ 3,531,250	2,228,074
	\$59,649,269	10	\$ 3,531,250	2,116,934
		11	\$ 3,531,250	2,011,339
Difference	\$ (9,649,269)	12	\$ 3,531,250	1,911,011
		13	\$ 3,531,250	1,815,688
		14	\$ 3,531,250	1,725,119
		15	\$ 3,531,250	1,639,068
		16	\$ 3,531,250	1,557,309
		16	\$50,000,000	22,050,393
			Bond Price	59,649,269

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**Case 3**

A firm shows in its books bonds with a face value of \$35,000,000. The bonds were issued at par, with a semi-annual coupon rate of 6.000 percent, and now have eight years to maturity. However, the bonds are now priced to yield 10.000 percent. The market value of this long-term obligation is \$16,781,355, and the difference between the market value and the book value of the bond is \$7,586,439.

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**Market Value versus Book Value of Debt**


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		Period	Cash Flow	Present Value
Face Value	\$35,000,000	0		
Maturity (Years)	8	1	\$ 1,050,000	1,000,000

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(Continued)

		Period	Cash Flow	Present Value
Coupon Rate	6.000%	2	\$ 1,050,000	952,381
Yield	10.000%	3	\$ 1,050,000	907,029
		4	\$ 1,050,000	863,838
Price	\$27,413,561	5	\$ 1,050,000	822,702
		6	\$ 1,050,000	783,526
Bond Price =	\$27,413,561	7	\$ 1,050,000	746,215
Present Value				
of Coupons	\$11,379,658	8	\$ 1,050,000	710,681
Present Value				
of Principal	\$16,033,903	9	\$ 1,050,000	676,839
	\$27,413,561	10	\$ 1,050,000	644,609
		11	\$ 1,050,000	613,913
Difference	\$ 7,586,439	12	\$ 1,050,000	584,679
		13	\$ 1,050,000	556,837
		14	\$ 1,050,000	530,321
		15	\$ 1,050,000	505,068
		16	\$ 1,050,000	481,017
		16	\$35,000,000	16,033,903
			Bond Price	27,413,561

## ACQUISITIONS DRIVEN BY P/E MULTIPLES

### Case 1

Big Time Corp.'s sales increase by 10.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 10.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption ("Acquisition Scenario") show a **15.2 percent** sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at **15.2 percent** a year is sexier than one growing at only 10.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time's profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of **3.0 percent** produces a larger company that also earns **3.0 percent** on sales. Shareholders do not gain anything in the process, as the following figures demonstrate.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from **\$150.0**

million in Year 1 to \$165.0 million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from \$1.20 to \$1.32. With the price-earnings multiple at 12 times, equivalent to the average of the company's industry peers, Big Time's stock price rises from \$14.40 to \$15.84 a share.

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-average earnings multiple of 12 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of \$85.5 million. At Big Time's Year 1 share price of \$14.40, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of 5.9 million shares.

With the addition of Small Change's net income, Big Time earns \$172.9 million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased number of shares outstanding (130.9 million) produces earnings per share of \$1.32. At a price-earnings multiple of 12 times, Big Time is worth \$15.84 a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from 10.0 percent to 15.2 percent has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by 10 percent whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.

Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc.

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Debt	\$1,000.00	\$1,100.00	32.00	\$ 35.20	\$1,000.00	1,032.00
Equity	\$1,000.00	\$1,100.00	25.00	\$ 27.50	\$1,000.00	
Big Time Annual Coupon Rate for Debt	10%					
Small Change Annual Coupon Rate for Debt	15%					
(\$000.000 Omitted)						
Sales	\$5,000.00	\$5,500.00	\$238.10	\$261.90	\$5,000.00	\$5,761.90
Cost and Expenses						
Cost of Goods Sold	3,422.70	3,765.00	160.60	176.70	\$3,422.70	3,941.60
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses	1,250.00	\$1,375.00	61.90	68.10	\$1,250.00	1,443.10

(Continued)

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Interest Expense	100.00	110.00	4.80	5.30	\$ 100.00	115.30
Total Costs and Expenses	4,772.70	5,250.00	227.30	250.00	\$4,772.70	5,500.00
Income before Income Tax Expenses	227.30	250.00	10.80	11.90	\$1,227.30	261.90
Income Taxes	77.30	85.00	3.70	4.00	77.30	89.00
Net Income	\$ 150.00	\$ 165.00	\$ 7.10	7.80	\$ 150.00	\$ 172.90
Year-over-Year Sales Increase		10.00%		10.00%		15.20%
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%
Shares Outstanding (million)	125.00	125.00			125.00	130.90
Earnings per Share	\$ 1.20	\$ 1.32			\$ 1.20	\$ 1.32
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)	12.00	12.00	12.00	12.00	12.00	12.00
Price per Share	\$ 114.40	\$ 15.84			\$ 14.40	\$ 15.84
Year-over-Year Increase		10.00%				10.00%
Market Capitalization	\$1,800.20	\$1,980.20	\$ 85.50	\$ 94.10	\$1,800.20	\$2,074.30
Year-over-Year Increase		10.00%		10.00%		15.00%
Debt/Equity Ratio	55.50%	55.50%	37.40%	37.40%	55.50%	49.80%
Acquisition Price					\$85.50	
Number of Shares					5.90	
taxrate	34%					
growth_rate	10%					
industry_PE_mult	12					

## Case 2

Big Time Corp.'s sales increase by 8.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 8.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own



stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption (“Acquisition Scenario”) show a **13.1 percent** sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at **13.1 percent** a year is sexier than one growing at only 8.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time’s profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of **3.0 percent** produces a larger company that also earns **3.0 percent** on sales. Shareholders do not gain anything in the process, as the following figures demonstrate.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from **\$150.0** million in Year 1 to **\$162.0** million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from **\$1.20** to **\$1.30**. With the price-earnings multiple at 12 times, equivalent to the average of the company’s industry peers, Big Time’s stock price rises from **\$19.20** to **\$20.74** a share.

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-averager earnings multiple of 16 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of **\$114.0** million. At Big Time’s Year 1 share price of **\$19.20**, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of **5.9** million shares. With the addition of Small Change’s net income, Big Time earns **\$169.7** million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased number of shares outstanding (**130.9** million) produces earnings per share of **\$1.30**. At a price-earnings multiple of 16 times, Big Time is worth **\$20.74** a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from 8.0% to **13.1 percent** has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by **8 percent** whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.

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Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc

Debt	\$1,000.00	\$1,080.00	32.00	\$ 34.60	\$1,000.00	1,032.00
Equity	\$1,000.00	\$1,080.00	25.00	\$ 27.00	\$1,000.00	
Big Time Annual						
Coupon Rate for						
Debt	10%					
Small Change						
Annual Coupon						
Rate for Debt	15%					
(\$000.000						
Omitted)						

(Continued)

	Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
	Big Time Corp		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Sales	\$5,000.00	\$5,400.00	\$238.10	\$257.10	\$5,000.00	\$5,657.10
Cost and Expenses						
Cost of Goods Sold	3,422.70	3,696.50	160.60	173.40	\$3,422.70	3,870.00
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses	1,250.00	\$1,350.00	61.90	66.90	\$1,250.00	1,416.90
Interest Expense	100.00	108.00	4.80	5.20	\$ 100.00	113.20
Total Costs and Expenses	4,772.70	5,154.50	227.30	245.50	\$4,772.70	5,400.00
Income before Income Tax Expenses	227.30	245.50	10.80	11.70	\$ 227.30	257.10
Income Taxes	77.30	83.50	3.70	4.00	77.30	87.40
Net Income	\$ 150.00	\$ 162.00	\$ 7.10	7.70	\$1,150.00	\$ 169.70
Year-over-Year Sales Increase		8.00%		8.00%		13.10%
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%
Shares Outstanding (million)	125.00	125.00			125.00	130.90
Earnings per Share	\$ 1.20	\$ 1.30			\$ 1.20	\$ 1.30
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)	16.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	16.00	16.00
Price per Share	\$ 19.20	\$ 20.74			\$ 19.20	\$ 20.74
Year-over-Year Increase		8.00%				8.00%
Market Capitalization	\$2,400.30	\$2,592.30	\$114.00	\$123.20	\$2,400.30	\$2,715.50
Year-over-Year Increase		8.00%		8.00%		13.00%
Debt/Equity Ratio	41.70%	41.70%	28.10%	28.10%	41.70%	8.00%
Acquisition Price					\$114.00	
Number of Shares					5.90	
taxrate	34%					
Growth rate	8%					
industry_PE_mult.	16					

**Case 3**

Big Time Corp.’s sales increase by 16.0 percent between Year 1 and Year 2. Small Change, a smaller, privately owned company in the same industry, also achieves 16.0 percent year-over-year sales growth. Suppose now that at the end of Year 1, Big Time acquires Small Change with shares of its own stock. The Big Time income statements under this assumption (“Acquisition Scenario”) show a **21.5 percent** sales increase between Year 1 and Year 2.

On the face of it, a company growing at **21.5 percent** a year is sexier than one growing at only 16.0 percent a year. Observe, however, that Big Time’s profitability, measured by net income as a percentage of sales, does not improve as a result of the acquisition. Combining two companies with equivalent profit margins of **3.0 percent** produces a larger company that also earns **3.0 percent** on sales. Shareholders do not gain anything in the process, as the figures below demonstrate.

If Big Time decides not to acquire Small Change, its number of shares outstanding remains at 125.0 million. The earnings increase from **\$150.0** million in Year 1 to **\$174.0** million in Year 2 raises earnings-per-share from **\$1.20** to **\$1.39**. With the price-earnings multiple at 24 percent times, equivalent to the average of the company’s industry peers, Big Time’s stock price rises from **\$28.80** to **\$33.41** a share.

In the Acquisition Scenario, on the other hand, Big Time pays its industry-average earnings multiple of 24 times for Small Change, for a total acquisition price of **\$171.1** million. At Big Time’s Year 1 share price of **\$28.80**, the purchase therefore requires the issuance of **\$5.9** million shares. With the addition of Small Change’s net income, Big Time earns **\$182.3** million in Year 2. Dividing that figure by the increased number of shares outstanding (**130.9** million) produces earnings per share of **\$1.39**. At a price-earnings multiple of 24 times, Big Time is worth **\$33.41** a share, precisely the price calculated in the Non-Acquisition Scenario.

The mere increase in annual sales growth from 16.0 percent to 21.5 percent has not benefited shareholders, whose shares increase in value by **16 percent** whether Big Time acquires Small Change or not.

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Acquisitions Driven by P/E Multiples  
Big Time Corp. and Small Change Inc.

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Debt	\$1,000.00	\$1,160.00	32.00	\$ 37.60	\$1,000.00	1,032.00
Equity	\$1,000.00	\$1,160.00	25.00	\$ 29.00	\$1,000.00	
Big Time Annual						
Coupon Rate for						
Debt	10%					

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(Continued)

Small Change Annual Coupon Rate for Debt      15%		Non-Acquisition Scenario				Acquisition Scenario	
(\$000.000 Omitted)		Big Time Corp		Small Change Inc.		Big Time Corp	
		Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Sales		\$5,000.00	\$5,800.00	\$238.10	\$276.20	\$5,000.00	\$6,076.20
<b>Cost and Expenses</b>							
Cost of Goods Sold		3,422.70	3,970.30	160.60	186.30	\$3,422.70	4,156.60
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses		1,250.00	\$1,450.00	61.90	71.80	\$1,250.00	1,521.80
Interest Expense		100.00	116.00	4.80	5.60	\$ 100.00	121.60
Total Costs and Expenses		4,772.70	5,536.30	227.30	263.70	\$4,772.70	5,800.00
Income before Income Tax Expenses		227.30	263.70	10.80	12.50	\$ 227.30	276.20
Income Taxes		77.30	89.60	3.70	4.30	77.30	93.90
Net Income		\$ 150.00	\$ 174.00	\$ 7.10	8.30	\$ 150.00	\$ 182.30
Year-over-Year Sales Increase			16.00%		16.00%		21.50%
Net Income as a Percentage of Sales		3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%
Shares Outstanding (million)		125.00	125.00			125.00	130.90
Earnings per Share		\$ 1.20	\$ 1.39			\$ 11.20	\$ 1.39
Price-Earnings Multiple (times)		24.00	24.00	24.00	24.00	24.00	24.00
Price per Share		\$ 28.80	\$ 33.41			\$ 28.80	\$ 33.41
Year-over-Year Increase			16.00%				16.00%
Market Capitalization		\$3,600.40	\$4,176.50	\$171.10	\$198.40	\$3,600.40	\$4,374.90
Year-over-Year Increase			16.00%		16.00%		22.00%
Debt/Equity Ratio		27.80%	27.80%	18.70%	18.70%	27.80%	23.60%
Acquisition Price						\$171.10	
Number of Shares						5.90	
taxrate	34%						
growth_rate	16%						
industry_PE_ mult	24						

## STOCK PRICES AND GOODWILL

### Case 1

The shares of Amalgamator and Consolidator are both trading at multiples of 2.5 times book value per share. Shareholders' equity is \$200 million at Amalgamators and \$60 million at Consolidator. Amalgamator uses stock held in its treasury to acquire Consolidator for \$263 million.

The purchase price represents a premium of 75 percent above the prevailing market price. Prior to the acquisition, Amalgamator's ratio of total assets to total liabilities is 1.25 times, while the comparable figure for Consolidator is 1.18 times.

The total-assets-to-total-liabilities ratio after the deal is 1.41 times. By paying a premium to Consolidator's tangible asset value, Amalgamator creates \$203 million of goodwill.

### Case 2

As the scene opens, an explosive stock market rally has driven up both companies' shares to 4.5 times book value. The ratio of total assets to total liabilities, however, remains at 1.25 times for Amalgamator and 1.18 times for Consolidator. As in Case 1, Amalgamator pays a premium of 75 percent above the prevailing market price to acquire Consolidator.

The premium is calculated on a higher market capitalization, however. Consequently, the purchase price rises from \$263 million to \$473 million. Instead of creating \$203 million of goodwill, the acquisition gives rise to a \$413 million intangible asset. Somehow, putting together a company boasting a 1.25 times ratio with another sporting a 1.18 times ratio has produced an entity with a ratio of 1.59 times.

Now, let us exclude goodwill in calculating the ratio of assets to liabilities. Amalgamator's ratio of tangible assets to total liabilities following its acquisition of Consolidator is 1.23 times in both Case 1 and Case 2. This is the outcome that best reflects economic reality.

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*
Case 1				
Tangible Assets	1,000	400		1,400
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0		203

(Continued)

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*		
Total Assets	1,000	400		1,603		
Liabilities	800	340		1,140	Premium	75%
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	200	60	263	463		
Total Liabilities and SE	1,000	400		1,603	Multiple	2.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.25	1.18		1.41		
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.25	1.18		1.23		
Market Capitalization	500	150		1,156		
Case 2						
Tangible Assets	1,000	400		1,400		
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0		413		
Total Assets	1,000	400		1,813	Premium	75%
Liabilities	800	340		1,140		
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	200	60	473	673		
Total Liabilities and SE	1,000	400		1,813	Rally Multiple	4.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.25	1.18		1.59		
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.25	1.18		1.23		
Market Capitalization	900	270		3,026		

\*Ignores possible impact of EPS dilution.

**Case 3**

The shares of Amalgamator and Consolidator are both trading at multiples of 1.5 times book value per share. Shareholders' equity is \$400 million at Amalgamators and \$260 million at Consolidator. Amalgamator uses stock held in its treasury to acquire Consolidator for \$527 million.

The purchase price represents a premium of 35.00 percent above the prevailing market price. Prior to the acquisition, Amalgamator's ratio of total assets to total liabilities is 1.50 times, while the comparable figure for Consolidator is 1.76 times.

The total-assets-to-total-liabilities ratio after the deal is 1.81 times. By paying a premium to Consolidator's tangible asset value, Amalgamator creates \$267 million of goodwill.

**Case 4**

As the scene opens, an explosive stock market rally has driven up both companies' shares to 3.5 times book value. The ratio of total assets to total liabilities, however, remains at 1.50 times for Amalgamator and 1.76 times for Consolidator. As in Case 3, Amalgamator pays a premium of 35.00 percent above the prevailing market price to acquire Consolidator.

The premium is calculated on a higher market capitalization, however. Consequently, the purchase price rises from \$527 million to \$1,229 million. Instead of creating \$267 million of goodwill, the acquisition gives rise to a \$969 million intangible asset. Somehow, putting together a company boasting a 1.50 times ratio with another sporting a 1.76 times ratio has produced an entity with a ratio of 2.43 times.

Now, let us exclude goodwill in calculating the ratio of assets to liabilities. Amalgamator's ratio of tangible assets to total liabilities following its acquisition of Consolidator is 1.58 times in both Case 3 and Case 4. This is the outcome that best reflects economic reality.

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*
Case 3				
Tangible Assets	1,200	600		1,800
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0		266.5
Total Assets	1,200	600		2,067

*(Continued)*

	United Amalgamators Corporation	United Consolidators Inc.	Purchase Price	Combined Companies Pro Forma*		
Liabilities	800	340		1,140	Premium	35%
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	400	260	527	927		
Total Liabilities and SE	1,200	600		2,067	Multiple	1.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.5	1.76		1.81		
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.5	1.76		1.58		
Market Capitalization	600	390		1,390		
Case 4 Tangible Assets	1,200	600		1,800		
Intangible Assets (Goodwill)	0	0		969		
Total Assets	1,200	600		2,769	Premium	35%
Liabilities	800	340		1,140		
Shareholders' Equity (SE)	400	260	1,229	1,629		
Total Liabilities and SE	1,200	600		2,769	Rally	3.5
Total Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.5	1.76		2.43		
Tangible Assets/ Total Liabilities	1.5	1.76		1.58		
Market Capitalization	1,400	910		5,700		

\*Ignores possible impact of EPS dilution.



**PROJECTING INTEREST EXPENSE**

Colossal Chemical Corporation (\$000,000 omitted)			
<b>Long-Term Debt (Excluding current maturities)</b>			
		2010	2011
Notes Payable			
Due Dates	Rate		
2012	12.000%	82	44
2013	7.500%	56	80
Debentures			
Due Dates			
2018	12.500%	55	55
2020	10.875%	120	120
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	5.875%	40	40
		\$353	\$339
(\$000,000 omitted)			

2010 Amount	2011 Amount	÷ 2 =	Average Amount Outstanding	@Rate =	Estimated Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt
82	44	2 =	63	12.000% =	\$ 7.560
56	80	2 =	68	7.500% =	\$ 5.100
55	55	2 =	55	12.500% =	\$ 6.875
120	120	2 =	120	10.875% =	\$13.050
40	40	2 =	40	5.875% =	\$ 2.350
Total			346		\$34.935
Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt			Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding		Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt
\$34.935		÷	\$346	=	10.100%

**Colossal Chemical Corporation**  
(\$000,000 omitted)

**Long-Term Debt**  
(Excluding  
current  
maturities)

		2010	2011
Notes Payable			
Due Dates	Rate		
2012	9.500%	96	65
2013	9.750%	65	90
Debentures			
Due Dates			
2018	11.880%	50	60
2020	12.125%	90	90
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	5.125%	60	60
		\$361	\$365

(\$000,000 omitted)

2010 Amount	2011 Amount	÷2 =	Average Amount Outstanding	@Rate =	Estimated Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt
96	65	2 =	80.5	9.500% =	\$ 7.648
65	90	2 =	77.5	9.750% =	\$ 7.556
50	60	2 =	55	11.875% =	\$ 6.531
90	90	2 =	90	12.125% =	\$10.913
60	60	2 =	60	5.125% =	\$ 3.075
Total			363		\$35.723

Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt	Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding	=	Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt
\$35.723	÷	\$363	= 9.840%

Colossal Chemical Corporation  
(\$000,000 omitted)

Long-Term Debt  
(Excluding  
current  
maturities)

	2010		2011
Notes Payable			
Due Dates	Rate		
2012	6.600%	55	75
2013	5.750%	40	60
Debentures			
Due Dates			
2018	10.250%	90	90
2020	9.125%	75	75
Industrial Development Bonds			
2023	8.500%	80	80
		\$340	\$380

(\$000,000 omitted)

	2011			Average Amount			Estimated	
2010 Amount	Amount	÷	2	=	Outstanding	@Rate	=	Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt
55	75	2	=	65	6.600%	=	\$ 4.290	
40	60	2	=	50	5.750%	=	\$ 2.875	
90	90	2	=	90	10.250%	=	\$ 9.225	
75	75	2	=	75	9.125%	=	\$ 6.844	
80	80	2	=	80	8.500%	=	\$ 6.800	
Total				360			\$30.034	

Interest Charges on Long-Term Debt			Average Amount of Total Long-Term Debt Outstanding			Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt
\$30.034		÷	\$360	=		8.340%

## **SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN FORECASTING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS**

### Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement

Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case	1% Increase in Gross Margin	1% Decline in Tax Rate	5% Increase in Sales
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,216
Cost of goods sold	1,161	1,139	1,161	1,219
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528	\$ 528	\$ 528	\$ 554
Depreciation	121	121	121	121
Research and development	84	84	84	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>	<u>1,872</u>	<u>1,893</u>	<u>1,977</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217	\$ 238	\$ 217	\$ 238
Interest expense	34	34	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188	\$ 209	\$ 188	\$ 209
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 64</u>	<u>\$ 71</u>	<u>\$ 62</u>	<u>\$ 71</u>
Net Income	<u>\$ 124</u>	<u>\$ 138</u>	<u>\$ 126</u>	<u>\$ 138</u>
Growth Sales	0%	0%	0%	5%
CGS as % of Sales	55%	54%	55%	55%
SG&A % of Sales	25%	25%	25%	25%
Taxrate	34%	34%	33%	34%

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**Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement**


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Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

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	Base Case	1% Increase in Gross Margin	1% Decline in Tax Rate	5% Decrease in Sales
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,005
Cost of goods sold	1,161	1,118	1,161	1,102
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528	\$ 528	\$ 528	\$ 501
Depreciation	121	121	121	121
Research and development	84	84	84	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>	<u>1,851</u>	<u>1,893</u>	<u>1,809</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217	\$ 259	\$ 217	\$ 196
Interest expense	34	34	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188	\$ 230	\$ 188	\$ 167
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 64</u>	<u>\$ 78</u>	<u>\$ 62</u>	<u>\$ 57</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 124</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 152</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 126</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 110</u></u>

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**Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected  
Income Statement**

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**Colossal Chemical Corporation**  
**Year Ended December 31, 2011**  
(\$000,000 omitted)

Change in Sales Growth 5%  
Change in Gross Margin (2)%  
Change in SG&A % Sales 5%  
Taxrate (2)%

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	Base Case	Forecast
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,216
Cost of goods sold	1,161	1,174
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 528	\$ 665
Depreciation	121	121
Research and development	<u>84</u>	<u>84</u>
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,893</u>	<u>2,044</u>
Operating Income	\$ 217	\$ 172
Interest expense	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 188	\$ 143
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 64</u>	<u>\$ 46</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 124</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 97</u></u>
Growth Sales		5%
CGS as % of Sales	55%	53%
SG&A % of Sales	25%	30%
Taxrate	34%	32%

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## Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement

Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

	Base Case	1% Increase in Gross Margin	1% Decline in Tax Rate	5% Increase in Sales
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,216
Cost of goods sold	1,477	1,456	1,477	1,551
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 253	\$ 253	\$ 253	\$ 266
Depreciation	121	121	121	121
Research and development	84	84	84	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,935</u>	<u>1,914</u>	<u>1,935</u>	<u>2,022</u>
Operating Income	\$ 175	\$ 196	\$ 175	\$ 194
Interest expense	34	34	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 146	\$ 167	\$ 146	\$ 165
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 50</u>	<u>\$ 57</u>	<u>\$ 48</u>	<u>\$ 56</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 96</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 110</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 98</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 109</u></u>
Growth Sales	0%	0%	0%	5%
CGS as % of Sales	70%	69%	70%	70%
SG&A % of Sales	12%	12%	12%	12%
Taxrate	34%	34%	33%	34%

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**Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement**


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Colossal Chemical Corporation  
Year Ended December 31, 2011  
(\$000,000 omitted)

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	Base Case	2% Increase in Gross Margin	2% Decline in Tax Rate	5% Increase in Sales
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,110	\$2,216
Cost of goods sold	1,477	1,350	1,393	1,462
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 253	\$ 317	\$ 317	\$ 332
Depreciation	121	121	121	121
Research and development	84	84	84	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,935</u>	<u>1,872</u>	<u>1,914</u>	<u>2,000</u>
Operating Income	\$ 175	\$ 238	\$ 196	\$ 216
Interest expense	34	34	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 146	\$ 209	\$ 167	\$ 187
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 50</u>	<u>\$ 71</u>	<u>\$ 53</u>	<u>\$ 64</u>
Net Income	<u><u>\$ 96</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 138</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 113</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 123</u></u>
Growth Sales	0%	0%	0%	5%
CGS as % of Sales	70%	64%	66%	66%
SG&A % of Sales	12%	15%	15%	15%
Taxrate	34%	34%	32%	34%

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 Impact of Changes in Selected Assumptions on Projected Income Statement
 

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 Colossal Chemical Corporation  
 Year Ended December 31, 2011  
 (\$000,000 omitted)
 

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	Base Case	Forecast
Sales	\$2,110	\$2,216
Cost of goods sold	1,477	1,507
Selling, general, and administrative expense	\$ 253	\$ 377
Depreciation	121	121
Research and development	84	84
Total costs and expenses	<u>1,935</u>	<u>2,088</u>
Operating Income	\$ 175	\$ 127
Interest expense	34	34
Interest (income)	<u>(5)</u>	<u>(5)</u>
Earnings before Income Taxes	\$ 146	\$ 98
Provision for Income Taxes	<u>\$ 50</u>	<u>\$ 31</u>
Net Income	<u>\$ 96</u>	<u>\$ 67</u>
Growth Sales		5%
CGS as % of Sales	70%	68%
SG&A % of Sales	12%	17%
taxrate	34%	32%

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